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Introduction
I.1 Introduction
The successful identification of key policies that foster economic growth and develop-
ment makes it possible to implement optimal growth strategies that could cut world
poverty, affect income inequalities across countries, and improve the standards of liv-
ing of individuals.1 However, we implicitly need to solve a closely related puzzle first
in order to be prepared to define the scope of such policies: Why do some countries
grow and others stagnate?
The Science magazine considers this question as one of the 125 “most compelling
puzzles and questions facing scientists today” (Science magazine (2005)). While the
importance to identify the key determinants of economic growth and development is
obvious, a unified theory that matches empirical facts is still missing. Instead, the
emergence of endogenous growth theory since the early 90s induced a vast strand of
literature covering numerous potential determinants of economic growth ranging from
macroeconomic policies over trade and industrial policies to deep-seated institutional
factors, and initial conditions. Clearly, policymakers have direct control over some of
these factors, but only limited (long-term) or no control over others.
If we have a closer look at the empirical part of the literature, the overall picture
still remains puzzling. In particular, Summers (2003) suggests three main ingredients
for growth: (i) economic integration through trade and investment, (ii) maintenance
of sustainable government finances and sound money, and (iii) an institutional en-
vironment in favor of contract enforcements and property rights. He concludes: “I
would challenge anyone to identify a country that has done all three of these things
and has not grown at a substantial rate” (Summers, 2003). Indeed, this policy mix
1Various studies confirm that conventional measures of standards of living, e.g. health, literacy,
life expectancy, etc., are highly correlated with per capita income levels across countries as well as
over time (compare, e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995)). Moreover, Rodrik (2005) illustrates that
disparities in income across countries account for the bulk of global disparities.
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appears to be intuitively appealing. Yet, Rodrik (2005) illustrates that corresponding
inferences for policy implications are not generally consistent with empirical facts.
Figure 1 shows that Latin American countries experienced sustained growth during
the 1960s and 1970s which represent periods of import substitution policies (high bar-
riers to trade and capital flows) - e.g. El Salvador undertook tremendous reforms since
1989 in favor of macroeconomic stabilization, trade liberalization and private sector
deregulations without achieving higher growth (see Figure 2). In contrast, Figure 3
illustrates that economic growth took off in India in the early 1980s while economic
reforms did not take place before 1991. Instead, the initial growth take-off was pre-
ceded by substantial public investments in infrastructure in the late 1970s and early
1980s as well as a gradual shift towards a more “business-friendly” policy environment
at that time.2 Table 1 denote that China, Vietnam, India and Uganda have experi-
enced tremendous growth during the 1990s in the presence of major barriers to trade
and capital flows.3 Moreover, the index of overall property rights from the Frasier
Institute of Economic Freedom reports for China a index number of 6.8 in 1985 and
4.9 in 2000 which is below the one of Mali, Iran, Panama or Romania.
Consequently, it appears that we need to take some care in isolating growth-
enhancing strategies and keep in mind to incorporate country-specific conditions ac-
curately. Nevertheless, recent advances in development accounting are pointing the
way for future research. Caselli (2005) provides a comprehensive survey and various
robustness checks of contributions in development accounting. He concludes that fluc-
tuations in factor accumulation (labor, physical and human capital) account only for
1/3 of the fluctuations of income across countries. Thus, the bulk of international in-
come differences is due to variations in total factor productivity (TFP). It follows that
a successful theory needs to explain why some countries experience high productivity
growth while others lag behind.
Indeed, a closer look at some case studies supports the pivotal role of TFP-growth
as an engine of overall growth in GDP per capita. Figure 1 clearly indicates that vari-
ations in the growth rate of GDP per capita in Latin America from 1960 until 2000
are primarily due to variations in TFP-growth. The periods of high sustained growth
in the 1960s and 1970s comply with periods of high TFP-growth, while the large de-
crease in GDP-growth in the 1980s is accompanied by a sharp drop in productivity.
Moreover, Figure 3 shows that growth in India is driven primarily by TFP-growth.
2See Rodrik (2005) for a more detailed description of the growth take-off in India.
3In particular, China and Vietnam achieved sustained growth in the absence of trade liberaliza-
tions or enhancements of property rights since almost three decades.
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In particular, Figure 5 and 6 reveal that before 1980, states with a lot of manufactur-
ing activity performed generally poorly, while thereafter, growth is driven primarily
by manufacturing intensive states. Figure 4 illustrates that TFP-growth is also the
primary source of China’s ’growth-takeoff’.
The theories of endogenous growth, initiated by Romer (1990), Grossman and Help-
man (1991), and Aghion and Howitt (1992), are able to explain TFP differences due
to differences in the rate of technological progress across countries. They disclose the-
oretical mechanisms that provide incentives for firms to invest in innovative activities.
These induce new technologies or technology spill-overs. Thus, they explain endoge-
nous technical change which determines the course of TFP-growth in the long-run. It
follows that a theory of TFP needs to explain why some countries are more successful
in developing or adopting new technologies than others.4 Several causes have been
considered to induce such differences: the quality of institutions (e.g. Acemoglu et al.
(2002), Parente and Prescott (1999)), the openness to trade (e.g. Eaton and Kortum
(2002)), or the degree of financial development (e.g. Aghion et al. (2005)).
In the following, we provide supplementary approaches that help explain the incen-
tives for firms to invest in innovative activities by accounting for the interdependence
between different micro- and macroeconomic factors. We consider three complemen-
tary models which suggest new mechanisms that contribute to the explanation of
differences in TFP-growth across countries and over time. The first two reveal mi-
croeconomic mechanisms that allow for an impact of monetary policy and public
infrastructure investments on firm-level technology choices, respectively. The third
model demonstrates that part of the differences in TFP-growth across countries have
to be attributed to differences in the distribution of capital and labor across firms.
In all cases, we provide detailed empirical evidence that is consistent with the pre-
dictions of the corresponding models based on cross-country, industry, and firm-level
panel data. All approaches provide guidance in which way public policymakers can
influence the course of long-run productivity growth.
The first chapter analyzes the impact of infrastructure capital on different sources
of economic growth. The conventional literature, which is based on the growth model
of Barro (1990), predicts that infrastructure investments induce private capital accu-
mulation. However, we do not find an empirical link between (telecommunication)
infrastructure and the accumulation of physical or human capital in a dynamic panel
of 36 relatively developed countries from 1970 until 2000. This negative finding is con-
4See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997), Howitt (2000), or Caselli and Coleman (2005) for theoretical
contributions to international technology diffusion and technological catch-up.
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firmed by disaggregated panel data as we detect that U.S. firms do not increase capital
investments in periods of higher aggregate infrastructure investments. In contrast, we
demonstrate a link between infrastructure capital and the rate of technological change
in the country as well as the firm panel.5 We employ a threefold strategy to address
the problem of a potential endogeneity of the infrastructure variable.6 First, we rely
on internal instrumental variables as suggested by Blundell and Bond (1998). Sec-
ond, we alternatively include demographic variables as external instruments which
has been suggested by Canning (1999) and Calderon and Serven (2005). Third, the
mix of macro- and microeconomic variables allows for an inspection of causality in the
firm panel. Our empirical findings challenge the predictions of conventional models
on infrastructure and growth. Therefore, we provide an alternative theoretical mecha-
nism that justifies an impact of infrastructure capital on firm-level technology choices.
In particular, we develop an extended R&D growth model, which emphasizes a cost-
reducing feature of infrastructure capital, to demonstrate a potential link between the
level of infrastructure capital and endogenous technological change. Finally, we show
that the link between infrastructure and R&D can lead to multiple balanced growth
pathes if we endogenize the provision of infrastructure capital. That is, countries or
regions with a low initial infrastructure capital stock suffer from little R&D invest-
ments which in turn result in a low level of output. The latter implies a low demand
for infrastructure services and hence little infrastructure investments. The long-run
balanced growth rate is still strictly positive in this “low-growth scenario”, but it is
also strictly dominated by the growth rate in a “high growth scenario”.
In the second chapter, we show that inflation reduces long-run productivity growth
if financial markets are incomplete. This result is presented by means of an endogenous
growth model whose key ingredients are (i) a nominal short-run portfolio choice for
households, (ii) an agency problem which gives rise to financial market incompleteness,
(iii) a firm-level technology choice between a return-dominated but secure and a more
productive but risky project. In this framework, we show that it is optimal for firms
to hold nominal corporate liquidity (i.e. cash and marketable securities) in order to
partly insure against investments in risky projects. Accordingly, inflation involves
a costs for nominal corporate insurance and hence induces an additional cost of the
productive relative to the return-dominated investment project. Thus, inflation causes
5The rate of technological change is approximated by investments in R&D and the growth rate
of TFP.
6Moreover, we include several corporate and aggregate control variables in the estimation speci-
fications to reduce the potential for an omitted variable bias.
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long-run real effects in the aggregate due to a link from the short-run interplay between
nominal and financial frictions to a firm’s qualitative investment portfolio. It follows
that economies (time periods) that feature a higher level of inflation are predicted to
exhibit lower TFP-growth in the long-run. We confirm the robustness of this aggregate
empirical relationship by means of country panel data. Moreover, our theoretical
approach generates several model-specific predictions which are confirmed by U.S.
industry as well as firm-level panel data. Most importantly, we find that (i) firms
insure systematically against risky R&D investments by means of corporate liquidity
holdings and (ii) periods of higher inflation restrain firm-level R&D investments by
reducing corporate liquidity holdings. Thus, the disaggregated U.S. data support the
empirical relevance of our specific microeconomic mechanism.
The third chapter presents a growth model for an economy consisting of firms
which are heterogeneous in technologies and input demands. This framework makes
it possible to capture the effects of the distribution of input factors among firms
on economic growth. We show that the growth rate in this economy depends not
only on changes in the aggregate level of capital and labor, but also on changes in
the allocation of these inputs across firms. As the latter effects are neglected in
conventional growth models, they are misleadingly captured by the residual TFP
measure. In contrast, we are able to quantify the influence of these components.
Our empirical analysis, which is based on structural estimation from firm-level data,
reveals that changes in allocation of capital and labor have pronounced effects on
GDP-growth for most European countries. Further, we take cross-country differences
in the distributional effects into account to improve conventional growth accounting
exercises. In particular, we find that they explain additionally up to 17% of growth
differences among 19 European countries. Consequently, allowing for heterogeneity
in firm-level technologies and input demands increases the explanatory power of the
inputs.
The next three chapters each present one idea as a self-contained unit.
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Table 1: World Bank’s ’Star Globalizers’
Country Growth rate in the 1990s Trade policies
China 7.1% Average tariff rate 31.2%,
national trade barriers,
not a WTO member
Vietnam 5.1% Tariffs range between 30− 50%,
national trade barriers and state trading,
not a WTO member
India 3.3% Tariffs average 50.5% (2. highest in the world)
Uganda 3.0% Moderate reform
Source: Collier and Dollar (2001: 6)
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Figure 1: Sources of growth in Latin America
Figure 2: El Salvador - failure of institutional reforms
7
Figure 3: India’s growth takeoff
Figure 4: China’s ’growth-takeoff’: The change in infrastructure stocks and TFP-
growth
8
Figure 5: Growth and manufacturing across Indian states before 1980
Figure 6: Growth and manufacturing across Indian states after 1980
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Chapter 1
Calling for innovations -
infrastructure and sources of
growth
This chapter analyzes the impact of infrastructure capital on different
sources of economic growth. Starting with the contribution of Barro
(1990), the literature on infrastructure and growth mainly focuses on the
relationship between private and public capital investments. In contrast,
we demonstrate a link between (telecommunication) infrastructure capital
and endogenous technological change in the context of an dynamic panel
estimation applying aggregate country- as well as U.S. firm-level data.
The main empirical finding is that the increase in telecommunication in-
frastructure during the last 30 years enhanced R&D investments but did
not affect the accumulation of physical or human capital in our sample.
Moreover, we provide an extended R&D growth model, which emphasizes
a cost-reducing feature of infrastructure capital, to demonstrate a potential
link between the level of infrastructure capital and endogenous technolog-
ical change. Finally, we show that the link between infrastructure and
R&D can lead to multiple balanced growth pathes if we endogenize the
provision of infrastructure capital.
1.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we analyze the effect of (telecommunication) infrastructure capital on
different sources of economic growth. That is, we investigate whether infrastructure
investments influence the accumulation of input factors, such as private and human
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capital, or total factor productivity (TFP) and R&D.
Several recent empirical contributions report a positive causal relationship between
infrastructure and GDP-growth for different regions and time periods.1 The main
empirical challenge in these studies is the identification of cause and effects between
infrastructure and growth. Fernald (1999) shows that the rise in road services sub-
stantially increased the productivity (TFP) across industry in the U.S. from 1953 to
1973.2 The author employs an implicit test for endogeneity by showing that produc-
tivity growth is above average in vehicle intensive industries. Roeller and Waverman
(2001) formulate a structural model for the supply and demand of telecommunication
infrastructure to separate cause and effects on aggregate production.3 They find large
positive effects of telecommunication investments on economic growth in a panel of
21 OECD countries from 1970-90. Belaid (2004) confirms the results for a panel of
37 developing countries from 1985-2000. Finally, Calderon and Serven (2005) apply
an instrumental variables approach to estimate a positive causal effect of different
infrastructure measures on GDP-growth in a panel of 121 countries from 1960-2000.
These studies highlight the importance of infrastructure investments to foster eco-
nomic growth and development. However, little is known about the explicit role of
infrastructure capital in the production process. Does it represent an additional input
factor in the production function or does it influence the technology with which other
inputs are combined? In other words, are infrastructure investments a complementary
input factor to private and human capital accumulation or do they trigger technical
change by affecting incentives for R&D? In the first case, infrastructure investments
feature temporary growth effects in the presence of fixed input factors (e.g. labor)
1Gramlich (1994) or Holtz-Eakin and Schwartz (1994) survey the earlier empirical literature on
infrastructure and growth.
2He measures a rate of return of 100% before 1973 and a negative rate from 1973-89. To put it
in the words of Fernald (1999): “the interstate highway system was very productive, but a second
one would not be”.
3The identification of cause and effects crucially hinges on the specification of demand and supply
functions and the conformance of price elasticities across the OECD countries.
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while in the second they improve the efficiency of all other input factors and hence
long-run productivity growth. The corresponding policy implications differ substan-
tially in both settings. Moreover, in the former scenario, infrastructure capital is
expected to reflect a crucial growth determinant mainly in less developed countries
with shortages of physical capital, while it appears to be less important in R&D
driven more advanced economies. In this regard, note that the empirical evidence
above refers to developed as well as developing countries.4 Against this background,
the present chapter attempts to specify the mechanism that links infrastructure cap-
ital to economic growth in relatively developed countries by accounting for different
sources of economic growth.
Most part of the theoretical literature on infrastructure and growth suggests that
the provision of infrastructure affects economic growth by interacting simultaneously
with private capital investments. This literature is substantially influenced by the
work of Barro (1990). This approach lumps together private and infrastructure capi-
tal with intellectual capital that is accumulated by technological progress. Thus, it is
implicitly assumed that (broader) capital accumulation, which is studied by neoclas-
sical theory, and technological knowledge are one and the same. In particular, Barro
(1990) assumes a Cobb-Douglas production function that features constant returns
to scale for the accumulation of private and infrastructure capital because part of
this broader capital accumulation is supposed to reflect technological progress needed
to counteract diminishing returns. It follows that infrastructure or private capital
investments feature not only level but also growth effects in the long-run which are
only limited due to a financing by distortional taxes. The key assumption underlying
the Barro (1990) model is the link from infrastructure investments to private capital
accumulation. This approach has been generalized in several ways. Turnovsky (1997)
accounts for public capital which is subject to congestion, Kosempel (2004) for the
4Roeller and Waverman (2001) and Belaid (2004) quantify substantial elasticities of GDP with
respect to telephones per 1000 workers for advance (0.45) and developing countries (0.5) for similar
time periods using identical estimation techniques.
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case of finitely lived households, Turnovsky (2000) for an elastic labor supply, and
Ghosh and Mourmouras (2002) for an open-economy framework. An alternative ap-
proach is followed by Bougheas et al. (2000) who show that infrastructure investments
increase an economy’s degree of specialization.
The empirical part of our contribution is related the work of Fernald (1999),
Bougheas et al. (2000) and Hulten et al. (2003) who analyze the impact of infras-
tructure on productivity and product specialization in the U.S. and India, respec-
tively. In contrast to these studies, we focus on different sources of economic growth,
use different econometric techniques, and apply panels of mostly developed countries
as well as U.S. firms. We approximate the rate of technical change by investments
in R&D or TFP-growth. We address the problem of endogeneity by (i) the use of
internal as well as external instrumental variables for infrastructure capital, (ii) the
inclusion of different institutional control variables, and (iii) the mix of macro- and
microeconomic variables in the panel of U.S. firms. We detect that infrastructure
investments enhance the rate of technical change in subsequent years in the country
panel. Similarly, infrastructure capital is found to boost R&D expenses of U.S. firms.
In contrast, we do not find a significant effect on investment rates in private or human
capital. Our results refine the outcomes of earlier empirical studies outlined above
and qualify the mechanisms and policy implications of existing theories.
Moreover, we present a simple theoretical model in order to explicitly demonstrate
the link between the provision of infrastructure and technological progress. The the-
oretical distinction between the impact of infrastructure capital on private factor
accumulation and technological progress is important at least for two reasons: (i) it
relates long-run productivity/GDP-growth to the stock of infrastructure capital in-
stead of its growth rate (as in the former literature). (ii) it comprises different policy
implications than the existing models which are based on neoclassical inference. That
is, we identify policies that influence the efficiency of the R&D sector (higher edu-
cation, industrial and innovation policy) to foster growth and innovations, instead
of neoclassical policies that influence the saving behavior of households. Finally, we
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show that the link between infrastructure and R&D can lead to multiple balanced
growth pathes if we endogenize the provision of infrastructure capital.
Section 2 briefly illustrates some empirical stylized facts in favor of a positive
relationship between the provision of infrastructure and subsequent increases in TFP-
growth. Section 3 defines the empirical strategy to distinguish between cause and
effects and reports the empirical findings. In section 4, we suggests a specific mech-
anism that illustrates the impact of infrastructure capital on endogenous technical
change (R&D). Section 5 illustrates the conditions that ensure the existence of mul-
tiple strictly positive balanced growth equilibria for a given endogenous provision of
infrastructure capital. The final section concludes.
1.2 Infrastructure and TFP - some illustrations
In this section, we provide some stylized facts on the role of infrastructure investments
in the two major success stories in terms of economic growth and productivity in the
last 30 years: China and India.5
First, we refer to Rodrik (2005) to exemplify the importance of infrastructure in-
vestments for the growth take-off in India. The author reveals that the tremendous
increase in GDP/TFP-growth in India can not be explained by conventional theories.
He shows that the growth-takeoff was not accompanied by institutional reforms, trade
liberalizations or improvements of property rights. Instead, as outlined in Figure 3,
Rodrik underlines that it was preceded by substantial investments in infrastructure.
In addition, most of the growth-acceleration took place in the manufacturing sector at
that time. That is, the author suggests that the increase in the provision of infrastruc-
ture services in India before 1980 augmented the productivity in the manufacturing
sector in subsequent years. The empirical work of Hulten et al. (2003) confirms this
hypothesis for India.
5China is included in our sample of 36 developed and transition countries which we use in the
following section. It is the poorest countries in our sample.
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Figure 4, which is based on our own calculations, plots the GDP- and TFP-growth
rates together with major infrastructure indices for China.6 The graph demonstrates
that the growth-takeoff around 1980 was preceded by major infrastructure investments
in China. In particular, Figure 4 illustrates that the number of telephone mainlines per
1000 workers was relatively constant in China before 1975 and improved considerably
thereafter. These case studies suggest a link between the provision of infrastructure
and subsequent productivity improvements in the two largest developing regions. Our
empirical analysis in the following section will approve this conjecture for a panel of
developed OECD and some transition countries.7
1.3 Empirical Evidence
In this section, we provide empirical evidence for a positive relationship between
investments in telecommunication infrastructure and subsequent R&D intensities at
the aggregate and firm-level employing dynamic panel estimations. In addition, we
find no evidence for an effect on factor accumulation or human capital.
Data
The OECD provides data for “Main Science and Technology Indicators” for 36 coun-
tries from 1980 until 2004.8 We employ the “Gross Domestic Expenditure on R&D
as a percentage of GDP” to approximate the R&D intensities per country.9 To ap-
6The construction of TFP follows Caselli (2005) and is outlined in Appendix B. The infrastructure
variables are the number of telephone lines per 1000 workers (telecom) and the share of paved roads
in total roads (paved) obtained from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank.
7The poorest country in the sample is China followed by Turkey.
8The sample contains the following countries: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland,
Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Russia, Singapore, Slovenia, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom,
United States.
9The highest fraction of R&D intensities was achieved in Israel in 2002 (5.08%) and the lowest in
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proximate a country’s infrastructure capital stock, we use the number of telephone
mainlines per 1000 workers (telewo). The series stems from the World Development
Indicator database. This database provides several different infrastructure measures.
Yet, these measures are highly correlated: the correlation coefficient between a coun-
try’s telephone mainlines per 1000 workers and power generating capacity or the share
of paved roads amount to .81 and .61, respectively. Therefore, we exclusively focus
on the role of telephone mainlines to avoid problems of collinearity.
Moreover, we consider several variables to control for institutional differences over
time and across countries. In particular, we include real GDP per capita in purchasing
power parity (rgdp), government (gov) and private investment shares (inv) relative
to real GDP, trade openness (open), the amount of private credits issued by deposit
money banks relative to the level of GDP (credit), and overall property rights (ppr).10
The first four variables are obtained from the Penn World Tables. The amount of
private credits serves as a proxy for the level of financial development and comes from
Levine et al. (2000), while the property right index stems from the Fraser Institute
of Economic Freedom database. Moreover, we use the growth rate of real GDP per
capita in purchasing power parity (gdp−growth) from the Penn World Tables and the
average years of schooling in the total population (tyr25) from Barro and Lee (1996)
as additional dependent and control variables. We consider 5-year averages to smooth
out business cycle effects.11 Overall, our unbalanced panel covers 6 time observations
for 36 countries. Figure 1.1 and 1.2 show the scatter-plots for telephone mainlines
per 1000 workers and the share of private capital investments and R&D investments,
respectively.
At the firm-level, we employ U.S. data from the Compustat database. The data
relate to the balance sheets of US nonfinancial firms and cover the time period
Greece in 1982 (0.17%). In the U.S. the fraction was roughly around 2.7% during the 1990s, which
was apart from Sweden, Israel and Japan the highest in the beginning of the 1990s.
10We measure the number of telephone mainlines and real GDP in logs. All other variables enter
in levels since they represent shares relative to GDP.
11That is, we use the following non-overlapping time averages: 1075-1979, ..., 2000-2004.
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Figure 1.1: Scatter-Plot: Private investments share and telephone mainlines
Figure 1.2: Scatter-Plot: Share of industry-financed R&D investments and telephone
mainlines
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1970-2000. In particular, we include the following firm-level data: R&D expenses,
corporate capital investments (inv), the amount of total assets (assets), total sales
(sales), and operating income before taxes (oincome). All variables are measured
in millions of dollars. We employ once more 5-year averages since we focus on a
long-run growth frequency. Overall, we have an unbalanced panel consisting of over
3000 firms and six time observations. In addition, we investigate the effect of the
macroeconomic infrastructure variable on firm-level investment decisions.12 In order
to ensure that this aggregate variable does not capture general trends in GDP, we
also incorporate the U.S. real GDP per capita and the private investment share.
Estimation Procedure
We use different dynamic panel techniques to examine the coherence between our
infrastructure variable and different sources of economic growth. Accordingly, we
control for country or firm fixed effects to account for unobservable, time-invariant
factors that influence infrastructure as well as R&D investments (e.g. institutions,
geography). In addition, we incorporate time fixed effects in the country panel which
control for common aggregated shocks over time.
Apart from the inclusion of institutional control variables as well as country and
time fixed effects, our strategy to address the problem of a potential endogeneity
of infrastructure is threefold. First, we rely on internal instrumental variables as
suggested by Blundell and Bond (1998). These are appropriate in the absence of
autocorrelation which is shown to hold in all conclusive specifications. Second, we
alternatively include a set of external instruments provided by demographic variables.
In particular, we account for the rate of urbanization and the population density. The
use of demographic variables as external instruments is motivated by Canning (1999)
and Calderon and Serven (2005), who reveal that much of the observed variations
12We stress that our results based on the GMM difference estimator do not suffer from an aggre-
gation bias, as outlined by Moulton (1990), since we employ serial correlation robust standard errors
to avoid within-group correlation.
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in infrastructure stocks are explained by these variables. Third, the mix of macro-
and microeconomic variables allows for an inspection of causality since the marginal
investment of a single firm has no contemporaneous feedback effect on aggregate
macroeconomic infrastructure investments.
We employ the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM difference (GMM − dif) as well
as the Blundell and Bond (1998) GMM system estimator (GMM − sys) because of
the significance of the lagged dependent variables, e.g. lagged R&D share. These
estimation procedures are based on the general method of moments (GMM) and are
constructed to yield consistent estimates in dynamic panels. In particular, Arellano
and Bond (1991) estimate a dynamic panel data model in first differences and apply
appropriate lagged levels as instruments for the first differences of the endogenous
variables. These are valid instruments if (i) the time-varying disturbance i,t is not
serially correlated, and (ii) the explanatory variables Xi,t are weakly exogenous. In
other words, considering the following dynamic panel data model in first differences:
yi,t − yi,t−1 = α(yi,t−1 − yi,t−2) + β(Xi,t −Xi,t−1) + (i,t − i,t−1), i = 1, 2, ..., N, t = 3, 4, ..., T,
the basic assumptions of Arellano and Bond (1991) are:
E[yi,t−s(i,t − i,t−1)] = 0, for s ≥ 2; t = 3, ...T
E[Xi,t−s(i,t − i,t−1)] = 0, for s ≥ 2; t = 3, ...T,
where yi,t is the dependent variable, Xi,t a vector of endogenous and exogenous
explanatory variables, N the number of cross-sections, T the number of time-periods,
i,t the error term and α and β parameters to be estimated. In addition, Blundell and
Bond (1998) apply supplementary moment restrictions on the original model in levels,
whereby lagged differences are used as additional instruments for the endogenous
and predetermined variables in levels. Given that E[yi,t, µi] is mean stationary, the
Blundell and Bond (1998) estimator incorporates the additional moment restrictions:
E[(yi,t−1 − yi,t−2)(ηi + i,t)] = 0,
E[(Xi,t−1 −Xi,t−2)(ηi + i,t)] = 0.
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Hence, they require the additional assumption of no correlation between the
differences of these variables and the country-specific effect. The authors show that
this procedure is more efficient if explanatory variables are persistent.13 Furthermore,
we consider all variables as potentially endogenous apart from the government share
and the overall property rights.
Results - R&D
Table 1.1 reports the effects of telephone mainlines and the institutional controls on the
R&D share. The first column reports a negative contemporaneous correlation between
telephone mainlines and the share of R&D after controlling for the institutional and
financial indicators.14 Accordingly, the negative correlation does not simply capture
an economy’s degree of financial or institutional development. In the next column, we
apply the least square dummy variable estimator to additionally control for country
fixed effects. The coefficient of infrastructure is still significant on a 1% level. Yet,
the corresponding estimates are biased in the presence of a lagged dependent variable.
Therefore, we present the results of the GMM difference estimator in column three.
Accordingly, we find that an increase in telephone mainlines by 1% enhances aggregate
R&D investments, on average, by .29% in the subsequent five years. The result is
significant on a 1% significance level. In contrast, only the level of real GDP and a
country’s degree of openness influenced aggregate R&D investments significantly. For
example, the number of telephone mainlines per 1000 workers increased in the U.S.
from 1975 until 1980 by roughly 2%. According to our estimation result, this rise
triggered an increase in the R&D share by .58% in the subsequent five years, which
amounts to 21% of the overall increase in the R&D share in that period.
13We apply heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors and cluster errors at the country or firm level
to obtain standard errors that are also robust to within group correlation.
14We include the contemporaneous values as well as the first lags of the control variables in the
OLS and the least square dummy variable estimation. We do not report the results for the first lags
in the corresponding tables.
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Table 1.1: Effect of telephone mainlines on share of R&D investments
R&D share
OLS LSDV GMM-diff GMM-sys1)
l1telewo .1870∗∗∗ .4866∗∗∗ .2915∗∗ .1838∗ .2842∗∗ .4506∗∗∗ .2406∗∗ .3598∗∗∗
(2.73) (3.61) (2.01) (1.79) (2.43) (3.06) (2.11) (2.59)
l1R&D 1.04∗∗∗ 1.08∗∗∗ .9814∗∗∗ .9828∗∗∗ .9477∗∗∗ .9875∗∗∗ .9618∗∗∗ .9929∗∗∗
(22.59) (6.83) (5.18) (11.28) (10.02) (10.15) (12.13) (12.19)
rgdp .0576 -2.73∗∗∗ -1.79∗ .0698 -.3202 .1341 -.1952
(.14) (-3.36) (-1.91) (.35) (-1.22) (.80) (-.91)
gov .0098 -.0014 -.0027 .1838 .0105 .0033 .0130∗ .0075
(1.18) (-.17) (-.40) (1.31) (1.39) (.44) (1.65) (.95)
ppr .1183∗∗∗ .0207 -.0033 .0398 .0577 .1407∗∗ .0493 .1273∗∗∗
(3.28) (.46) (-.10) (1.45) (1.19) (2.45) (1.12) (2.59)
credit .1609 .0208 .0658 -.2054 -.2877∗ -.2163 -.2993∗∗
(.93) (.20) (.38) (-1.38) (-1.78) (-1.59) (-2.10)
open .0004 .0132∗∗ .0010∗ -.0016 -.0004 -.0014 -.0009
(.08) (2.64) (1.91) (-1.37) (-.30) (-1.32) (-.73)
inv -.0157 .0203 .0077 .0113 .0140 .0110 .0109
(-.88) (1.04) (.61) (1.22) (1.54) (1.43) (1.50)
Country/Obs. 108 34/108 33/77 36/114 34/111 34/111 34/111 34/111
country FE no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
time FE no no no no no yes no yes
2. order serial correlation .971 .855 .936 .805 .958 .734
Hansen-test .953 .164 .994 .998 .998 .998
1) In column 7-8 we instrument telewo by external instruments (urban, pop. density). In columns 5-8
we employ only first two appropriate lags of endogenous variables to reduce instruments matrix. Always
include constant term, and employ s.e. that are robust to heteroscedasticity and within group correlation.
5-year averages, 1975-2004. t-statistics in parenthesis. ***,**,* significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%.
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Table 1.2: Effect of telephone mainlines on factor accumulation
inv-share inv-adj tyr25-growth tyr25
OLS LSDV GMM-sys GMM-sys LSDV GMM-sys
l1telewo .6641 1.46 .8675 .4716 .9220 .5507 -.0132 -.0168
(1.37) (1.53) (.52) (1.01) (1.04) (.40) (-.60) (-.20)
lag dep. var. .6532∗∗∗ .3360∗∗∗ .7184∗∗∗ .7472∗∗∗ .7039∗∗∗ .7337∗∗∗ - .8910∗∗∗
(10.70) (3.86) (8.26) (9.78) (7.54) (7.95) - (33.87)
rgdp 17.88∗∗∗ 24.23∗∗∗ -1.10 -.5412 -.5363 -.3915 -.1997∗∗∗ .1702
(5.12) (4.86) (-.77) (-.30) (-.24) (-.22) (-4.43) (1.19)
gov -.0283 -.0014 -.0302 -.0155 .0629 .0643 .0001 -.0064
(-.48) (-1.36) (-.89) (-.45) (1.34) (1.23) (.08) (-1.06)
ppr -.0404 -.3957 .3845 .2774 .3956 .3829 .0068 .0152
(-.10) (-1.00) (.76) (.48) (.71) (.72) (.55) (.30)
credit .9118 4.14∗∗∗ .2816 .2775 -.3940 -.1922 -.0005 -.0600
(.64) (3.35) (.19) (.19) (-.34) (-.17) (-.02) (-.27)
open -.0081 -.0723 .0172∗∗ .0145∗∗ .0103 .0077 .0014 -.0014∗∗∗
(-.18) (-1.46) (2.38) (2.36) (1.62) (.77) (1.33) (-2.70)
Country/Obs. 147 35/147 35/155 35/155 33/106 33/106 35/155 35/155
country FE no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
time FE no no no yes no yes no no
2. order serial correlation .924 .993 .936 .723 .357
Hansen-test .999 .998 .972 .948 .988
in columns 3-6 and 8 we employ only the first two appropriate lags of the endogenous variables to reduce the
number of instruments. 5-year averages 1975-2004 data. all regressions include a constant term, and employ
heteroscedasticity robust s.e. in column 2-8 we include s.e. that are robust to within group correlation.
t-statistics in parenthesis. ***,**,* significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%.
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In the following columns, we apply the GMM system estimator.15 In all specifica-
tions, we find that an increase in the number of telephone mainlines promotes R&D
investments in the subsequent years. The corresponding coefficients are significant
on a 1% or 5% level, respectively. Finally, in the last two columns, we use our set
of exogenous demographic indicators to instrument for a country’s infrastructure
capital stock in a given period. That is, we drop the internal instruments for the
infrastructure variable and instead impose a country’s rate of urbanization and
its population density as exogenous instruments.16 Column eight, our preferred
estimation specification, suggests that a 1% increase in the number of telephone
mainlines per 1000 workers augments the share of aggregate R&D relative to GDP
by .24% in the subsequent five years. This effect even amounts to .35% if we
additionally impose time fixed effects. Both coefficients are significant on a 1% level,
respectively. Finally, the Hansen test and the test for second order autocorrelation
confirm the validity of our instruments in all specifications which suggests that our
models are well specified. Summing up, we find robust evidence in favor of a positive
causal effect running from a country’s stock of infrastructure to its aggregate R&D
investments.
Results - factor accumulation
In Table 1.2, we examine the impact of infrastructure capital on the input factors
of a human capital augmented production function, i.e. private and human capital.
In the first four columns, we report the effect of improvements in the number of
telephone mainlines per 1000 workers on aggregate private investments. Accordingly,
we are not able to detect a positive impact of infrastructure capital on private capital
accumulation which is significant at conventional levels. In contrast, we find that an
15Thereby, we exclusively use the first two appropriate lags of the endogenous variables to avoid
overfitting - a larger number of instruments relative to the number of cross sections (countries).
16All other endogenous variables are still instrumented by their suitable own lags (internal instru-
ments).
24
increase in a country’s degree of trade openness promote private capital investments.
The specification tests do not reject that our dynamic panel data model is well
specified. Hence, improvements in telecommunication infrastructure do not affect
private capital investments if we correctly control for institutional measures or time
fixed effects in our sample of mostly developed countries. In columns five to six
of Table 1.2, we apply an alternative measure since R&D expenditures amount, by
definition, for a fraction of the overall private investments. Therefore, we construct
an adjusted measure of private capital investments, net of R&D expenditures.17 Yet,
we do not detect stimulating effects of infrastructure investments on the adjusted
variable. Finally, the last two columns of Table 1.2 show that infrastructure in-
vestments have no influence on the growth rate or the level of education in our sample.
Results - productivity growth
In the following, we investigate if the relationship between infrastructure and R&D
indeed causes productivity growth. Therefore, we estimate the effect of the lagged
values of telephone mainlines on the growth rate of real GDP per capita in purchas-
ing power parities. In line with the empirical growth literature, we include the lagged
(initial) level of GDP as a lagged dependent variable in the growth regression.18 Ac-
cordingly, we apply a dynamic panel data model. Moreover, we account for the human
capital measure as a supplementary control variable. It follows that the infrastructure
coefficient in the growth regression measures the impact on GDP-growth net of pri-
vate or human capital investments. Therefore, variations in the growth rate of GDP,
after controlling for movements in factor inputs, represent by definition variations in
TFP-growth. Table 1.3 lists the results for the growth regressions. The first two
columns report a positive correlation between the number of telephone mainlines and
17That is, we subtract the share of R&D investments from the share of overall investments to
obtain the adjusted values.
18The corresponding coefficient is negative and significant on a 1% level in all estimation specifi-
cations. Compare e.g. Calderon and Serven (2005) or Barro (1990).
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productivity growth. Column three to five display the results of the GMM difference
and system estimation. We detect a significant positive effect of telephone mainlines
on productivity growth, whereby the exogeneity of infrastructure can not be rejected.
Moreover, we find evidence that economic growth is positively related to the degree of
trade openness, the private investment share and the index of overall property rights.
In addition, we employ our exogenous demographic instruments for infrastructure in
column six of Table 1.3. Accordingly, an increase in the infrastructure capital stock
significantly enhances economic growth, net of amendments in factor inputs.
In the last three columns of Table 1.3, we include the aggregate share of R&D
instead of the infrastructure variable. Column seven reveals that an increase in the
aggregate R&D share augments economic growth. The corresponding coefficient is
significant on a 1% level. In column eight, we incorporate lagged levels and differences
of the number of telephone mainlines as an exogenous instrument for the aggregate
R&D share. That is, we test if the growth-effect of telephone mainlines is indeed
transmitted via R&D investments. In other words, if Y represents GDP, R&D the
aggregate share of R&D, I the infrastructure measure, X the control variables,  the
error term and α0,1,2, β0,1,2 parameters, we estimate the following equation by the
GMM system estimator:
∆Yi,t = β0 + β1Yi,t−1 + β2(R&D)i,t +X
′
i,tβ3 + ηi + i,t (1.1)
whereby we treat R&D as endogenous and model it respectively as:
(R&D)i,t = α0 + α1Ii,t +X
′
i,tα2 + ηi + i,t (1.2)
In accordance with our previous results, column seven reveals that R&D, which is
instrumented by lagged levels and differences of the number of telephone mainlines,
promotes productivity growth. The corresponding coefficient is significant on a 1%
level. Finally, in the last column of Table 1.3, we use the exogenous infrastructure
instruments - the rate of urbanization and the population density - as instruments
for the R&D share. Again, the results suggest that the effect of infrastructure is
transmitted via adjustments in aggregate R&D. It follows that a substantial part of
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Table 1.3: Effect of telephone mainlines on productivity growth
GDP-growth
OLS LSDV GMM-diff GMM-sys1) GMM-sys2)
l1telewo .8749∗∗ .6940 1.56∗ 2.65∗∗∗ 1.68∗∗∗ 1.89∗∗
(1.98) (1.39) (1.89) (4.50) (4.83) (2.42)
l1rgdp -3.36∗∗∗ -6.52∗∗∗ -6.84∗∗∗ -4.54∗∗∗ -4.66∗∗∗ -3.18∗∗∗ -4.12∗∗∗ -4.13∗∗∗ -3.63∗∗∗
(-3.78) (-4.51) (-2.71) (-2.77) (-6.20) (-3.62) (-3.40) (-4.59) (-3.33)
gov -.0065 .0078 -.0350 .1838 -.0213 -.0245 -.0822∗∗∗ -.0831∗∗∗ -.0608∗
(-.15) (.20) (-.73) (-1.36) (-.71) (-.72) (-2.61) (-2.78) (-1.95)
ppr .2740 -.0516 .0526 .6186∗ .4907∗∗ .3338 .2251 .0162 .2567
(1.16) (-.16) (1.82) (1.45) (1.99) (1.32) (.70) (.07) (.84)
credit .1663 -1.42 .4152 .5019 .2388 1.35 1.02
(.13) (-1.19) (.29) (.19) (-1.59) (.93) (1.01)
open .0118 .1090∗∗∗ .0437∗ .0103 .0200∗∗∗ .0197∗∗∗ .0187∗∗∗
(.40) (4.55) (1.67) (1.18) (2.61) (2.75) (2.58)
inv .2490∗∗∗ .2046∗∗∗ .0725 .1257∗ .1614∗∗∗
(3.43) (2.62) (.62) (1.93) (4.02)
tyr25 .1975 -.5983 .4118 .2168
(.56) (-1.12) (.75) (1.05)
R&D 1.16∗∗∗ 1.26∗∗∗ .7419∗
(2.87) (3.63) (1.84)
Country/Obs. 147 35/147 35/118 36/158 35/153 36/158 35/142 35/142 35/142
country FE no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
time FE no no no no no yes yes yes yes
2. order serial correlation .227 .367 .250 .242 .085 .103 .214
Hansen-test .702 .050 .999 .841 .932 .916 .984
1) see Table 1.1. 2) in column 8 and 9 we use first lag of telewo and demographic variables as exogenous instruments for
R&D share, respectively. 5-year averages, 1975-2004. t-statistics in parenthesis. ***,**,* significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%.
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the impact of telephone mainlines on TFP-growth can be explained by its effect on
private R&D investments.
Results - firm-level R&D investments
In Table 1.4, we report the effect of telephones mainlines on firm-level R&D invest-
ments in the U.S. The application of disaggregated data has the advantage that a
corresponding correlation between firm-level decisions and macroeconomic variables
can be interpreted as a causal effect running from the latter to the former. The first
column displays that an increase in telephone mainlines per 1000 workers augments
corporate investments in R&D after controlling for changes in corporate sales, assets,
and operating income as well as aggregate real GDP, and aggregate private invest-
ments. In the second column, we additionally control for firm-level fixed effects. The
results reveal a positive impact of telephone mainlines on firm-level R&D expenses,
however, the coefficient is biased due to the presence of the lagged dependent variable.
The third column reports the estimates for the GMM difference procedure.19 Accord-
ingly, an increase of 10 new telephone mainlines per 1000 workers induces an increase
in corporate R&D investments, on average, by 3.37 MIO$ in the same period. The
corresponding coefficient is significant on a 1% level. In the last two columns of Table
1.4, we employ firm-level investments in capital as the dependent variable. We find
that telecommunication infrastructure investments do not affect the overall capital
investments per firm. The corresponding coefficient is even negative, but not signif-
icant at conventional levels. In contrast, we detect that firms increase their capital
investments if their assets and their operating income increases or if the aggregate
level of real GDP increases. Overall, the firm-level results support the hypothesis
that infrastructure investments improve the incentives of firms to invest in R&D, but
not to invest in general capital.
Summing up, the empirical findings suggest that the relationship between infras-
19We consider the firm-level variables as endogenous and the macroeconomic variables as exoge-
nous.
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Table 1.4: Effect of telewo on firm-level R&D investments
R&D investments Capital investments
OLS LSDV GMM-diff LSDV GMM-diff
telewo .6599∗ .9840∗∗∗ .3374∗∗∗ -1.21 -2.44
(1.78) (2.67) (2.60) (-1.27) (-1.44)
lag dep. var. 1.23∗∗∗ .5415∗∗∗ .5453∗∗∗ .1624∗∗∗ .1183∗∗∗
(16.51) (3.86) (2.89) (4.35) (4.09)
assets -.0023 -.0074∗∗∗ .0082∗∗ .2164∗∗∗ .2915∗∗∗
(-1.63) (-3.90) (2.09) (5.01) (3.11)
sales .0048 .0374∗∗∗ .0308∗∗ -.0703 -.1488
(1.52) (3.29) (1.89) (-.68) (-1.33)
oper. income .0128 .0261 -.1179∗∗ 1.53∗∗∗ 1.84∗∗
(.61) (.72) (-2.26) (3.13) (2.49)
rgdp -.0085∗ -.0122∗∗∗ -.0036∗∗ .0231∗∗∗ .0404∗∗∗
(1.80) (-2.78) (-2.47) (2.73) (2.65)
aggr. inv -3.91 -.0116 2.54∗∗∗
(-1.24) (-2.45) (3.79)
Firms/Obs. 6041 3017/6041 2743/5611 2738/10989 2738/5603
country FE no yes yes yes yes
time FE no no no no no
2. order serial correlation .228 .345
Hansen-test .224 .224
5-year averages 1970-1999 data. all regressions include a constant term, and
employ heteroscedasticity robust s.e. in column 2-4 we include s.e. that are
robust to within group correlation. t-statistics in parenthesis.
***,**,* significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%.
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tructure and growth is not linked to factor accumulation in our sample. This finding
contradicts the predictions of the theoretical literature on infrastructure and growth
which typically links growth-promoting effects of infrastructure investments to a stim-
ulation of private capital investments, compare e.g. Barro (1990). Our results reject
this complementarity between public (infrastructure) and private capital investments.
Instead, we demonstrate that the provision of telecommunication infrastructure boosts
productivity growth and investments in (the adoption of) new technologies (R&D).
1.4 The basic (partial) model
In the this section, we provide a growth model of endogenous technological change
a` la Romer (1990) that is extended to account for a cost-reducing feature of in-
frastructure capital for investments in innovative intermediate goods. This model
generates a link from infrastructure capital to economic growth via endogenous tech-
nical change (R&D). Alternatively, this link can be established if one allows the stock
of (telecommunication) infrastructure to directly affect the efficiency of research and
development. In this case, the infrastructure stock would enter the law of motion
for the stock of knowledge in (1.9). Alternatively, we demonstrate a mechanism that
accounts for a positive externality of infrastructure capital on the net present value
of the expected return of investment in innovative activities in equilibrium.20
Physical infrastructure deviates from other types of capital in two important ways:
it is (partly) non-excludable and (partly) non-rival. The former raises the question
of an appropriate financing since a partly excludability allows for a private provision.
The latter has important implications for economic growth and development. That is,
an increase in the infrastructure capital stock exerts an externality on all private pro-
ducers if infrastructure capital is non-rival and influences private production. In this
regard, the provision of infrastructure capital can potentially create long-run growth
20Our approach differs from the previous literature, which is based on Barro (1990), in that we
account for a general equilibrium effect of the stock of infrastructure capital on the incentives to
invest in R&D instead of private capital accumulation.
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comparable to the functioning of non-rival knowledge in the endogenous growth the-
ory.
Holtz-Eakin and Schwartz (1994) find robust empirical evidence for a negative
relationship between the costs of the establishment of a new business and the provision
of infrastructure capital in the economy. Moreover, Bougheas et al. (2000) detect a
positive relationship between infrastructure capital and the degree of specialization in
the intermediate sector for the U.S. economy. In the following, we take this empirical
relationship for granted. In particular, we suppose that the use of a large variety of
specialized intermediate goods in the production of final output creates proportional
business costs (φ) - e.g. transportation, coordination, and search costs.21 These costs
entail an additional markup on the (monopolistic) prices requested from intermediate
goods firms and are negatively related to the provision of infrastructure capital in the
economy.22
We suppose that φ is a negative, continuous, monotonic function of the infrastruc-
ture capital stock with the following properties: φ(G), φ′ < 0, φ′′ > 0, limG→∞ → 1,
limG→0 → ∞. Thus, φ is convex, approaches a lower bound if G approaches infinity
and approaches infinity if G approaches 0. The lower bound represents the constraint
that the price premium can not become negative. Moreover, in the absence of infras-
tructure capital intermediate specialization is not feasible as costs approach infinity.
We assume, in accordance with Romer (1990), that investments in R&D lead to
new varieties of intermediate products. Thus, a successful R&D project results in the
21For example, φ captures fixed entry costs which are necessary to set up a new business. In
addition it appears reasonable to assume that such entry costs are decreasing in the provision of
infrastructure capital - e.g. the appearance of high-speed telecommunication networks potentiates the
firm’s ability to sell/transmit specialized goods via internet without the need to establish a widespread
distribution system (Fernald and Ramnath, 2004). There are various additional plausible empirical
anecdotes in favor of this assumption, e.g. the construction of the interstate highway system in the
U.S. (Fernald, 1999), the disposability of electricity in the beginning of the last century (Jovanovic
and Rousseau, 2005).
22In this regard, its functioning is similar to the one of exogenous iceberg costs in trade models.
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entry of a new intermediate producer in a market that is characterized by monopolistic
competition. Therefore, φ(G) is taken as given by potential new market entrants that
base their entry decision on the net present value of the return of a potential R&D
investment. This value is shown to depend on φ(G).23 Thus, φ acts like a costly
exogenous distortion of the interactions between intermediate and final producers.
The model consists of a competitive final output sector, a intermediate goods
sector which is characterized by monopolistic competition, an infrastructure capital
goods sector, and a law of motion for the stock of technologies.
Final output sector (Y )
Competitive firms employ manufacturing labor (Ly), a (symmetric) combination of
all varieties of specialized intermediate goods (xj) and an aggregate of all varieties
of infrastructure services (G) to produce a final output good (Y ). Each specialized
intermediate good corresponds to a new technology, whereas At denotes the stock of
existing technologies. Hence final output is manufactured according to the production
function Y = Lχy,tG
β
t
∫ At
0
xαj,tdj, α, β, χ > 0.
There are several assumptions underlying the specific functional form of the pro-
duction function that are worth discussing. As in the basic model of Romer (1990)
growth results from an increasing specialization of the intermediate goods sector,
whereas each new innovation (At) involves a new intermediate good. The specific
form of the production function supposes that the elasticity of substitution between
different intermediate goods or between intermediates and infrastructure capital is
equal to one (Cobb-Douglas).24
23Our qualitative results would not change if φ could be (partly) internalized by intermediate
producers as long as infrastructure capital is (partly) non-rival. The reason is that intermediate
producers do not internalize the externality of their own demand for infrastructure capital on the costs
of entry of other potential producers. The provision of infrastructure in a decentralized equilibrium
would be inefficient.
24Alternatively, we could have employed a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production
function as in Young (1993). This does not change the functioning of the model. In this more
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For convenience, we normalize the price of the final output good to one (py = 1).
The final producers buy the intermediate products, pay a wage (wy) for manufacturing
labor, and a price (pG) for the usage of infrastructure services in the production
process. Hence, infrastructure capital is indeed a productive input in the final output
sector which allows for the analysis of a private provision of infrastructure capital
(see section 1.5). Though, we do not impose the special case of constant returns to
scale in private and infrastructure capital (β + α < 1). As a consequence, including
G in the production function exclusively has level but not growth effects in the long-
run.25 In other words, we separate the infrastructure service in the production of final
output from its impact on potential business costs of new intermediate producers.
The representative firm in the competitive final output sector takes prices as given
and chooses its inputs to maximize instantaneous profits in t (piy,t):
piy,t = L
χ
y,tG
β
t
∫ At
0
xαj,tdj −
∫ At
0
[1 + φ(Gt)]pI,j,txj,tdj − wy,tLy,t − pG,tGt (1.3)
where (pI,j) is the price of of an intermediate product j.
Note that infrastructure capital is partly excludable. On the one hand, the provider
can exclude final output firms from infrastructure services so that they can be charged
for their direct use. On the other hand, the provider can not control that the existence
of an infrastructure network causes a positive externality on the costs of the provision
of new intermediate goods. The final producer determines its use of xj,t, Ly,t and Gt
to maximize its profit resulting in the first-order conditions:26
general case, the equilibrium growth rate simply depends on an additional parameter measuring the
degree of substitutability in the economy.
25Thus, the growth-effect of infrastructure characterized below exclusively results exclusively from
the cost-reducing infrastructure externality φ(G).
26Note that final output firms demand the same amount of each intermediate so that xj = x,
pj = p, pij = pi and Axαj =
∫ At
0
xαj dj hold because of symmetry.
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pI,j,t = L
χ
y,tG
β
t αx
α−1
j,t
1
1 + φ(G)
(1.4)
wy = χL
χ−1
Y G
β
tAx
α
j (1.5)
pG,t = L
χ
Y βG
β−1
t Ax
α
j (1.6)
Intermediate capital goods sector (x):
Since the innovation of a specialized intermediate good creates market power, we
assume that for each intermediate j in A there exists one monopolist who produces
xj using capital (K) in terms of forgone consumption as an input. An intermediate
producer requires η units of K to produce one unit of intermediate j, so that K =
η
∫ A
0
xjdj.
27 Each monopolist chooses xj to maximize his profits (piI,j) given the
perceived inverse demand function for each intermediate (pI,j,t) and the interest rate
(r) payments per unit of capital. Thus, each intermediate producer faces constant
marginal costs (rη) if the interest rate is constant. Because of symmetry the former is
the same for all intermediates (pI,j = pI). The level of infrastructure capital is taken
as given.28 Hence, we obtain the following profit function:29
piI = pI,jxj − rηxj = 1
1 + φ(G)
LχyG
βαxαj,t − rηxj,t (1.7)
Computing the first-order condition and substituting for rη results in the following
profit function:
piI = (1− α)px (1.8)
R&D sector (A)
The rate of technological change (A˙) is a positive function of research labor (LR), a
productivity parameter (λ) and its stock of knowledge (A):
27We abstract from further constraints in the provision of private capital.
28At this stage, a new intermediate firm has not entered the market so that the aggregate infras-
tructure capital stock is exogenous for the potential intermediate producer.
29In the following, we concentrate on symmetric balanced growth equilibria, so that we can omit
time subscripts to simplify the notation.
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A˙t = λLR,tAt (1.9)
It is implicitly assumed that all researchers have free access to the entire stock of
knowledge, so that each new innovation/imitation induces a positive externality on
future research. This specification is due to Romer (1990). An increase in population
raises the rate of technological change, hence it entails scale effects. We abstract
from such scale effects by setting population growth to zero (normalize L = 1).
Households
Identical, infinitely lived households maximize their utility from consumption (C)
subject to a resource constraint and No-Ponzi game conditions. The utility function
supposes a constant relative risk aversion: u(ci) =
c
(1−σ)
i −1
1−σ , where σ is the degree of
risk-aversion. We implicitly assume an inelastic labor supply. Thus, the consumption
plan satisfies the standard Euler equation:
C˙t =
rt − ρ
σ
Ct (1.10)
where rt is the real interest rate, ρ a time-preference rate and σ the degree of
risk-aversion.
Solution for a balanced growth equilibrium
So far we have not characterized the financing structure of infrastructure capital (the
market structure in the sector). Yet, we will solve the (partial) model for a balanced
growth equilibrium, in which A, G, C and Y all grow at the same constant exponential
rate, to illustrate the mechanism of the model for a given financing structure.
The key mechanism involving technological progress is a free-entry condition into
the research sector. It is the basic assumption underlying the market structure of
monopolistic competition and translates expected future profits in the intermediate
sectors into investments in R&D.30 In particular, the free entry condition into R&D
30Hellwig and Irmen (2001) show that expected future rents due to imperfect competition are not
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ensures that the present discounted value of expected future profits from a new in-
novation equals the costs for the production of a new design. If we assume that
monopoly profits last forever the present discounted value equals pi
r
, where r is the
real interest rate. The costs of a new design are productivity adjusted wages paid to
research labor (wR
λA
). Thus, the free entry condition amounts to:
pi
r
=
wR
λA
(1.11)
The labor force is free to work in the manufacturing or research sector so that in
equilibrium wages in both sectors must be equal (wy = wR).
31 Given the wage in
manufacturing (1.5) and the profit function (1.8) the free-entry condition is solved for
the equilibrium demand for manufacturing labor:
⇒ LY = χr(1 + φ(G))
λα(1− α) (1.12)
It follows from (1.9) that the equilibrium growth rate of the technology stock
amounts to γ = A˙
A
= λLR = λ(1− LY ). We know from the production function that
final output grows in a balanced growth equilibrium at the same rate as A. Hence,
C˙
C
also grows at the rate γ. If we substitute for LY from (1.12) and r = γσ + ρ from
(1.10) we obtain the following growth rate for the stock of technologies:
γ =
A˙
A
=
α(1− α)λ− χρ(1 + φ(G))
α(1− α) + χσ(1 + φ(G)) (1.13)
We can infer from (2.20) that the growth rate of the stock of technologies is an
increasing function of the stock of infrastructure capital ( ∂γ
∂G
> 0, ∂
2γ
∂2G
> 0). Since
(endogenous) technological change is the only source of GDP-growth in a balanced
growth equilibrium, GDP also grows at that rate.32
in general necessary to ensure investments in R&D since intentional actions of entrepreneurs looking
for profits can trigger such investments even in perfectly competitive markets.
31We abstract from any labor market constraints (L = LR + LY ).
32The equilibrium growth rate suggests a minor technical restriction: In order to ensure that
consumer’s preferences are finite we need to impose that the growth of current utility (1−σ)γ is less
than the discount rate ρ.
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Proposition I: Given the cost-reducing feature of infrastructure capital in the
intermediate goods sector, the assumptions underlying the production function,
and the law of motion for the stock of technologies, it follows that the rate of
technical change (and hence output growth) is an increasing function of the stock of
infrastructure capital ( ∂γ
∂G
> 0).
Intuitively, a higher provision of infrastructure reduces the business costs in the
intermediate sector (φ(G)). This cost-reducing feature of infrastructure capital aug-
ments the demand for specialized intermediate goods and hence increases the net
present value of the returns of investments in R&D. Due to the research arbitrage
(free-entry) condition this leads to a shift of resources from the manufacturing sector
(Ly) to the R&D sector (LR). Consequently, a low provision of infrastructure capi-
tal represents an impediment for economic growth because investments in R&D are
relatively unprofitable.
Besides, γ is a positive function of the exogenous productivity parameter in the
R&D sector (λ). This relationship is quite crucial since the effectiveness of the domes-
tic R&D measured by λ determines the potential scale of the positive infrastructure
externality on the incentive to invest in R&D ( ∂
2γ
∂G∂λ
> 0). If λ is high, the impact
of the infrastructure externality is large. Hence, there exists a complementarity be-
tween the effect of infrastructure investments and the effectiveness of the R&D sector.
Since λ is exogenous it represents all country-specific factors that are neglected in this
model and that influence the effectiveness of the R&D sector, e.g. intellectual property
rights, tertiary education, or corruption.
It is important to note that the equilibrium growth rate is not necessarily strictly
positive. If we set (2.20) equal to 0 we can compute the threshold level for the
productivity of the R&D sector (λ∗) such that γ is positive:
λ∗ >
χρ
α(1− α)(1 + φ(G)) (1.14)
In a zero-growth trap (λ < λ∗), the quality of the institutional framework is not
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sufficient to ensure that the returns from investments in R&D outweigh the costs of
specialization for the given level of infrastructure capital. Thus, (marginal) infras-
tructure investments have no growth effect and the long-run TFP-level (At) remains
constant. Consequently, all resources (labor) are allocated to the manufacturing sec-
tor.33 It follows that a country requires to some degree a sound domestic R&D sec-
tor to gain sustainingly from infrastructure investments. From a policy perspective
this implies that supplementary policies or institutional changes to support corporate
R&D activities should be implemented before investments in infrastructure capital
are carried out/subsidized.34
1.5 Endogenous provision of infrastructure capital
In this section, we endogenize the infrastructure capital stock (G). Ex ante, the
interaction between an endogenous infrastructure supply and economic growth
is not clear. On the one hand, infrastructure investments are costly or dissipate
scarce resources. On the other hand, higher growth facilitates the financing of
infrastructure investments due to scale effects. In this regard, our results are
based on two additional assumptions. First, investments in infrastructure require
different scarce resources than R&D investments. Second, infrastructure capital
is partly excludable so that the financing of infrastructure investments depend
on the realization of aggregate output. Both assumptions appear to be empiri-
33Note that the growth rate cannot become negative because the re-allocation of human capital
(L) from research to manufacturing is bounded by 0.
34To illustrate the analogous results for the long-run TFP-level (A) we can solve the lin-
ear differential equation (2.20). Hence, we obtain the following solution for the level of TFP:
At = A0 exp [Ω− Γ]t, where Ω = α(1−α)λα(1−α)+χσ(1+φ(G)) and Γ = χρ(1+φ(G))α(1−α)+χσ(1+φ(G)) . If we take the
limit for t→∞ to approximate the TFP-level in the long-run balanced growth path, we get:
lim
t→∞ (At) =
 →∞ if Ω− Γ > 0A0 if Ω− Γ ≤ 0

The condition Ω− Γ > 0 is of course equivalent to λ > λ∗.
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cally plausible.35 The second assumption entails a reversed causality between the
provision of infrastructure and GDP-growth implying the possibility of multiple
growth-equilibria. We illustrate the existence of multiple balanced growth equi-
libria in the presence of increasing marginal infrastructure investment costs over time.
Infrastructure capital goods sector (G)
As discussed in section 2, the assumption of a partly excludable infrastructure
capital stock allows for a private provision Gt. Conceptually, we suppose that the
infrastructure sector consists of competitive firms supplying infrastructure services
and a monopolistic network provider.36 The competitive service firms take the
perceived inverse demand function for infrastructure services (pG,t) as given and pay
a proportional rental price (rG,t) for the access to operate the infrastructure network.
Thus, as long as the infrastructure service sector is perfectly competitive, we have
pG,t = rG,t. In this case, it makes no difference if the network provider supplies infras-
tructure services himself or sells the rights to do so to competitive firms. The network
provider invests It in infrastructure capital (Gt) incurring variable (C(It, t)) and fixed
(F ) investment costs. We assume that C(It, t) is an increasing continuous, monotonic
function with C1 = ∂C∂It > 0, C2 = ∂C∂t ≥ 0 and CIt,t = ∂
2C
∂It∂t
≥ 0.37 Note that time enters
as an explicit argument in the costs function since we do not exclude that the cost
function depends on additional time-dependent (endogenous) variables (e.g. At or
Yt). Thus, marginal costs increase over time if the latter condition holds with equality
(e.g. strictly convex investment costs). Increasing marginal costs might be a more
realistic assumption for an economy that grows according to a balanced growth rate.38
35The former assumption reproduces that infrastructure investments are intensive in unskilled
labor while R&D is human capital intensive.
36Due to fix costs (see below) the sector displays a natural monopoly. It does not matter if the
network provider is private or public as long as she dynamically optimizes its investments.
37The assumption of constant marginal costs is not crucial but simplifies the solution of the model.
The case of a convex cost function is reported below.
38For example, we might assume that the marginal costs increase in the stock of knowledge or
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Monopolistic provider of infrastructure capital
The instantaneous profit function of the monopolist is given by the perceived inverse
demand function (pG,t), the investment and the fix costs: piG,t = pG,tGt−C(It, t)−F . It
follows that the monopolist faces a dynamic optimization problem. The depreciation
rate of the infrastructure capital stock amounts to δ, so that G˙t = It − δGt. Hence,
the private monopolist chooses It to maximize the (discounted) current value of its
expected future profits subject to G˙t = It − δGt and
∫∞
t
piG,sds ≥ Fˆ .39 If the latter
condition is satisfied the monopolist faces the following maximization problem:40
max
It,Gt
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt[pG,tGt − C(It, t)− F ]dt, G˙t = It − δGt (1.15)
To solve the dynamic optimization problem we define the current value Hamilto-
nian:
H(It, Gt, λt, t) = e
−ρt[pG,tGt − C(It, t)− F ]dt+ λt[It − δGt] (1.16)
Combining the first-order conditions we get the following optimality conditions:
[p′G,tGt + pG,t] = CIt
(
ρ+ δ − C˙ItCIt
)
(1.17)
G˙t = It − δGt (1.18)
lim
t→∞
[λtIt] = 0 (1.19)
In the case of constant marginal investment costs (C˙It = ∂CIt∂t = 0), the first condi-
tion states that instantaneous marginal revenue must equal marginal costs. Otherwise,
GDP to take into account that investment costs are higher if more advanced technologies are applied
or if the size of the economy increases.
39If the fix costs arise every period we have [Fˆ =
∫∞
t
(F )ds]. If they arise only in the first period
we have [Fˆ = F ].
40Note that we assume for simplicity that the infrastructure monopolist discounts future profits
with ρ and not r. In the latter case G = G(γ) would be a higher-order non-linear function of γ. Given
C(It, t) = µYtIt this results in three balanced growth rates whereas only two are strictly positive.
Finally, recall that we abstract from additional private capital constraints in our economy.
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the right hand side is adjusted to incorporate the dynamic effects of infrastructure
investments on future profits stemming from an increase in the shadow price of infras-
tructure capital over time. The monopolist extends the provision of G in this case.
Intuitively, she anticipates that the shadow price of infrastructure capital increases in
the presence of positive balanced growth due to two reasons: (i) future investments
are more costly relative to current investments, (ii) the demand for infrastructure
capital increases. Hence, she is better off producing more infrastructure capital today
since its future value increases for him. The second condition gives the law of motion
for infrastructure capital and the third is a transversality condition.
If we substitute in (1.17) for pG,t from (1.6) and solve for Gt, we obtain:
Gt =
β2Yt
CIt(ρ+ δ −M(γ))
(1.20)
The infrastructure capital stock is increasing in the level of GDP. In addition, it is
an increasing function of the elasticity of final output with respect to infrastructure
capital as a rise in β implies a higher demand for G. In contrast, it is decreasing in the
depreciation rate (δ) and the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution (ρ). However,
we know from (2.20) that G must be constant in a balanced growth path. It then
follows from (1.20) that marginal investment costs (CIt) must grow proportional to
GDP in order to sustain balanced growth. Hence, the monopolist faces increasing
marginal investment costs. In this case, the growth rate of marginal investment costs
is a positive function of the balanced growth rate of the economy:
C˙It
CIt
= M(γ),
M ′ > 0, M ′′ = 0. Thus, the infrastructure capital stock is an increasing function of
the equilibrium growth rate of the economy (∂G
∂γ
> 0).41
Moreover, we show in Appendix A that ∂
2G
∂2γ
> 0 holds for reasonable parameter
values. Thus, the infrastructure capital stock is an increasing, convex function of
the balanced growth rate (G = G(γ), where G′ > 0, G′′ > 0). We also know from
section 2 that the balanced growth rate is in turn an increasing, convex function of
41The exact derivative is given in Appendix A. Besides, we show that a technical sufficient condition
for ∂
2G
∂2γ > 0 is δ + ρ > γ.
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Figure 1.3: Multiple equilibrium growth rates
the stock of infrastructure capital (γ = γ(G), where γ′ > 0, γ′′ > 0). In addition,
both functions are monotonic and continuous. Consequently, we potentially obtain
two different equilibrium growth rates (fixed points) if we combine (2.20) and (1.20)
to solve for a general equilibrium balanced growth path. Since γ is bounded by zero,
γ(0) = 0 (due to the property that limG→0 φ(G) → ∞) and G(0) = G0 > 0 holds in
equilibrium, we infer that both growth rates are strictly larger than zero if a balanced
growth equilibrium exists. The result is illustrated in Figure 1.3.
Thus, the reversed causality between the provision of infrastructure capital and
economic growth potentially results in two equilibrium balanced growth rates. In
the high-growth scenario, the economy is characterized by a high infrastructure
capital stock and fast technological change. In the low-growth scenario, the rate
of technological change is constraint by the low provision of infrastructure capital
which lowers the incentive to invest in R&D and hence the rate of GDP-growth.
This in turn limits the demand for infrastructure investments (financing constraint).
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Hence, if the initial stock of infrastructure capital (relative to GDP) is too low, the
growth rate of the economy is constrained. This, in turn, constraints the supply of
infrastructure services so that the economy is trapped in a low-growth equilibrium.
It follows from (2.20) that the crucial initial infrastructure level, that needs to be
exceeded in order to result in the high-growth equilibrium, is declining in the quality
of (R&D-) institutions (λ). In principle, sufficient public subsidies for infrastructure
investments, which represent an external financing source in the model, can install
the high-growth scenario. Note that public subsidies do not in general induce
economic growth, but might trigger the transition to the higher balanced growth path
(depending on the financing source).42 The results of the general equilibrium model
with an endogenous supply of infrastructure capital are summarized in Proposition II.
Proposition II: Given the assumptions underlying Proposition I, a positive initial
infrastructure capital stock G0, the requirement of different input factors in the
infrastructure- and R&D sector, and the provision of partly excludable infrastructure
capital by a dynamically optimizing supplier facing increasing marginal costs
proportional to GDP, there exist two strictly positive balanced growth rates with
γ1 > γ2. The high-growth economy is characterized by fast technological change and
a high stock of infrastructure capital, while the low-growth economy by little R&D
investments and a low provision of infrastructure capital.
The proof is given in Appendix A.
In the following, we present two explicit examples for different realizations of the
cost function. First, we assume a constant marginal costs function (
∂2CIt,t
∂It∂t
= 0) and
second, we suppose that investment costs are increasing in the size of the economy
measured by GDP (
∂2CIt,t
∂It∂t
> 0).
42We do not analyze the transition path belonging to both balanced growth path, but the growth
rate during the transition from γ2 to γ1 may in principle exceed γ1. If so, it suggests that the
extraordinary growth performance of some recent economies (growth miracles) can be explained by
one-time growth effects (and its transition path) due to the accumulation of infrastructure capital.
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Constant marginal costs
In the following, we assume constant marginal infrastructure investment costs: C(It) =
µIt. In order to obtain an explicit solution we also need to impose a specific functional
form for φ(G). We assume φ(G) = 1 + (G/Y c)−1, where 0 ≤ c ≤ 1, which is in
line with the properties of φ stated in section 2. The parameter c measures the
degree of congestion in the economy. If c = 0 congestion effects are absent and if
c = 1 only the relative stock of infrastructure capital influences the business cost.
Thus, infrastructure capital is allowed to be partly excludable as well as partly rival.
Substituting C(It), φ(Gt, Yt) and (1.20) into (1.11) research arbitrage equation, we
obtain:
γcm =
A˙
A
=
α(1− α)β2λ− χρβ2 − χρµ(δ + ρ)Y c−1t
α(1− α)β2 + χβ2σ + χσµ(δ + ρ)Y c−1t
(1.21)
Thus, the long-run growth rate of the stock of technologies is increasing in the
level of GDP. Hence, if c < 1, a balanced growth path does not exist. The economy
features unbalanced, exponential growth. A positive balanced growth path only
exists if the business costs depend on the relative infrastructure capital stock (c = 1).
In this case, congestion effects completely eliminate scale effects from final output.
Note that this (intuitively appealing) special case can be derived endogenously by
assuming that in equilibrium final output firms exclusively demand infrastructure
capital to offset congestion effects in the economy. Besides, γcm is decreasing in µ,
ρ, and δ as these factors reduce the equilibrium provision of infrastructure capital
and is increasing in the share of Gt in the final output sector (β) and the exogenous
(institutional) productivity parameter of R&D (λ).
Increasing marginal costs
In the following, we assume that the marginal costs of infrastructure investments are
increasing in the level of GDP: C(It) = µYtIt.43 This relationship is intuitively appeal-
43We et c = 0 because this cost function already captures congestion effects.
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ing since the production costs of infrastructure services are expected to depend on the
wage level of an economy just like the production costs of final output or R&D. This
cost function can be derived endogenously by assuming that the monopolist needs to
hire unskilled labor (U) in order to produce infrastructure capital. If the wage of un-
skilled labor is proportional to the wage of skilled labor (L) the costs of infrastructure
investments are increasing in the level of GDP. The costs function satisfies the suffi-
cient conditions for multiple balanced growth equilibria outlined above. Substituting
C(It, t), φ(Gt) and (1.20) into (1.11), we get:44
γim1 =
α(1− α)µ(λ+ δ + ρ) + β2χσ + χµ(σ(δ + ρ)− ρ) + Z1/2
2µ(α(1− α) + χσ) (1.22)
γim2 =
α(1− α)µ(λ+ δ + ρ) + β2χσ + χµ(σ(δ + ρ)− ρ)− Z1/2
2µ(α(1− α) + χσ) (1.23)
where Z = [α(1−α)µ(λ+δ+ρ)+β2χσ+χµ(σ(δ+ρ)−ρ)]2−4µ[α(1−α)+χσ][α(1−
α)λµ(δ + ρ)− ρ(β2 + χµ(δ + ρ))] > 0. As long as λ > λ∗∗ = ρβ2+ρχµ(ρ+δ)
α(1−α)µ(δ+ρ) both growth
rates are strictly positive. This conditions relates the exogenous productivity of the
R&D sector to the weighted cost of infrastructure investment/capital and ensures
that expected future profits from R&D investments are positive. Moreover, the first
regime strictly dominates the second in terms of economic growth (γ1 > γ2).
Both equilibrium growth rates are strictly increasing in λ (given λ > λ∗∗).45 In
addition, an increase in the exogenous (institutional) productivity parameter has
a larger impact on the growth rate in the high-growth regime (∂γ1
∂λ
> ∂γ2
∂λ
> 0).
This result follows directly from the fact that the return of R&D investments is
constrained by high intermediate business costs (low infrastructure capital) in the
low-growth equilibrium. Besides, γ1 is increasing in the share of infrastructure capital
in the final output sector (β). Hence, γ1 can potentially still be raised to a higher
balanced growth path by an additional external financing source.46 In contrast, the
44Note that the infrastructure provider does not internalize the static effect of an increase in Gt
on the output level in a decentralized equilibrium.
45The exact derivatives are reported in Appendix A.
46Thus, the infrastructure externality outweighs the inefficiencies from the monopolies for the
45
impact of β on γ2 is indeterminate and depends on the realizations of the parameter
values.47 Finally, an increase in the constant factor of the marginal investment costs
(µ) causes a decline in γ1. Again, the impact on γ2 is indeterminate. Thus, under
certain parameter realization the positive effect of µ on the level of the shadow price
of infrastructure capital may outweigh its direct negative effects on the instantaneous
profit function of the infrastructure monopolist.
Infrastructure subsidy
The equilibrium provision of infrastructure capital in our model is socially inefficient.
The inefficiency results from the infrastructure externality as well as the monopolistic
supplies of intermediate and infrastructure capital goods. Consequently, a government
subsidy for infrastructure capital may potentially install the growth maximizing level
of infrastructure capital. We have shown above that infrastructure is undersupplied
in a decentralized equilibrium ( ∂γ
∂β
> 0). It follows that a positive government subsidy
for the infrastructure monopolist would be growth-enhancing. It might even induce
a regime shift from the lower balanced growth rate to the higher one in the case of
increasing marginal investment costs.
In general, we can compute the growth-maximizing subsidy (τ ∗) given the different
infrastructure investment cost functions. Therefore, we assume that the subsidy is
financed by an income tax. The monopolist’s period by period profit function changes
to: piG,t = pG,tGt + τYt − µC(It, t) − F . Moreover, we refer to the special case of a
Cobb-Douglas production function for final output by setting χ = 1−α−β.48 For the
purpose of illustration, we focus on the case of constant marginal investment costs and
assume that congestion eliminate scale effects. Following the procedure from above
infrastructure capital stock belonging to γ1. We discuss this result separately in the next section.
47Interestingly, the negative effect of β on the level of the shadow price of infrastructure capital
may outweigh the positive direct effect on the instantaneous profit function of the infrastructure
monopolist under certain parameter realizations.
48This specification implies constant returns to scale for the combination of labor, intermediates
and infrastructure capital in the production of final output.
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the equilibrium level of infrastructure (Gmst ) and the growth rate (γ
ms) are:49
Gmst =
[(1− τ)β2 + τβ]
µ(ρ+ δ)
Yt
γms =
α(1− α)[(1− τ)2β2 + τ(1− τ)β]λ− (1− α− β)ρ(1 + µ(δ + ρ))
α(1− α)[(1− τ)2β2 + τ(1− τ)β] + (1− α− β)σ(1 + µ(ρ+ δ)) (1.24)
Setting ∂γ
ms
∂τ
= 0 and solving for τ yields the following growth-maximizing gov-
ernment subsidy: τ ∗ = 1−2β
2(1−β) . Not surprisingly, the growth-maximizing subsidy is
decreasing in β. Moreover, τ ∗ internalizes the growth-enhancing infrastructure exter-
nality for a given level of the distortional income tax. For example, for β = 0.3, τ ∗
is approximately equal to 0.28. For β ≥ 0.5 the growth-maximizing subsidy is 0. In
this case, the negative growth effect from an additional income tax would outweigh
the positive infrastructure externality. In general, the result shows that different
market structures in the infrastructure capital sector have different implications for
equilibrium growth.
1.6 Conclusion of Chapter 1
This article decomposes the growth effect of infrastructure investments. It suggests
that infrastructure affects innovative investments and technological change instead of
factor accumulation.
The empirical section provides evidence for a positive causal effect from infras-
tructure capital on TFP-growth from a dynamic panel estimation. We find that
investments in (telecommunication) infrastructure cause an increase in R&D invest-
ments in subsequent periods. We control for a potential endogeneity of infrastructure
by (i) including internal as well as exogenous instruments for infrastructure and (ii)
analyzing the effect of macroeconomic aggregates on firm-level investment decisions.
Moreover, we detect that infrastructure promotes TFP-growth via adjustments in ag-
49Notice that in the presence of an income tax rate the partial growth rate (2.20) amounts to:
γ′ = (1−τ)α(1−α)λ−(1−α−β)ρφ(G)(1−τ)α(1−α)+(1−α−β)σφ(G/Y ) .
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gregate R&D. Finally, we are not able to detect a positive relationship between the
provision of infrastructure and private investments in physical or human capital.
The empirical findings are striking since they challenge conventional growth theo-
ries which link growth-promoting effects of infrastructure investments to a stimulation
of private capital investments. Our results reject this complementarity between pub-
lic (infrastructure) and private capital investments. Instead, they suggest a direct
effect of telecommunication infrastructure on technical change in relatively developed
countries which is independent from private or human capital accumulation. Second,
the impact of infrastructure on R&D features different policy implications. That is,
the growth-effect of infrastructure investments depends on factors such as intellec-
tual property rights, the degree of product market competition or tertiary education
instead of factors that influence a household’s saving decision.
In addition, we suggest a theoretical mechanism that complies with this empirical
finding. In particular, we illustrate a positive link between the provision of infras-
tructure capital and the incentives to invest in R&D. This result is based on the
assumption that infrastructure capital reduces costly distortions between the interac-
tions of the final and intermediate sector (e.g. transportation and coordination costs).
Moreover, the model implies crucial complementarities between infrastructure capital
and other factors that influence the effectiveness of the R&D sector. Finally, we show
that the link between infrastructure and R&D can lead to multiple balanced growth
pathes if we endogenize the provision of infrastructure capital.
The connection between infrastructure and technical change refines the link be-
tween infrastructure and growth and helps to explore productivity differences across
countries. The results suggest that future work on the link between infrastructure and
growth should be devoted to its effect on innovative activities and technical change.
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Chapter 2
Inflation, financial market
incompleteness and long-run
TFP-growth
This chapter demonstrates a negative relationship between inflation and
long-run productivity growth. Inflation generates long-run real effects due
to a link from the short-run interplay between nominal and financial fric-
tions to a firm’s qualitative investment portfolio. First, we employ coun-
try panel data to investigate the robustness of a negative causal effect
of inflation on long-run TFP-growth. Second, we develop an endogenous
growth model whose key ingredients are (i) a nominal short-run portfolio
choice for households, (ii) an agency problem which gives rise to finan-
cial market incompleteness, (iii) a firm-level technology choice between a
return-dominated but secure and a more productive but risky project. In
this framework, inflation increases the costs of corporate insurance against
productive but risky projects and hence a firm’s choice of technology. It
follows that economies (time periods) that feature a higher level of in-
flation are predicted to exhibit lower TFP-growth in the long-run. That
is, each level of inflation is associated with a different long-run balanced
growth path as long as financial markets are incomplete. Finally, we ap-
ply U.S. industry as well as firm-level dynamic panel data to examine the
relevance of our specific microeconomic mechanism. We find that (i) firms
insure systematically against risky R&D investments by means of corpo-
rate liquidity holdings, (ii) periods of higher inflation restrain firm-level
R&D investments by reducing corporate liquidity holdings.
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2.1 Introduction
Does inflation reduce long-run economic growth? If so, what is the key transmis-
sion mechanism relating inflation to long-run growth? To answer these questions, we
provide empirical evidence - in accordance with Fischer (1993) and others - that the
level of inflation reduces long-run productivity growth. Thereafter, we develop a novel
theoretical explanation for a long-run relationship between the two variables in the
context of an endogenous growth model with financial market frictions. Our trans-
mission mechanism relates the qualitative composition of investments, instead of their
quantity, to the level of inflation. Hence, we partly endogenize total factor productiv-
ity (TFP) by demonstrating that monetary policy is a relevant component of long-run
TFP-growth. Finally, we present micro-econometric evidence from disaggregated U.S.
sectoral and firm-level data that is consistent with our specific microeconomic mech-
anism underlying the macroeconomic monetary transmission channel.
Recent progress in development accounting have identified differences in total factor
productivity (TFP), rather than physical or human capital accumulation, as the main
factor generating cross-country income and growth differences.1 Accordingly, varia-
tions in TFP explain about 2/3 of the variations in income across countries. However,
TFP is measured as the component of output that is not explained by labor or (hu-
man) capital inputs. Therefore, Abramovitz (1956) refers to this residual measure as
the “measure of our ignorance”. Against this background, substantial efforts have
been devoted to endogenize TFP.2 The effect of nominal variables on real economic
activities, on the other hand, has been mainly analyzed in a business cycle framework.
1Caselli (2005) provides an exhaustive survey of recent contributions to development accounting
and demonstrates the robustness of this result.
2The title of a contribution by Prescott (1998) anticipates recent developments in the endogenous
growth literature: “Needed: A Theory of Total Factor Productivity”. So far, the most prominent
explanations for cross-country differences in TFP concentrate on the role of government regulations
(Prescott, 1998), human capital (Benhabid and Spiegel, 2005), or institutions (Acemoglu et al.
(2002)).
50
In this respect, it is well recognized that monetary policy can influence fluctuations
in real variables in the short-run, but most theoretical contributions treat monetary
policy shocks and TFP as orthogonal in the long-run. Accordingly, the determinants
of growth and cycles are most often regarded as two separated entities.3
Our theoretical contribution takes a different route and combines elements of the
growth and business cycle literature. Specifically, we analyze the interdependence
between short-run nominal and financial frictions and its effect on long-run endoge-
nous technological change. The standard endogenous growth model is supplemented
in three dimensions. First, we incorporate a technology choice for producers. That
is, intermediate firms can channel investments into two distinct projects: a safe, but
return-dominated (“basic”) and a superior (“advanced”) project which yields higher
expected returns, but is subject to idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. We attribute invest-
ments that enhance the stock of technologies available for a firm, e.g. R&D expenses,
to the advanced projects since this type of investment is considered to be more pro-
ductive, but also more risky. Thus, (part of the) expenses for advanced technologies
generate a positive externality on the future stock of knowledge/technologies avail-
able in the economy. In contrast, investments in the basic technology reflect, e.g.,
expenses for machines of the same vintage relative to previous ones. Moreover, firms
operating the advanced technology can insure themselves against the idiosyncratic
liquidity risk by means of holding a precautionary stock of readily marketable assets;
however, due to an entrepreneurial moral hazard problem, which is the second key
building block of the model, the scope for insurance is limited. The consequence of
this friction is that financial markets are incomplete in that scarce liquidity - along
the lines of Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) - can not be efficiently provided to the pro-
ductive sector. Third, we assume that households are required to hold cash in order
3This observation is well paraphrased by Aghion et al. (2005): “The modern theory of business
cycles gives a central position to productivity shocks and the role of financial markets in the propaga-
tion of these shocks; but it takes the entire productivity process as exogenous. The modern theory of
growth, on the other hand, gives a central position to endogenous productivity growth and the role of
financial markets in the growth process; but it focuses on trends, largely ignoring shocks and cycles.”
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to consume at the end of a period. This short-run cash-in-advance constraint implies
that households have to choose between cash holdings for consumption purposes and
deposits with a financial intermediary that earn a net interest rate. It follows that
the short-run supply of nominal assets (liquidity) is costly even in an environment
of flexible prices. Taken together with the positive short-run demand for liquidity of
firms operating the advanced technology this approach involves a positive short-run
nominal interest rate that represents the cost of insurance against liquidity shocks.
That is, the nominal interest rate constitutes an additional cost of production by
means of the advanced technology relative to the basic one. This complementarity
between corporate liquidity holdings and a firm’s ability to invest in productive but
risky projects leads to a type of inflation tax on productivity-enhancing investments.
The short-run non-neutrality of monetary policy induces an investment composition
effect that is found to be associated with changes in the aggregate stock of technologies
in the long-run. Hence, the model postulates a novel aspect of monetary transmission
in that differences in the level of inflation across countries or time periods induce
long-run differences in TFP-growth as long as financial markets are incomplete.
Our empirical macroeconomic evidence demonstrates the robustness of this nega-
tive empirical relation. We apply a dynamic panel technique following Blundell and
Bond (1998) which allows some inspection of causality. Accordingly, we find that
inflation reduces long-run TFP-growth, whereby its exogeneity can not be rejected.
Furthermore, the firm-level moral hazard problem results in a constrained-efficient
contracting scheme between firms and financial intermediaries. This endogenous form
of financial market incompleteness allows for a set of empirical implications which are
specific to our model. We test these implications using disaggregated U.S. sectoral
and firm-level panel data. The results demonstrate that firms with riskier cash-flows
and higher R&D investments systematically adjust the composition of their asset and
investment portfolios in periods of higher inflation. In particular, we find that (i)
the sensitivity of TFP-growth with respect to inflation is significantly higher in more
volatile and more productive sectors, (ii) periods of higher inflation restrain firm-level
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R&D investments by reducing corporate liquidity holdings.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In section 2, we review the liter-
ature on inflation and long-run economic growth. Section 3 examines the aggregate
empirical relation between inflation and long-run TFP-growth. The next two sections
describe the theoretical model as the basic structure to highlight the novel monetary
transmission mechanism. In section 6, we test model-specific implications applying
sectoral and firm-level panel data in order to identify the underlying microeconomic
mechanism empirically. A final section concludes.
2.2 Literature review
A limited number of theoretical studies allow for an impact of changes in nominal
variables on long-run economic growth. In this regard, King et al. (1998) incorporate
constant returns to capital in a real business cycle model showing that temporary
nominal shocks can have permanent effects due to a reduction in capital investments.
Similarly, Aizenman and Marion (1993) develop a negative relation between nominal
fluctuations and GDP-growth due to the existence of investment irreversibility. More
recently, Fatas (2001) relates long-run growth to short-run business cycles. He embeds
an aggregate demand externality in an endogenous growth model to show that the
coordination of productive investments across different sectors may be an important
prerequisite for aggregate economic development. In contrast to our contribution,
the permanent effects in the above models are transmitted via the aggregate quan-
tity of investments. However, Ramey and Ramey (1995) reveal that the negative
empirical correlation between nominal macroeconomic fluctuations and the trend of
GDP-growth is independent of the aggregate quantity of investments.
Aghion et al. (2005) and Angeletos (2006) focus on the link between financial
market incompleteness and business cycle fluctuations. The former examine how
(exogenous) credit constraints affect the cyclical behavior of productivity-enhancing
investment. Specifically, they distinguish between a short-term and a long-term in-
vestment project which enhances future productivity. Survival of long-term projects
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is uncertain because they are subject to idiosyncratic liquidity shocks which - for
reasons left unspecified - can only be imperfectly insured. The authors show that
sufficiently tight credit constraints result in a procyclicality of long-term investment
which amplify the business cycle. Similarly, Angeletos (2006) studies the effects of id-
iosyncratic investment risk on the aggregate level and the allocation of savings within
the framework of a non-monetary neoclassical growth model. Their key result is that
incomplete markets reduce TFP by shifting resources away from the more risky, but
also more productive private equity investment. They focus on the impact of exoge-
nous credit constraints on an economy’s cyclical productivity dynamics and not on the
evolution of the long-run trend. Moreover, Aghion et al. (2005) and Angeletos (2006)
are concerned with real general equilibrium economies; they do not address a poten-
tial interplay between nominal and financial frictions. In order to better understand
the determinants of the interdependence between nominal and financial frictions, it is
important to carefully specify the source of market incompleteness which gives rise to
uninsured idiosyncratic risk. Therefore, we embed the financial contracting problem
discussed in Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) in our model. This endogenous form of
financial market incompleteness makes it possible to derive a number of theoretical
predictions which can be examined empirically.
Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997), among others, develop a theoretical link between
the degree of financial market development and long-term growth. Their reasoning is
based on the ability of agents to share the risk of investment projects. Thus, capital
investments in poor economies are constraint by risk diversification opportunities.
The model explains why the level and volatility of output are high in less developed
countries and decline with the degree of financial market development. Moreover,
Levine et al. (2000) provide empirical evidence in favor of a causal link from financial
development to economic growth. However, in contrast to these approaches, which
are based on real economies, incomplete financial markets transmit short-run nominal
constraints to long-run restrictions on the productivity trend in our model.
The empirical literature on inflation and growth employs cross-country (panel)
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regressions with low frequency data.4 In this context, Bruno and Easterly (1998)
and Easterly (2005) suggest that the negative relation between GDP-growth and
inflation is mainly due to inflation outliers. Assuming different threshold levels (e.g.
20%, 40%) they detect that the robustness of the negative relation depends on high-
inflation countries. In contrast, Fischer (1993) finds that the negative correlation
between inflation and TFP-growth is, if anything, larger in low-inflation (OECD-)
countries. Moreover, Fischer (1993) investigates the causal mechanism behind this
correlation in several ways. First, he examines the potential endogeneity of inflation
by considering sample variations across periods predominated by demand (1960-1972)
or supply (1973-1988) shocks.5 In line with the established literature, he starts from
the presumption that adverse supply shocks are the main source of the endogeneity
of inflation, i.e. while an adverse supply shock is inflationary, an adverse demand
shock would be deflationary. However, he finds that the correlation between inflation
and economic growth remains unchanged across periods of mainly demand or supply
shocks and therefore is led to the conclusion that inflation is exogenous with respect
to growth. Second, the author decomposes GDP growth into its components and
detects a robust negative relation between inflation the growth rate of TFP. Thus,
even after controlling for factor accumulation and employment, the negative effect
of inflation on growth persists. Similarly, De Gregorio (1993) finds that inflation
affects the productivity of investment rather than its level. It follows that there must
be some inflation-driven mechanism which records in terms of decreased aggregate
productivity growth.
4Important contributions in this branch of research include De Gregorio (1992), De Gregorio
(1993), and Barro and Lee (1996).
5The difficulty in identifying a causal relation between inflation and growth stems from the lack of
appropriate external instruments for inflation. For cross-country regressions, a possible instrumental
variable approach is due to Cukierman et al. (1993) who incorporate measures of central bank
independence as instrumental variables and detect negative correlations with economic growth. Our
own approach in Section 2.3 circumvents the problem by applying dynamic panel regressions, thus
relying on internal instruments whose validity is testable.
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The structure of the model we develop suggests that the availability of corporate
liquidity is a crucial determinant for firm-level qualitative investment decisions. To
get some guidance on the potential power of this mechanism, we relate our analysis to
the findings in Opler et al. (1999) who examine the determinants and implications of
holdings of cash and marketable securities by publicly traded non-financial U.S. firms.6
The authors establish that (i) firms with better outside financing opportunities tend
to hold a lower fraction of their total assets in the form of liquid assets, and that
(ii) firms with strong growth opportunities and riskier cash flows hold relatively high
ratios of cash to total non-cash assets.7 Moreover, there is evidence that firms retain a
relatively high fraction of their earnings as liquid reserves and that these reserves are
generally not used for capital investment, but rather tend to be depleted by operating
losses, i.e. the corporate liquidity is held as a hedge against production risk. As to
the quantitative importance of corporate cash holdings, the authors report the mean
over the firms in their sample of the ratio of cash to net assets to be 18%, while the
median amounts to 6.5%. Thus, corporate liquidity holdings are likely to constitute
a quantitatively relevant expense factor in the presence of inflation.
2.3 Inflation- TFP-growth nexus
Data and methodology: In this section, we complement the work of Fischer (1993)
and De Gregorio (1993) in that we apply a different econometric method and sup-
plementary robustness tests to investigate the inflation TFP-growth nexus. The ag-
gregate empirical analysis is based on an unbalanced panel data set consisting of 88
6The background for most theoretical and empirical studies of corporate cash holdings is the
presumption that external finance is costly and that firms hold liquid assets in order to survive
bad times and to have funds readily available if an investment opportunity arises. The benefits
of corporate liquidity must then be balanced against its costs which arises as a consequence of a
liquidity premium.
7We interpret these latter features - high growth potential and risky cash flows - as the identifying
characteristics of what we label advanced technology.
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countries from 1970-1999. We employ non-overlapping 5-year averages to smooth
out business cycle effects which reduces the time dimension to six observations per
country.8 Inflation is measured by the first difference of the natural logarithm of
the consumer price index from the World Development Indicator database (WDI). In
addition, we include various institutional and financial control variables to minimize
the potential of an omitted variable bias. In particular, we approximate a country’s
degree of financial market development by the amount of private credits relative to
GDP (credit).9 Furthermore, we account for the following control variables: the gov-
ernment and private investment shares from the Penn World Tables, the amount of
trade in goods as % of GDP (WDI), the terms of trade (WDI), an index of overall
property rights from the Fraser Institute of Economic Freedom database, and a mea-
sure of inflation uncertainty. We construct the TFP series following Caselli (2006). A
detailed description of the growth accounting methodology is provided in Appendix
B. In line with the empirical growth literature, we include the lagged level of TFP
as a lagged dependent variable in the growth regression.10 Accordingly, we apply a
dynamic panel data model. Therefore, we employ the method developed by Blundell
and Bond (1998) which is based on the general method of moments (GMM) and is
constructed to yield consistent estimates in dynamic panels.11 This procedure instru-
8Specifically, we use the following time averages: 1970-1974, 1075-1979, ..., 1995-1999.
9The proxy is obtained from from Beck and Levine (1999). We note that all of our results
are robust to the inclusion of alternative proxies from these authors such as the amount of liquid
liabilities, the rate of stock market trade, or the amount of financial deposits. The results are available
from the authors upon request.
10The corresponding coefficient is negative and significant on a 1% level in all estimation speci-
fications. Compare e.g. Caldern and Servn (2005) or Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), and Aghion
et al. (2005) for analogous approaches.
11In other words, considering the following dynamic panel data model in first differences:
yi,t − yi,t−1 = α(yi,t−1 − yi,t−2) + β(Xi,t −Xi,t−1) + (i,t − i,t−1), i = 1, 2, ..., N, t = 3, 4, ..., T,
the basic assumptions of Arellano and Bond (1991) are E[yi,t−s(i,t − i,t−1)] = 0, E[Xi,t−s(i,t −
i,t−1)] = 0 for s ≥ 2; t = 3, ...T , where yi,t is the dependent variable, Xi,t a vector of endogenous and
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ments predetermined and endogenous variables with the suitable corresponding lags
of these variables. It allows to gain inspection of causality and provides a tests of
autocorrelation and overidentifying restrictions to check for the validity of the instru-
ments.
In Figure 2.1, we plot annual data for inflation and TFP-growth using the subset
of 22 OECD countries from 1980-2000.12 The scatter-plot illustrates a negative
bivariate correlation between the two. However, this relation may be due to periods
of excessive inflation rates above 20% or 40% as suggested by Bruno and Easterly
(1998). Therefore, we focus on a smaller subset of 19 OECD countries from 1990-2000
in Figure 2.2. The highest observable inflation rate in this sample amounts to roughly
15%. Yet, the data still indicate a negative correlation between the two series. In
this respect, the simple scatter-plots already suggest that the negative aggregate
correlation between inflation and TFP-growth does not stem from inflation-outliers.
Results: In 2.1, we investigate the reduced-form relation between the two ag-
gregate series controlling for spurious correlation and endogeneity of inflation. The
first column reports a negative contemporaneous correlation between inflation and
TFP-growth after controlling for the institutional and financial indicators. Corre-
spondingly, this negative correlation does not simply capture an economy’s degree of
exogenous explanatory variables, N the number of cross-sections, T the number of time-periods, i,t
the error term and α and β parameters to be estimated. In addition, Blundell and Bond (1998) apply
supplementary moment restrictions on the original model in levels, whereby lagged differences are
used as additional instruments for the endogenous and predetermined variables in levels. Given that
E[yi,t, µi] is mean stationary, the Blundell and Bond (1998) estimator incorporates the additional
moment restrictions E[(yi,t−1 − yi,t−2)(ηi + i,t)] = 0, E[(Xi,t−1 − Xi,t−2)(ηi + i,t)] = 0, which
requires the additional assumption of no correlation between the differences of these variables and
the country-specific effect. The authors show that this procedure is more efficient if explanatory
variables are persistent.
12The informational value of the scatterplot is very limited if we exploit the entire panel of 88
countries since most inflation-observations are within the same range apart from some extreme
outliers due to periods of hyperinflation.
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Figure 2.1: Scatter-plot: Panel of 22 OECD countries 1980-2000
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Figure 2.2: Scatter-plot: Panel of 19 OECD countries 1990-2000
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financial or institutional development. In the next column, we apply the least square
dummy variable estimator to additionally control for country fixed effects. The coef-
ficient of inflation is still significant on a 1% level. Yet, the corresponding estimates
are biased in the presence of a lagged dependent variable. Therefore, we present our
preferred specification based on the method of Blundell and Bond (1998) in column
three. Accordingly, inflation, which is instrumented by its suitable own lags, reduces
TFP-growth. The corresponding coefficient is significant on a 1% level.13 Thus, our
results suggest that causation is running from inflation to TFP-growth. Moreover,
TFP-growth is decreasing in the lagged level of TFP and increasing in the measure of
overall property rights. The Hansen test and the test of second order autocorrelation
signalize that the validity of the instruments can not be rejected.
In the remaining columns of 2.1, we conduct several robustness checks for our
basic specification. Column four reveals that an increase in the private investment
share enhances TFP-growth. However, the corresponding coefficient of inflation is
still significant on a 5% level even after controlling for the fluctuations in aggregate
investments. We infer that the transmission channel of inflation is independent from
private factor accumulation. This result affirms our conjecture that inflation affects
the quality (composition) of private investments instead of their quantity.14 Column
five shows that our results are robust to the inclusion of time fixed effects which control
for aggregate shocks that are common for all countries in each time period. In column
six and seven, we try to discriminate empirically between level and uncertainty effects
of inflation. Therefore, we incorporate the standard deviation of inflation as a proxy
13We stress that the average effect of a 1% point increase is relatively small since some countries
experienced excessive inflation rates. In particular, inflation varies from 0-6000% while TFP-growth
varies from -10-10% in our sample. This reduces the average marginal effect of a 1% point increase
substantially. We outline below that the average marginal effects are much larger if we focus on the
OECD sub-sample or U.S. time series data.
14This result is in line with the earlier findings of Ramey and Ramey (1995) and Aghion et al.
(2005) on (nominal) volatility and GDP-growth.
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for inflation uncertainty.15 The standard deviation significantly reduces TFP-growth
if we abstract from level effects. Yet, we exclusively find a significant negative effect of
the level of inflation if we account for both uncertainty and level effects. However, we
note that the level and the standard deviation of inflation are highly correlated in our
sample. Nevertheless, these results suggest that the distorting impact of inflation is
due to movements in the level of inflation instead of changes in inflation uncertainty.
Finally, the last column of 2.1 displays the results for the sub-sample of 22 OECD
countries. Accordingly, a 5% increase in inflation reduces TFP-growth in this sub-set
of developed economies, on average, by .35% in the same time period.16 The negative
coefficient is significant on a 1% level. The coefficient in the OECD sub-set is more
pronounced since many countries suffered from periods of excessive inflation. This
reduces the marginal effect of a 1% point increase in inflation if we consider the full
sample. The result supports the hypothesis that inflation reduces TFP-growth even
in regions/periods of moderate or low inflation. Summing up, the aggregate results
highlight a negative empirical relation between inflation and TFP-growth in the data
with causality running from the former to the latter.
2.4 The model
In this section, we introduce an endogenous growth model which accounts for short-run
nominal and financial frictions to illuminate the long-run negative causation running
from inflation to TFP-growth. The economy is populated by two sets of agents,
households and entrepreneurs, each of unit mass. Moreover, there are a financial
intermediation and a productive sector. The latter is organized in decentralized firms,
15Uncertainty is measured as the average annual standard deviation for a corresponding 5-year-
interval.
16A 1% increase in inflation reduces the average annual U.S. TFP-growth by .4% if we exclusively
focus on yearly U.S. time series data from 1975-2000. In this case, we employ the first two lags of
inflation as instruments for the contemporaneous levels. The results are available from the authors
upon request.
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Table 2.1: Aggregate data: 5-year-averages: Inflation & TFP growth
TFP growth
OLS LSDV GMM-sys GMM-sys GMM-sys GMM-sys GMM-sys GMM-sys
infl -.0014∗∗∗ -.0009∗∗∗ -.0020∗∗∗ -.0016∗∗ -.0022∗∗∗ -.0059∗∗ -.0646∗∗∗
(-7.33) (-4.17) (-2.74) (-2.44) (-2.96) (-2.05) (-2.85)
infl-vol -.0009∗∗ .0026∗
(-2.01) (1.66)
credit .2479 -.7932 .7770 -.5247 .8965 .7517 .0139 .4846
(.54) (-.93) (.69) (-.46) (.81) (.66) (.01) (.58)
trade .0021 .0154 .0066 .0027 .0047 .0079 .0076
(.82) (.96) (1.05) (.35) (.87) (1.22) (1.38)
ki .1309∗∗∗
(2.21)
ppr .3130∗∗∗ .1759 .4452∗∗∗ .3656∗∗ .4182∗∗ .4294∗∗ .4779∗∗∗ -.2293∗
(3.58) (1.26) (2.94) (2.53) (2.81) (2.92) (3.32) (-1.71)
kg -.0113 -.0687 -.0243 -.0145 -.0214 -.0257 -.0145 -.0606
(-.59) (-.79) (-.87) (-.54) (-.81) (-.95) (-.54) (-1.07)
tot -.0066 -.0013 -.0055 -.0164 -.0058 -.0062 -.0047 .2247∗∗
(-.87) (-.12) (-.59) (-1.54) (-.66) (-.67) (-.51) (2.18)
lag dep. var. -.0049∗∗∗ -.0229∗∗∗ -.0180∗∗∗ -.0183∗∗∗ -.0162∗∗∗ -.0171∗∗∗ -.0151∗∗∗ -.6202∗∗∗
(-3.24) (-5.28) (-5.53) (-5.07) (-5.52) (-5.41) (-5.65) (-4.20)
time-FE - - - - yes - -
Cou./Obs. 86/363 86/363 86/363 86/363 86/363 86/362 86/362 22/107
2. auto-cor. - - 0.127 0.129 0.175 0.113 0.211 0.385
Hansen-test - - 0.122 0.287 0.161 0.108 0.195 0.939
We specify inflation, inflation-volatility, credit, trade and the investment share as endogenous and property rights,
government share and terms of trade as exogenous variables in the GMM system estimation. Inflation volatility
is measured by the average standard deviation of yearly inflation rates. Predetermined lagged level of TFP as
lagged dependent variable.
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which have access to two distinct technologies: a basic technology which is return-
dominated but risk-free and a more productive but risky advanced technology.17 There
exist various interpretations of what the two types of investments represent. For
example, the basic project might reflect investments in machines of the same vintage
relative to previous ones, while the advanced project might represent investments in
R&D, the learning a new skill, or the adoption of a new technology.18 The timing
structure underlying our model is as follows. Time is discrete, and within each period
t, there are three points in time: one at the beginning of the period when government
policy materializes and information about it is revealed, denoted t−, one at an interim
stage, and finally one at the end of the period, denoted t+. Monetary policy, which is
perfectly observable before individual decisions are realized each period, is the only
source of aggregate uncertainty since we focus on the inflation-growth nexus. Apart,
there exist purely idiosyncratic liquidity shocks ξit to the subset of firms operating
the advanced technology. We now turn to a detailed description of the environment
in which the economy’s agents interact and define their relevant decision problems as
well as the long-run balanced growth path of the economy.
2.4.1 Households
The economy is populated by a unit mass of infinitely-lived, risk averse households.19
Households enter a given period t with a nominal wealth position Mt. At time t
−,
households divide their nominal wealth into resources Qt disposable for consumption
later in the period and deposits Mt−Qt with a financial intermediary that earn a net
17As a general rule, variables pertaining to the basic sector are indicated by the variable/superscript
k, while z is the relevant indicator for the advanced sector.
18Similarly, the basic project might be putting money into the current business, while the advanced
reflects the start-up of a new business. See Aghion et al. (2005) for further discussion.
19Where necessary, variables pertaining to the household sector will be denoted with a superscript
H.
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interest rate (R˜t − 1).20 Thus, there is a cash constraint on the goods market with
the consequence that the household’s current expenditure for consumption cHt must
be covered by the resources Qt. After aggregate shocks have unfolded, households
rent out their sector-specific physical capital to the firms which operate a portfolio
of projects using the basic and advanced technology, respectively. Moreover, they
supply their labor inelastically. That is, each household is endowed with a constant
amount of labor which can be used for either of the two intermediate sectors, whereby
households are indifferent as to the sectoral composition of their labor supply. Hence,
the constant aggregate supply of household labor amounts to: h
H
= hHt = h
k,H
t +h
z,H
t .
Since households are indifferent as to where their labor is employed the sectoral wage
rates must be identical in equilibrium, i.e. W k,Ht = W
z,H
t = W
H
t . At time t
+,
households receive the returns from labor (W k,zt ) and capital (R
k,z
t ) and make their
consumption decisions. The household has preferences over sequences of consumption;
hence, the household problem is to maximize lifetime utility:
E0−
∞∑
t=0
βtu(cHt ) (2.1a)
subject to the cash constraint:
Qt ≥ Pt
[
cHt + xt
]
, (2.1b)
and an equation describing the evolution of nominal assets:
Mt+1 = Qt − PtcHt + R˜t[Mt −Qt + Jt] + Υt
+ W k,Ht h
k,H
t +W
z,H
t h
z,H
t +R
k
t kt +R
z
t zt, (2.1c)
20This timing convention is standard in monetary models which feature a cash-in-advance con-
straint on the household side; compare e.g. Lucas (1990). Our timing convention necessitates a
careful treatment of the information sets relevant to the household when it takes decisions. Specifi-
cally, there is a distinction between expectation operators at the beginning of a period (time t−) and
at the end of a period (time t+).
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where Jt are cash injections into the financial market on behalf of the government
and Υt are nominal resources redistributed in a lump sum fashion among the con-
sumers at the end of the period, and subject to a law of motion for physical capital
xt = kt + zt, which accounts for depreciation:
xt = (kt+1 + zt+1)− (1− δ)(kt + zt) (2.1d)
The solution to the household problem can be summarized by a set of optimality
conditions which characterize the household’s equilibrium behavior. The first one is
the Euler equation describing the optimal inter-temporal allocation of nominal wealth:
Et−
{
uc(c
H
t )
Pt
− βR˜tuc(c
H
t+1)
Pt+1
}
= 0 (2.2)
Equation (2.2) implies a type of Fisher relation in that the nominal interest rate is
a function of the rate of inflation and the real interest rate in equilibrium. The latter
is in turn governed by the balanced growth rate of consumption and parameters of the
utility function. Next, there are two Euler equations which determine the sequence of
dynamic decisions between consumption and sector-specific investments; for i = k, z:
uc(c
H
t ) = βEt
{
uc(c
H
t+1)
[
(1− δ) + r
i
t+1
R˜t+1
]}
, (2.3)
where rit+1 =
Rit+1
Pt+1
is the real rental rate of capital in sector i in period (t + 1). An
immediate implication of the two equations (2.3) is that the sector-specific rental rates
must be equal in expectation, i.e. Et{rkt+1} = Et{rzt+1} = Et{rt+1}.
2.4.2 Entrepreneurs
Apart from households, there is a unit mass of risk neutral entrepreneurs, each one
capable of running a specific project associated with the advanced production tech-
nology.21 At the beginning of each period, a mass (1− η) of new-born entrepreneurs
21Apart from the fact that investments in the advanced project might represent investments in
human capital, we do not consider limitations in that production factor. Yet, a straightforward
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enters the economy without any initial wealth and replaces an equal measure of re-
tiring entrepreneurs.22 The remaining measure η of incumbent entrepreneurs stays
active. An individual entrepreneur arrives in period t with an amount Ait of nominal
wealth. Then, if she receives a random exit signal, she waits until the end of the
period to simply consume her accumulated wealth such that Ait = Ptc
E,i
t . In con-
trast, new entrants and entrepreneurs who have not received the exit signal have no
consumption motive; rather, each active entrepreneur inelastically supplies her (unit)
labor endowment hEt = h
k,E
t + h
z,E
t = 1 and thus augments her nominal wealth A
i
t by
her current wage earnings WEt . Hence, an individual entrepreneur’s effective wealth
position is Eit = A
i
t + W
E
t . This position E
i
t constitutes the entrepreneur’s necessary
private equity stake when she applies for funding of an advanced sector project with
the financial intermediary.
2.4.3 Financial intermediary
The financial intermediary (equivalently, a perfectly competitive financial sector) re-
ceives the time t− financial deposits Mt−Qt from the households as well as lump sum
cash injections Jt from the monetary authority. These funds are supplied to the loan
market at a gross nominal interest rate R˜t. At the loan market, this supply meets the
demand for nominal financial assets coming from the demand for liquidity Dt of firms
operating the advanced technology. Hence, financial market clearing requires:
Mt −Qt + Jt = Dt (2.4)
This condition simply stipulates that the equilibrium interest rate R˜t balances the
supply of loans with the corporate demand for funds due to its need for liquidity. The
financial intermediary operates after monetary policy is resolved and lends liquidity to
way to think about restrictions in the economy’s endowment of human capital (in our model) is an
endogenous mass of risk neutral entrepreneurs, which are capable of running the advanced project.
22Where necessary, variables pertaining to the entrepreneurial sector will be denoted with a su-
perscript E.
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the advanced sector firms. Yet, the provision of funds to advanced projects is compli-
cated by an entrepreneurial moral hazard problem which is dealt with by a financial
contract described in Section 2.4.5. Two key implication of that contracting scheme
are that firm bankruptcy is an equilibrium phenomenon and that the intermediary
must commit funds to individual advanced sector projects before these projects’ re-
spective liquidity needs are known. Therefore, it is important to recognize that the
financial intermediary is able to pool idiosyncratic risks across the advanced sector
firms. As a consequence, it is sufficient for the financial intermediary to break even
on an individual credit relationship in expectation. At the end of the period, the
intermediary receives the returns on its lending and financial investment activity and
pays the amount R˜t[Mt −Qt + Jt] to the households in return for their deposits.
2.4.4 Firms
In our economy, production activities proceed in two different steps. First, investments
in basic and advanced technologies results in two different types of intermediate goods
(ykt , y
z
t ). Second, the two types of intermediates are combined to produce the final
market good (yt) that is used for consumption purposes. In all three goods markets,
firms face perfect competition.
Market good
The market good producers employ the following CES aggregation technology:
yt =
(
ζ
1
ρykt
ρ−1
ρ + (1− ζ) 1ρyzt
ρ−1
ρ
) ρ
ρ−1
, (2.5)
where the two parameters 0 < ζ < 1 and ρ > 0 determine the share of each interme-
diate good in producing the aggregate market good and the elasticity of substitution
of the two factors.
Productive efficiency pins down the minimum cost combination of the final good
firms’ demands for intermediate input goods to be functions of the relative prices for
the relevant intermediate input P jt , j = k, z and for the final output Pt:
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ykt = ζ
(
P kt
Pt
)−ρ
yt and y
z
t = (1− ζ)
(
P zt
Pt
)−ρ
yt (2.6)
By perfect competition on the final goods market, the aggregate price level is
determined by marginal costs, i.e. the intermediate good prices, which are constant
from the final good firm’s perspective. Consequently, zero profits imply:
Pt =
(
ζP kt
1−ρ
+ (1− ζ)P zt 1−ρ
) 1
1−ρ
(2.7)
Intermediate goods
There are two perfectly competitive sectors producing intermediate goods. Both
sectors employ capital as well as labor as input goods, but are characterized by
different technologies. On the one hand, there is a safe, but return-dominated (basic)
technology; the other (advanced) technology yields a higher potential return, but is
subject to idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. The scope for an individual advanced firm’s
insurance against this idiosyncratic liquidity risk is endogenously determined via
the financial contract described in Section 2.4.5. The need for this insurance arises
as a consequence of an entrepreneurial moral hazard problem which prevents the
efficient refinancing of advanced projects and calls for the commitment of liquidity
at an ex ante, rather than an ex post stage. A natural way to think about advanced
technology projects are investments in R&D or the adoption of new (foreign)
technologies. We assume, in accordance with the literature on endogenous growth,
that investments in the advanced technology involve spill-overs to the future stock
of knowledge (Tt).23 Consequently, aggregate productivity has two components: an
exogenous and an endogenous one. The exogenous productivity parameters differ
in both sectors, whereby the productivity of the advanced technology is strictly
larger than the basic one by definition (V > A). We abstract from variations in the
23Compare Romer (1990) or Aghion and Howitt (1992). It does not matter in our framework if the
spill-overs reflect actual investments in R&D or the scope of the advanced technology for accidental
learning-by-doing.
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exogenous productivity parameters over time since we focus on the growth-effect
of short-run nominal fluctuations instead of technology-induced cycles. In addition
to the exogenous components of productivity, there is an endogenous one. The
endogenous component Tt, which we call the level of knowledge, augments the
productivity of both projects; the determination of Tt will be described later. Note
that the advanced sector is characterized by perfect competition. Hence, investments
in R&D take place not because of a monopolistic market structure, but due to the
incentives for firms to optimize the composition of their investments. That is, the risk
associated with R&D investments combined with the financial market incompleteness
limit the capacity of R&D ex ante. Consequently, as opposed to the endogenous
growth literature a` la Romer (1990) or Aghion and Howitt (1992), the key feature of
R&D is not the creation of monopoly rents, but its superior productivity combined
with the risk associated to it.
Basic sector: Firms in the basic sector seek to maximize time t+ profits by hiring
labor and capital inputs {lkt , kt}, whereby the vector of prices {P kt ,W kt , Rkt , R˜t} is taken
as given. A Cobb-Douglas aggregator converts household and entrepreneurial labor
inputs into their effective composite, and similarly agent-specific wages aggregate to
a sectoral wage rate:
lkt =
(hk,Ht )
Ω(hk,Et )
(1−Ω)
(Ω)Ω(1− Ω)(1−Ω) and W
k
t = (W
k,H
t )
Ω(W k,Et )
(1−Ω)
The technology characterizing the basic intermediate sector is assumed to be ho-
mogenous of degree one. For simplicity, we employ the Cobb-Douglas form:
ϕ(kt, l
k
t ) = (kt)
α (lkt )1−α
Hence, the problem of a representative firm operating the basic technology is:
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max
{kt,lkt }
Πkt = P
k
t
(TtAϕ(kt, lkt ))−W kt lkt −Rkt kt
= P kt y
k
t − C(W kt , Rkt ; ykt ) (2.8)
By constant returns to scale, efficient factor employment implies that marginal costs
are independent of the quantity produced, i.e. C(W kt , R
k
t ; y
k
t ) = MC
k
t (W
k
t , R
k
t ; 1)y
k
t .
Then, from the assumption of perfectly competitive intermediate goods markets, it
follows that the price of the basic intermediate good equals marginal costs, i.e. P kt =
MCkt (W
k
t , R
k
t ). Using the Cobb-Douglas specification of ϕ(kt, l
k
t ), the optimal factor
demands in the basic sector read:
kt =
αP kt y
k
t
Rkt
and lkt =
(1− α)P kt ykt
W kt
(2.9)
Finally, the price for the basic intermediate good is:
P kt =
1
TtA
(
Rkt
α
)α(
W kt
(1− α)
)(1−α)
(2.10)
Advanced sector: The problem of firms operating the advanced technology is
complicated by the risk that their production plan is hit by a liquidity shock24 which
may trigger the termination of productive projects before they yield any return. We
assume that all advanced projects feature an ex post positive net present value if
the entrepreneur has exerted effort. As in the basic sector, there is a Cobb-Douglas
24The liquidity shock admits a variety of interpretations. It can be thought of a simple cost
overrun, as a shortfall of revenue at an interim stage which could have been used as an internal
source of refinancing, as adverse information relating to the project’s end-of-period profitability, an
extra cost to familiarize the workers with the new technologies, or as an extra costs necessary for
the new technology to be adapted to domestic market conditions once the new technology has been
adopted. Hence, we stress that our notion of liquidity shock is consistent with what Opler et al.
(1999) empirically summarize under the heading of operating losses.
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aggregation of the respective labor inputs by households and entrepreneurs, and the
technology in the advanced sector is also given by a Cobb-Douglas production function
under constant returns to scale:
φ(zt, l
z
t ) = (zt)
α (lzt )
1−α
Each advanced firm is run by an individual entrepreneur who brings the amount Eit
as private equity into the firm. The firm’s production plan and its hedge against liq-
uidity shocks ξit, which are distributed according to a continuous distribution function
G(ξit) with associated (strictly positive) density g(ξ
i
t), are then determined as part of
a constrained-efficient contract between the entrepreneur and the financial intermedi-
ary. In particular, the liquidity provision stipulated by the financial contract will be
seen to pin down a threshold value ξˆ∗t up to which liquidity shocks are covered; this
threshold, in turn, determines an individual advanced firm’s ex ante survival prob-
ability G(ξˆ∗t ). Since the financial contract, derived in Section 2.4.5, turns out to be
linear in Eit , the distribution of equity across entrepreneurs does not matter and exact
aggregation is possible.25 Hence, we anticipate results and note in analogy to the
basic sector that the price level for the intermediate goods produced in the advanced
sector is:
P zt =
1
R˜t
∫ ξˆ∗t
0
G(ξt)dξt
1
TtV
(
Rzt
α
)α(
W zt
(1− α)
)(1−α)
(2.11)
The details of the financial contract are described in the next section.
2.4.5 Financial contracting
Following Holmstrom and Tirole (1998), we now turn to a detailed analysis of the
contracting problem which is specific to the advanced technology. In principle, all
investment projects might face constraint financing opportunities. In this respect,
25From now on, we will therefore drop the superscript i.
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the exact identifying assumption in our model is that the riskiness of an investment
project is, on average, increasing in its productivity. However, we separate the tech-
nology choices into two classes according to their productiveness whereas the riskiness
of less productive projects is normalized to zero to simplify the analysis of our model.
The sequencing of events underlying an individual advanced firm’s within-period con-
tracting problem can be decomposed into three stages.26
At stage one, after information about monetary policy (Jt) is unveiled, each ad-
vanced firm, run by an entrepreneur holding an equity position Et in the firm, con-
tracts with the financial intermediary to pin down its production plan and refinanc-
ing provisions.27 In particular, the refinancing provisions determine the degree of
insurance against idiosyncratic liquidity risk.28 Thereafter, a contract between the
financial intermediary (outside investor) and the entrepreneur (firm) holding equity
Et prescribes (i) the scale of production as determined by factor employment zt, l
z
t ,
(ii) a state contingent continuation rule Γt(ξt), and (iii) a state contingent trans-
fer τt(ξt) from the firm to the investor. Hence, a generic contract takes the form
Ct = {zt, lzt ,Γt(ξt), τt(ξt)}. A constraint on the contract is that it is written under
limited liability, i.e. in case of project termination factors must be remunerated by
the outside investor. At a subsequent interim stage (stage two) after the factor em-
ployment decisions have been made, the firm is hit by an idiosyncratic liquidity shock
ξt. If the shock is met by appropriate refinancing to be provided by the intermedi-
26Although the firm’s production plan is conditional on the predetermined entrepreneurial eq-
uity position Et, the firm problem itself is not dynamic because entrepreneurial asset accumulation
proceeds mechanically and there is no inter-temporal incentive provision.
27We assume that entrepreneurial self-financing is not possible; a sufficient condition for this to be
the case is derived in Appendix B.
28It is important to realize that the financial contract is negotiated after fresh cash Jt has been
injected into the economy. Consequently, the results of monetary policy that we will develop in the
sequel do not stem from an implicit nominal rigidity. On the contrary, our concept of corporate
liquidity is entirely real; what is affected by nominal fluctuations, however, is the price of such
liquidity.
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ary, the firm can continue; otherwise the firm is liquidated.29 After the continuation
decision, there is scope for moral hazard on the part of the entrepreneur in that she
can exert effort to affect the distribution of production outcomes. Specifically, we
define that, conditional on continuation, exerting effort guarantees a gross return of
P zt TtVf(zt, lzt ) = P zt y˜zt to production activity, while shirking leads to zero output,
but generates a private (non-monetary) benefit Bt. We assume that the private ben-
efit is proportional to firm revenue conditional on survival; in particular, we have:
Bt = bP
z
t TtVf(zt, lzt ) = bP zt y˜zt with 0 < b < 1.30 Finally, at stage three, the revenue
from production accrues and payoffs are realized according to the rules stipulated in
the financial contract. The financial intermediary engages in a continuum of contracts
with advanced sector firms; hence, since liquidity risk is idiosyncratic, the interme-
diary is able to pool the risk inherent in the investments across individual firms’
projects. As an implication, we can completely abstract from the effects of idiosyn-
cratic uncertainty on the investor’s evaluation of payoffs. Similarly, the entrepreneur
who is exposed to her uninsured private equity risk is risk neutral and cares only
about expected profits as long as she is active.
Hypothetically abstracting from both the entrepreneurial incentive constraint and
the cost of obtaining liquidity at the interim stage, it is easy to see that there exists
a unique cutoff value of one corresponding to a continuation policy which prescribes
project continuation if and only if the liquidity shock is such that ξ ≤ 1. The reason
is that the stage one investment is sunk; hence, at the interim stage, it is optimal
to refinance up to the full value of what can be generated in terms of revenue at the
final stage. However, the need to take into account the incentive constraint and the
costs of liquidity provision implies that the constrained-efficient continuation policy
will take the form:
29We assume that the liquidity shock is verifiable, but it is shown in Holmstrom and Tirole (1998)
that nothing changes if only the firm observes the shock as long as the firm does not benefit from
diverting resources.
30Note, however, that the specific value of b > 0 will not matter as long as the contract to be
derived below delivers an interior solution.
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Γt(ξt) =
 1, if ξt ≤ ξˆt0, if ξt > ξˆt
for some cutoff value ξˆt < 1. Hence, Γt(ξt) is a simple indicator function with
Γt(ξt) = 1 in case of continuation and Γt(ξt) = 0 in case of termination.
A constrained-efficient contract Ct = {zt, lzt ,Γt(ξt), τt(ξt)} with (zt, lzt ) determining
the scale of production, and Γt(ξt) and τt(ξt) pinning down the state contingent poli-
cies for project continuation and transfers per unit of production costs C (W zt , R
z
t ; y˜
z
t ),
respectively, then solves the following second best program of maximizing the en-
trepreneur’s net return:
max
Ct
∫
{Γt(ξt)P zt y˜zt − τt(ξt)C (W zt , Rzt ; y˜zt )} dG(ξt)− Et (2.12a)
subject to a participation constraint for the investor that requires him to break
even in expectation:
∫ {
τt(ξt)C (W
z
t , R
z
t ; y˜
z
t )− Γt(ξt)ξtR˜tP zt y˜zt
}
dG(ξt) ≥ C (W zt , Rzt ; y˜zt )− Et (2.12b)
and a state-by-state incentive compatibility constraint for the entrepreneur:
Γt(ξt)P
z
t y˜
z
t − τt(ξt)C (W zt , Rzt ; y˜zt ) ≥ Γt(ξt)bP zt y˜zt ∀ ξt, (2.12c)
where:
y˜zt = TtV (zt)α (lzt )1−α
is firm-level output conditional on survival and:
C (W zt , R
z
t ; y˜
z
t ) = W
z
t l
z
t +R
z
t zt
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are the associated total costs which accrue when a output level of y˜zt is targeted in
case of survival.
Note how the specification of this problem, by means of the participation constraint
(2.12b), incorporates the requirement that the investor who bears the risk of project
failure be willing to finance the firm, whereby the outside investor commits both the
factor remuneration and the interim resources needed to meet the liquidity shock.
The cost of providing liquidity at the interim stage, which has to be obtained in the
financial market at the financial rate R˜t, will be key in shaping the solution to problem
(2.12).
The algebraic solution to the optimal contract defined in (2.12) is provided in
Appendix B. Intuitively, the constraint optimal contract implies that the firm is the
residual claimer of the return of investment given that the outside investor breaks even
in expectations. Thus, the firm wants to maximize the initial scale of investment. If
we define ξˆ0t =
1−b
R˜t
as the cutoff value that maximizes the expected marginal return to
outside investors, it follows that the optimal cutoff value, which defines the equilibrium
provision of liquidity at the interim stage, must be in the interval ξˆ∗t ∈ [ξˆ0t , ξˆFBt ]. That
is, if ξt < ξˆ
0
t , then both parties prefer to continue ex post because both parties can
realize gains on the investment in the sunk stage one; if ξt > ξˆ
FB
t , then both parties
prefer to abandon the project because the net social marginal return of continuing is
negative. Within the interval [ξˆ0t , ξˆ
FB
t ], there emerges a trade-off: On the one hand,
increasing ξˆt implies that continuation is possible in more contingencies, and thus
the marginal net social return λt(ξˆt) on each unit of initial investment is increased.
On the other hand, decreasing ξˆt allows to increase the amount of initial investment
MCzt (·)y˜zt .
The solution of the constraint efficient contract results in an the optimal continu-
ation value ξˆ∗t that satisfies the optimality condition:
∫ ξˆ∗t
0
G(ξt)dξt =
MCzt (·)
P zt
1
R˜t
(2.13)
This condition reflects that the maximum equilibrium provision of liquidity must
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coincide with the adjusted markup on advanced sector output prices, whereas the
adjustment represents the cost of providing liquidity which is given by the nominal
interest rate (R˜t).
Hence, second best contracting is indeed consistent with liquidity holdings at the
firm-level, whereby the nominal interest rate R˜t reflects the shadow price for such
scarce liquidity. Moreover, we can derive a measures of aggregate liquidity demand
under financial intermediation by aggregating over the advanced sector firms:
D∗t =
[∫ ξˆ∗t
0
ξtg(ξt)dξt
]
P zt y˜
z
t < D¯t (2.14)
Thus, the second best liquidity demand under financial intermediation, which effi-
ciently economizes on the use of scarce liquidity by pooling liquidity risk across firms,
falls below the demand that results from a policy which disregards the scope for risk
sharing across firms.
2.4.6 Empirical implications
As an immediate consequence of optimal financial contracting as derived in Section
2.4.5 and B.1, we put on record the following empirical implications of optimal fi-
nancial contracting as governed by equation (2.13), which will be subject of our later
empirical analysis of industry and firm-level panel data.
• H1: Ceteris paribus31, an increase in R˜t leads to a lower cutoff ξˆ∗t :
dξˆ∗t
dR˜t
= −
∫ ξˆ∗t
0
G(ξt)dξt
R˜tG(ξˆ∗t )
< 0, (2.15)
31The claimed result obtains if, to a first approximation, MC
z
t (·)
P zt
remains constant. That is, the
results derived in the following are valid from a partial equilibrium perspective; taking into account
general equilibrium effects does not change the qualitative (sign) properties of the relevant derivatives.
However, to obtain a closed-form solution, we have to determine a functional form of G(ξ). It is
shown in Appendix B that the general equilibrium effect is negative if G′ > 0.
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which follows from total differentiation of condition (2.13).
Thus, quite intuitively, higher nominal interest rates R˜t lead to smaller hedging
against idiosyncratic liquidity shocks because the intermediary’s participation con-
straint gets tighter in line with the increased costs of providing liquidity. In order to
examine the effects of other changes in the economic environment on firms’ liquidity
demand, we establish two auxiliary results.
First, increased volatility of the liquidity shock distribution G(·) in the sense of
a mean-preserving spread implies a lower cutoff value ξˆ∗t ; formally
dξˆ∗t
dσξ
< 0.32 The
intuition behind this result is that increased risk makes the option to terminate the
project more valuable. The empirical prediction therefore is that firms operating in a
more volatile environment are insured to a smaller degree.
• H2: Increased production risk (in the form of a mean-preserving spread of the
distribution G(·)) accentuates the negative effect of R˜t on the cutoff ξˆ∗t :
d
dσξ
(
dξˆ∗t
dR˜t
)
=
dξˆ∗t
dσξ
d
dξˆ∗t
(
dξˆ∗t
dR˜t
)
< 0, (2.16)
where the inequality follows from the fact that ξˆ∗t is decreasing in the volatil-
ity of the shock distribution and differentiation of expression (2.15) with respect to ξˆ∗t .
Second, situations where production by means of the advanced technology is more
profitable, i.e. situations characterized by lower ratios
MCzt (·)
P zt
, are predicted to feature
a lower ξˆ∗t ; formally
dξˆ∗t
d(MCzt /P
z
t )
> 0.33 The reason for the poorer insurance of more
profitable projects is the contracting trade-off underlying the choice of ξˆ∗t : While
a more generous provision with liquidity has the advantage of withstanding larger
32Variations in the standard deviation σξ need to be restricted to mean-preserving spreads, the
result then obtains by partial integration; compare Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995), chapter
6.
33This follows from total differentiation of condition (2.13), for given R˜t.
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shocks, it necessarily implies a lower stage one investment volume. Thus, for highly
profitable projects, both contracting parties prefer to cut ξˆ∗t in order to expand the
project size. Based on these results, we can derive two additional hypotheses relating
to the sensitivity of specific firms (or industries) to fluctuations in the nominal interest
rate.
• H3: Increased profitability accentuates the negative effect of R˜t on the cutoff
ξˆ∗t :
d
d(MCzt /P
z
t )
(
dξˆ∗t
dR˜t
)
=
dξˆ∗t
d(MCzt /P
z
t )
d
dξˆ∗t
(
dξˆ∗t
dR˜t
)
> 0, (2.17)
where the inequality follows from the fact that ξˆ∗t is increasing in the marginal-
cost-to-price ratio and differentiation of expression (2.15) with respect to ξˆ∗t .
2.4.7 Endogenous technical change
In this section, we describe the endogenous part of the productivity processes - the dy-
namics of Tt. As mentioned above, we assume that the advanced projects (yzt ) generate
spill-overs on the future stock of knowledge since they embody investments in R&D,
skills or the adoption of new technologies. Thus, the stock of knowledge/technologies
is characterized by the difference equation:
Tt+1 = Tt
(
1 + 
∫ 1
0
yzt,idi
)
= Tt
(
1 + 
∫ 1
0
G(ξˆ∗t )y˜
z
t,idi
)
(2.18a)
where 0 <  ≤ 1 represents the fraction of investments in the advanced technology
that involve knowledge spill-overs.
The law of motion specifies that productivity growth is increasing in productivity-
enhancing investments, whereby we suppose that only successful advanced investment
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projects create productivity spill-overs proportional to the contemporaneous stock of
knowledge.34 Note that the specification in (2.18a) is essentially the same as the
corresponding ones in the endogenous growth literature: the rate of technical change
is governed by investments in R&D, which, in our model, are part of the investments
in the advanced sector.35 In particular, we suppose that investments in R&D consist
of expenses for research labor and capital (e.g. research lab) which are combined
in a Cobb-Douglas fashion. Hence, given V , A and an initial level T0, the current
realization of the TFP-level depends on all successful past realizations of advanced
investment projects. Consequently, it depends on past realizations of inflation if
financial markets are incomplete.
Note that an increase in the stock of knowledge/technology (T ) enhances the pro-
ductivity in both sectors since we suppose that the new technology is not skill biased
- it can be adopted for both types of projects.
2.4.8 Government policy
In order to close the model, a specification for government policy is needed. We
suppose that government policy is governed by an exogenous process which consists
of periodic injections Jt of money in the financial market. Jt is implicitly defined
as Jt = (emgt − 1) (Mt + At), where mgt is the gross rate of money growth. Hence,
the aggregate of nominal wealth held by households and entrepreneurs is updated
according to:
(Mt+1 + At+1) = e
mgt (Mt + At) .
34Note that terminated advanced projects are liquidated before the entrepreneur exerts any effort
(moral hazard). Thus, it is assumed that these failed projects do not cause any knowledge externality.
35Compare, e.g., Romer (1990) or Aghion and Howitt (1992).
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2.5 Long-run balanced growth path
In this section, we demonstrate that the equilibrium growth rate along the long-run
balanced growth path is negatively related to the inflation rate. The important result
of the analysis shows that this is due to a compositional effect between investment
into the basic sector and investment into the advanced project.
Our setup allows to define a set of aggregate relations characterizing a competitive
equilibrium in each period. The definition of a competitive equilibrium in our economy
and the corresponding equilibrium relations are reported in Appendix B. Moreover,
(2.18a) concatenates a sequence of competitive equilibria. The long-run dynamics
of the model are fully governed by the law of motion of the endogenous stock of
technologies in (2.18a) because technological progress is the only source of endogenous
growth in this model:
γ = 
∫ 1
0
G(ξˆ∗)y˜zi di = y
z, (2.20)
where yz = y˜zG(ξˆ∗) is the aggregate level of (realized) output in the advanced
sector.36 As a consequence, we need to solve for the impact of the variables in our
model on the scale of successful advanced investment projects in order to analyze
the determinants of the long-run balanced growth path. The analysis of the impact
of inflation on the growth rate is carried out in three steps: First, we show that a
drop in the cutoff value for the optimal liquidity provision ξˆ∗ leads to a compositional
change of aggregate output towards the good produced in the basic sector. Second,
as already emphasized by hypothesis (H1), an increase in the nominal interest rate
reduces the optimal cutoff value and hence the insurance provided against idiosyn-
cratic liquidity risk in the advanced sector. Moreover, because the real rental rate of
capital is increasing in the nominal interest rate, the aggregate output level in the
advanced sector is strictly falling in the nominal interest rate. Third, it is shown that
36In the discussion of the balanced growth path, we leave out time subscripts for notational con-
venience.
80
the equilibrium level of the nominal interest rate itself is increasing in the inflation
rate.
Along the balanced growth path, the rental rates of capital and the wages in both
sectors must be equal. Consequently, since both the basic technology and the advance
technology employ the identical composition of capital and labor as input factors, the
associated total costs in the advanced sector, which accrue when an output level of
y˜z is targeted in case of survival, amount to V · M˜Cz = A ·MCk. Making use of
the optimal input factor demands and noting that MCk = P k in the basic sector, we
obtain:
yz
yk
=
V
A
G(ξˆ∗) (2.21)
In other words, the markup of prices over marginal costs in the advanced sector is
zero due to perfect competition if we abstract from the liquidation risk in the advanced
sector. Hence, the productivity adjusted marginal costs in both sectors are equal in
this case. If we differentiate (2.21) with respect to the cutoff-value (ξˆ∗), we obtain
the responsiveness of the intermediate output ratio with respect to changes in the
insurance of corporate liquidity shocks in the advanced sector:
d
(
yz
yk
)
dξˆ∗
=
V
A
g(ξˆ∗) > 0 (2.22)
Hence, the equilibrium ratio of investments in the advanced sector relative to the
basic sector is increasing in corporate liquidity holdings (ξˆ∗). Intuitively, lower cor-
porate liquidity holdings induce, on average, relatively more failure of advanced in-
vestment projects. In addition, this also leads to a reduction of investment into the
advanced technology as the advanced projects loose attractiveness in terms of ex-
pected revenues as compared to the basic technology. Moreover, it follows from H1
that this ratio is decreasing in the nominal interest rate R˜. That is, less liquidity is
devoted to the insurance of the advanced projects since the costs of liquidity holdings
increase.
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Finally, we know that the aggregated output level (y) is decreasing in the financial
rate (R˜) since on the one hand the real rental rate of capital increases in the financial
rate R˜ and on the other hand labor is constant.37 Because the nominal interest rate
R˜ reduces both, the ratio ( y
z
yk
) and the aggregate output level, it immediately follows
that it reduces production in the advanced sector, i.e.:
dyz
dR˜
< 0 (2.23)
Therefore, taken together with (2.20), we infer that the equilibrium balanced
growth rate is strictly increasing in the provision of liquidity according to the fi-
nancial contract. An increase in the amount of corporate liquidity holdings enhances
economic growth ( dγ
dξˆ∗
> 0). It follows from (H1) that the long-run balanced growth
rate is decreasing in the nominal interest rate (R˜). In fact, each equilibrium level of
the nominal interest rate implies a different long-run balanced growth rate: γ = γ(R˜).
Importantly, this link between a nominal variable and TFP-growth in the case of in-
complete financial markets is due to firm-level heterogeneity of investment projects.
The highlighted tradeoff between risk and productivity in our framework yields an
investment composition effects that results lower aggregate growth rates for higher
levels of the nominal interest rate as emphasized in the following implication:
• I1: An increase in R˜ leads to a lower long-run balanced growth rate γ by
reducing the liquidity holdings of firms in equilibrium:
dγ
dR˜
= 
dyz
dR˜
< 0 (2.24)
Moreover, (2.2) implies a type of Fisher equation in equilibrium between the nom-
inal interest rate and the level of inflation. In particular, we can re-write (2.2) as
follows if the economy is in a balanced growth equilibrium:
37This can be easily demonstrated by making use of the two inter-temporal Euler equations for
nominal wealth (2.2) and physical capital accumulation (2.3).
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R˜ = piφ(γ) (2.25)
In (2.25), pi = P
′
P
where P ′ denotes the price level in the next period. The de-
terministic function φ(γ) = uc(c
H)
βuc(c′H) depicts the marginal rate of substitution along
the long-run balanced growth path. For a standard (strictly concave) utility function
u(cH), φγ > 0. Total differentiation of condition (2.25) yields:
dR˜
dpi
=
φ
1− φγ dyzdR˜
> 0, (2.26)
which is strictly positive by I1. It follows that higher rates of inflation induce a
higher nominal interest rate if the economy is in a long-run balanced growth equilib-
rium. Consequently, economies that feature a higher level of (trend) inflation suffer
from reduced long-run productivity growth. Similarly, periods of high inflation within
a country reduce productivity growth while low-inflation periods cause a transition
to a higher balanced growth path.
• I2: An increase in the inflation rate pi leads to a lower long-run balanced growth
rate γ:
dγ
dp˜i
= 
dyz
dR˜
dR˜
dpi
< 0 (2.27)
Note that (2.20) implies that there exists a single long-run balanced growth rate
in the (first-best) case of complete financial markets (b = 0). In this case, the ex ante
pledgeable unit return complies with the ex post pledgeable unit return (ξˆFBt = ξˆ
∗
t ), so
that all investments projects in the advanced sector are re-financed:
∫ ξˆ∗t
o
G(ξ)dξ = 1.
Not surprisingly, it follows that the long-run balanced growth rate in a complete finan-
cial market economy dominates the growth rate in an economy that is characterized
by incomplete markets. Yet, the empirical firm-level evidence from Opler et al. (1999)
suggests that firms require liquidity holdings in order to invest in productive and risky
projects even in the U.S. economy.
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2.6 Empirical analysis
In this section, we employ disaggregate U.S. data to examine the specific microe-
conomic mechanism underlying our model. We do so in two steps, first exploiting
industry-level data and then firm-level data.
2.6.1 Sectoral level
Data and methodology: Our model provides a set of firm-level predictions (H1
- H3). It is straightforward to extend our one-sector model to a multi-sector setup,
whereby each individual industrial sector is a replica of the representative production
structure described in Section 4. The economy-wide TFP measure T can then be in-
terpreted as industry-specific productivity measures, and the contracting implications
H1 - H3 do apply not only for individual firms, but also for industrial sectors. Hence,
we can empirically test our hypotheses by means of industry-level data. As an impli-
cation of H2, we hypothesize that the response in terms of the cutoff ξˆ∗ to movements
in the nominal interest rate is stronger for firms operating in more volatile industries.
A positive correlation between the rate of inflation and nominal interest rates in equi-
librium (compare equation 2.26) and the fact that a lower ξˆ∗ ceteris paribus leads to
lower TFP-growth (compare equation (2.23)) then together imply that the negative
relation between TFP-growth and inflation is expected to be stronger in more volatile
sectors. In addition, we presume that firms operating in more productive sectors in
terms of their historically realized TFP-growth have had access and are more exposed
to superior investment opportunities. For given R˜, inspection of equation (B.2) re-
veals a link between the technology V available to a firm and its profitability P z
MCz
in
case of survival; the intuitive implication is that high productivity growth goes along
with high potential profitability. Hence, from H3, profitable firms operating in indus-
tries with high realized productivity growth are expected to react more sensitively to
higher inflation.
We apply 3-digit industry-level data for the U.S. to investigate these hypotheses.
The productivity of U.S. industrial sectors is measured by the yearly growth rate of
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real value added per industry from the UNIDO (2002) industrial statistics database.
The yearly data are available for 28 industries from 1963-2000.38 The classification of
3-digit U.S. industries with respect to average volatility (standard deviation) and av-
erage growth of productivity in our sample are reported in Table 2.2. The correlation
coefficient between these two rankings is positive 0.23 (s.e.=0.03) and significantly dif-
ferent from zero at a 1% level according to Spearman’s rank correlation test. Hence,
an independence of both rankings is rejected confirming that more volatile sectors
are characterized by higher average productivity growth.39 Therefore, identifying (i)
volatile and (ii) strongly growing sectors with industries that are highly exposed to
the advanced technology, we divide the sample according to the median, the first
and the fourth quartile of both measures. According to our theoretical model, the
differential impact of inflation on TFP-growth across the relevant sub-samples should
result from the different sensitivity of corporate liquidity holdings in response to higher
inflation and is expected to be more pronounced in the 14 (7) industries whose volatil-
ity/average productivity growth is above the median (in the first quartile).
We control for industry specific fixed effects in all estimations. Since the first lag
of the growth rate (or level) of value added is not significant at conventional levels
in any specification, we employ a static panel estimation. That is, we estimate the
following model:
yi,t = α+ β1Πt−1 + β2(Πt−1 ∗DVi) + β3Xt + ηi + i,t, i = 1, 2, ..., N, t = 1, 2, ..., T
(2.28)
where yi,t is the growth rate of real value added per industry, Πt−1 the first lag of
inflation, DVi a dummy which amounts to one for industries with an above median
(first quartile) volatility/mean, Xt a vector of aggregate control variables, N = 28
38We deflate the value added series in each sector with the economy-wide GDP-deflator.
39Among the ten most volatile sectors, we find industries such as professional & scientific equip-
ment, petroleum refineries, plastic products, industrial chemicals, iron and steel or non-ferrous met-
als. In contrast, the four least volatile sectors are food products, other chemicals, beverages and
printing and publishing.
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the number of cross-sections, T = 38 the number of time-periods, ηi industry specific
fixed effects,  the error term, and α and β parameters to be estimated.40
We cluster the error terms at the industry level so that the standard errors are
robust to within group (serial) correlation.41 Inflation is measured by the first differ-
ence of the natural logarithm of the economy-wide consumer price index. We include
the first lag of inflation (L.infl) due to the potential endogeneity of contemporaneous
measures. Apart, we include the contemporaneous level and the first lag of the
growth rate of GDP (GDP − growth), the private investment share (inv − share)
and the amount of overall credit (credit) as control variables. The latter variable
is often used as a proxy for the degree of financial market development in the literature.
Results: The first column in 2.3 reports the correlation between the first lag
of inflation and the growth rate of real value added for the full sample. We find
that an 1% increase in the economy-wide rate of inflation triggers, on average, a
drop in the sectoral growth rate of real value added by .96% after controlling for
changes in (lagged) GDP-growth, the private investment share and the overall supply
of credits. The next two columns, contrast the sensitivity of value added growth
with respect to inflation in high and low volatility sectors (above/below median). In
accordance with H2, we detect that the negative impact of inflation is significant in
both sub-samples, but on average 40% higher in the 14 highly volatile sectors. In
order to test for a statistical significance of the difference between both coefficient,
we interact the lag of inflation with a dummy variable which amounts to one for
high volatility industries (according to the median) and zero otherwise. Column four
reveals that the interaction is negative and significant on a 10% level. That is, the
distorting impact of an 1% increase in inflation aggravates, on average, by .32% if we
focus on high volatility as opposed to low volatility sectors. This effect is even more
pronounced if we compare the sensitivity in the seven most volatile sectors with the
40We also included a linear time trend, but it is not significant at conventional levels.
41Consequently, our results are not subject to the caveat raised by Moulton (1990).
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Table 2.2: USA: Sectoral volatility and mean of growth in value added per worker
Industries volatility ranking average growth ranking
Petroleum refineries 22.41135418 1 8.718858009 4
Non-ferrous metals 14.82056985 2 6.70920077 14
Iron and Steel 13.20761732 3 4.28101271 26
Wood products, except furniture 12.33161156 4 7.080945619 13
Professional & scientific equipment 11.82739193 5 9.520253349 3
Leather products 10.80728372 6 3.355740195 28
Industrial chemicals 9.80919931 7 6.565964224 17
Tobacco 9.466520079 8 9.765847611 2
Plastic products 9.047342577 9 11.40471846 1
Misc. Petroleum and coal products 8.966026705 10 7.523389904 8
Transport equipment 8.93003486 11 6.708187212 15
Pottery, china, earthenware 8.753001453 12 6.344808742 18
Machinery, except electrical 8.447901686 13 7.217618028 11
Footwear, except rubber or plastic 7.94506906 14 0.592402327 29
Machinery, electric 7.771043776 15 7.865959786 6
Furniture, except metal 7.139279992 16 7.311662001 10
Paper and products 7.022639071 17 7.458034007 9
Other non-metallic mineral products 6.880040345 18 5.97226836 23
Textiles 6.602291836 19 5.229363677 25
Rubber products 6.212744352 20 5.399295643 24
Other manufacturing products 5.895932472 21 6.204043301 20
Glass and products 5.803579219 22 6.009918041 22
Wearing apparel, except footwear 5.515015898 23 3.865111854 27
Fabricated metal products 5.513984278 24 6.108224644 21
Total manufacturing 5.035217269 25 7.183158099 12
Printing and publishing 4.634205085 26 8.18032749 5
Beverages 4.122690753 27 6.238331092 19
Other chemicals 3.660652642 28 7.535671621 7
Food products 2.840748937 29 6.661717672 16
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one in the residual 21 sectors. In particular, the sensitivity of value added growth
per industry with respect to inflation is, on average, 76% higher in the seven most
volatile sectors (.62/.81). The difference is significant on a 5% level. Thus, we are
able to link the inflation-sensitivity of sectoral TFP-growth to the average sectoral
volatility of productivity growth per industry. This systematic variation in the data is
consistent with the prediction of our model summarized in H2. Columns six to seven
of 2.3 classify the impact of inflation on productivity growth according to the median
and first quartile of the observed average productivity growth of a given industry in
the sample. In accordance with H3, column six reports that the negative impact
of inflation is more pronounced in industries whose average productivity growth is
above the sample median. Yet, the difference is not significant at conventional levels.
Moreover, the coefficient not significant and even positive if we focus on the seven
sectors that experienced the highest average productivity increase in the sample.
Overall, the results emerging from the analysis of industry-level corroborate our
theoretical predictions that the negative effect of inflation on TFP-growth varies sys-
tematically with the riskiness as measured by the sectoral volatility of value added
growth (H2) of investment portfolios across sectors. In particular, we interpret these
findings as supportive for our theoretical model’s distinction between the basic tech-
nology, which is normalized to be free of liquidity risk, and the advanced technology,
where idiosyncratic liquidity shocks give rise to a corporate demand for (partial) insur-
ance against such risk. In the next subsection, we will revisit the specific implications
arising from this setup on the basis of firm-level data.
2.6.2 Firm-level
Data and methodology: Microeconomic data on firm-level behavior allow for a
straightforward test of our specific theoretical mechanism. That is, our model pre-
dicts that corporate liquidity holdings are associated with investments in superior
technologies. Moreover, firms react to an increase in inflation (the nominal interest
rate) by reducing their liquidity holdings and by shifting their portfolio towards more
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Table 2.3: Inflation-sensitivity in volatile/high-growth vs. non-volatile/low-growth sectors
Growth rate of value added
full sample vol>med vol<1.qua full sample full sample full sample full sample
inflation -.9632∗∗∗ -1.19∗∗ -.7390∗∗∗ -.8014∗∗∗ -.8107∗∗∗ -.8700∗∗∗ -1.02∗∗∗
(-4.20) (-2.69) (-5.83) (-3.84) (-3.73) (-3.51) (-4.25)
infl∗dvol -.3235∗ -.6167∗∗
(-1.65) (-2.58)
infl∗dmean -.1981 .2379
(-.97) (1.14)
GDP-growth 1.20∗∗∗ 1.29∗∗ 1.10∗∗∗ 1.19∗∗∗ 1.19∗∗∗ 1.20∗∗∗ 1.19∗∗∗
(4.36) (2.67) (3.92) (4.36) (4.34) (4.36) (4.35)
L.GDP-growth -.7851∗∗∗ -.8938∗ -.6764∗∗∗ -.7851∗∗∗ -.7869∗∗∗ -.7839∗∗∗ -.7858∗∗∗
(-2.92) (-1.71) (-4.11) (-2.92) (-2.93) (-2.92) (-2.92)
credit -11.46∗∗∗ -15.01∗∗ -7.91∗∗∗ -11.46∗∗∗ -11.52∗∗∗ -11.42∗∗∗ -11.49∗∗∗
(-3.26) (-2.23) (3.86) (-3.26) (3.27) (3.52) (-3.27)
inv-share .5734∗∗ .8181 .3287 -.6305 .5734∗∗ .5720∗∗ .5741∗∗
(2.04) (1.55) (1.64) (2.04) (2.05) (2.03) (2.04)
Ind./Obs. 28/946 14/473 14/473 28/946 28/946 28/946 28/946
The correlation coefficient between the volatility- and mean rankings amounts to .23 (s.e. 0.03) according to
Spearman’s rank correlation test. 1963-2000 yearly data. Always include a constant. Heteroscedasticity- and
serial correlation robust s.e. t-statistics in parenthesis. ***,**,* significant at 1%, 5%, 10%.
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secure investments (H1). In order to test these hypotheses we employ U.S. firm-level
data from Compustat. The data relate to the balance sheets of U.S. nonfinancial firms
and cover the time period 1970-2000. We consider annual data since we expect that
firms frequently adjust their liquidity and investment portfolios to changes in the cost
of insurance.42 Overall, we have an unbalanced panel consisting of over 8000 firms.
We include the following firm-level data: R&D expenses, the amount of cash and mar-
ketable securities (corp.liquidity), the amount of total assets (assets), the operating
income (opincome), and the amount of retained earnings (reearn). All variables are
measured in millions of dollars. Corporate R&D investments are used as a proxy for
investments in superior technologies. The amount of cash and marketable securities
approximate a firm’s corporate liquidity holdings. The other measures serve as control
variables. In particular, we expect that investments in advanced technologies increase
with the size of a firm (assets), its operating income and its retained earnings. In
addition, we use the rate of inflation measured by the first difference of the natural
logarithm of the economy-wide consumer price index to investigate the effect of this
macroeconomic variable on firm-level liquidity and investment portfolios.43 We em-
ploy the GMM system estimator following Blundell and Bond (1998). Note that the
mix of macro- and microeconomic data allows for a direct inspection of causality. In
particular, the coefficient of inflation reflects the causal impact on (marginal) R&D
expenses of a single firm since the latter has no feedback-effect on the aggregate level
of inflation.
We point out that the empirical evidence provided by Opler et al. (1999), which
42As our model demonstrates, these frequent corporate portfolio adjustments have long-run em-
pirical implications for the relationship between inflation and TFP-growth which we confirm in our
aggregate empirical analysis in section 2.3. Moreover, we obtain qualitatively similar firm-level re-
sults if we focus on longer or shorter time horizons by applying 5-year averages or quarterly data,
respectively. The results are available from the authors upon request.
43We stress that our results based on the GMM system estimator do not suffer from an aggregation
bias, as outlined by Moulton (1990), since we employ heteroscedasticity- and serial correlation robust
standard errors to avoid within-group correlation.
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we outlined in section 2.2, already supports part of our specific microeconomic
mechanism. That is, the authors reveal that U.S. firms with higher growth opportu-
nities, which are approximated by a firm’s market-to-book value as well as its R&D
expenses, hold on average more liquid assets (cash and marketable securities) relative
to total assets. We see these empirical findings as strongly supportive of the relevance
of corporate liquidity holdings for the purpose of insuring superior production
activities. In this regard, we extend the analysis in Opler et al. (1999) by investi-
gating the impact of inflation on corporate cash holdings and firm-level R&D expenses.
Results: The first two columns of 2.4 confirm H1 which states that inflation
reduces corporate liquidity holdings. Accordingly, a 1% point increase in inflation
reduces corporate liquidity holdings, on average, by 2.4 million US dollar in the same
year. The corresponding coefficient is significant on a 1% level if we employ the
GMM system estimator. Note that the long-run effect is even more pronounced in
this dynamic model since a reduction in the lagged dependent variable further re-
duces future realization of corporate liquidity holdings. The corresponding long-run
effect of a 1% point increase in inflation amounts to -9.74 million US dollar.44 The
negative effect of an increase in inflation is independent of variations in total assets,
operating income, retained earnings or firm fixed effects. Column three and four of
2.4 display a negative correlation between inflation and firm-level R&D expenses after
controlling for the other firm-level variables. Note that the coefficient of inflation de-
clines substantially if we additionally control for corporate liquidity holdings. Column
five and six report our preferred estimation specification following Blundell and Bond
(1998). We find that firms reduce their investments in R&D significantly in years
of higher inflation. Accordingly, a 1% point increase in inflation reduces corporate
R&D expenses, on average, by .19 million US dollar in the same year and by 8.8
million US dollar in the long-run. This distorting impact declines, on average, by
44If β1 = 2.36 denotes the coefficient of inflation and ρ = .7578 the one of the lagged dependent
variable the long-run effect approximately amounts to β11−ρ .
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Table 2.4: U.S. firm-level yearly data: R&D versus investments
Corporate liquidity R&D inv
OLS GMM-sys OLS OLS GMM-sys GMM-sys GMM-sys GMM-sys
inflation -1.73∗∗∗ -2.36∗∗∗ -.1692∗∗∗ -.1291∗∗∗ -.1919∗ -.0612 .1771 -.5942
(-7.45) (-4.88) (-3.82) (-3.03) (-1.69) (-.66) (.14) (-.40)
corp. liquidity .0173∗∗∗ .0470∗∗∗ -.1099
(3.65) (2.95) (-.66)
assets .0056 .0055 -.0009∗∗ -.0011∗∗∗ -.0018∗ -.0019∗∗ -.0109 -.0063
(1.56) (.74) (-2.05) (-2.79) (-1.84) (-1.95) (-.40) (-.25)
opincome .0034 -.0003 .0115∗∗∗ .0109∗∗∗ .0298∗∗∗ .0225∗∗∗ .5931∗∗∗ .6211∗∗∗
(.09) (-.03) (3.65) (3.36) (3.39) (2.90) (4.27) (4.07)
reearn .0213 .0749∗∗ .0009 -.0001 .0011 -.0033 -.0418 -.0257
(1.49) (2.14) (.72) (-.09) (.48) (-1.03) (-.47) (-.32)
lag-dep.-var. .898∗∗∗ .7578∗∗∗ 1.03 1.00 .9782 .9248 .9773 .9634
(29.11) (9.44) (75.78) (59.16) (21.1) (14.8) (12.7) (13.6)
Firms 8285 8285 8287 8287 8287 8287 8276 8276
Observations 64681 64681 64708 64703 64708 64703 64494 64494
2. auto-cor. .479 .899 .854 .743 .771
Hansen-test .160 .046 .272 .109 .100
The maximum lag is restricted to 10 years in order to reduce the size of the IV matrix. 1970-2000 yearly data.
Heteroscedasticity robust s.e. t-statistics in parenthesis. ***,**,* significant at 1%, 5%, 10%.
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68% if we additionally control for corporate liquidity holdings. The resulting inflation
coefficient is no longer significant at conventional levels. Thus, the negative effect of
inflation disappears once we control for changes in corporate liquidity holdings. This
finding reveals that the negative impact of inflation on firm-level R&D investments
is transmitted via fluctuations in corporate liquidity holdings just like our theoretical
mechanism suggest, compare H1 and I2. Moreover, in accordance with Opler et al.
(1999), we detect a strong positive correlation between corporate liquidity holdings
and R&D which is significant at a 1% level. We reject the presence of second order
autocorrelation in all estimation specifications and the Hansen test of overidentifying
restrictions supports the validity of the instruments. Hence, the estimation speci-
fications appears to be well specified.45 In the last two columns of 2.4, we include
the corporate level of overall capital investments instead of specific R&D investments
as the dependent variable. Recall that our model predicts that only investments in
the advanced technology are negatively affected by inflation or a reduction in corpo-
rate liquidity holdings. Indeed, the results show that inflation does not influence the
overall quantity of corporate investments. Similarly, they are also not affected by the
level of corporate liquidity holdings. Thus, the distorting impact of inflation is specific
to investments in advanced technologies. Finally, note that the systematic pattern of
correlation between R&D specific corporate investments and inflation after controlling
for other firm characteristics clearly suggests that the negative inflation coefficient is
not just picking up time effects.46 Instead, there appears to be a systematic variation
in the data supporting our hypotheses.
Summing up, the firm-level results show that inflation has a negative impact on
firm-level R&D expenses. However, this effect disappears if we correctly control for
corporate holdings of cash and marketable securities. Thus, the impact of inflation
on firm-level investments in superior technologies is due to variations in corporate
45Inflation is considered as an exogenous variable (see above). The microeconomic variables are
considered as (potentially) endogenous.
46We also included a linear time trend, but it is not significant at conventional levels.
93
liquidity holdings. This empirical result directly approves the microeconomic mecha-
nism underlying our theoretical derivations of a negative aggregate relation between
inflation and long-run TFP-growth.
2.7 Conclusion of Chapter 2
The present chapter presents an endogenous growth model that combines elements
of the growth and business cycle literature: it considers financial markets frictions
and their interaction with short-run nominal constraints and endogenizes the pro-
ductivity process via an endogenous technology choice which is catalyzed by these
frictions. We demonstrate that inflation reduces long-run productivity growth in this
framework. Thus, TFP-growth is partially endogenized by relating changes in the
long-run balanced growth path of TFP to changes in monetary policy. The model
replicates the negative empirical long-run relationship between inflation and TFP-
growth as observed by Fischer (1993) and others adequately. In the empirical analy-
sis, we present micro-econometric evidence from disaggregated sectoral and firm-level
data that is consistent with our specific microeconomic mechanism underlying the
macroeconomic monetary transmission channel. In particular, we detect at the in-
dustry level that the negative effect of inflation on productivity-growth per sector
varies systematically with the riskiness (volatility) of investments in a sector (H2).
The firm-level data reveal that an increase in inflation is associated with reduced cor-
porate liquidity holdings in the U.S. economy (H1). In addition, aggregate inflation
has a negative impact on firm-level R&D expenses, whereas we are able to show that
the effect is due to fluctuations in corporate liquidity holdings just as the theoreti-
cal model suggests. Therefore, the general equilibrium implications of the constraint
optimal financial contracting scheme are consistent with micro-econometric empirical
evidence. In fact, the disaggregated empirical results confirm the relevance of our
specific monetary transmission channel even in developed countries such as the USA.
These microeconomic interactions lead to the key insight: the short-run interplay be-
tween inflation, the financial market friction and a firm’s compositional investment
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decision involve long-run consequences for TFP-growth. Hence, the model postulates
a novel aspect of monetary transmission in that movements in inflation are associated
with changes in the long-run growth path of TFP. Since differences in TFP explain
roughly 2/3 of cross-country income fluctuations, differences in trend inflation across
countries represent an important factor to account for these fluctuations. This re-
sult entails strong policy implications for some (emerging) economies since changes in
monetary policy regimes represent a relatively inexpensive way to catch up in terms
of TFP and to encourage private sector development.
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Chapter 3
Distributional effects of capital and
labor on economic growth
In the following, we propose a growth model for an economy consisting
of firms which are heterogeneous in technologies and input demands. We
show that the growth rate in this economy depends not only on changes
in the aggregate level of capital and labor, but also on changes in the al-
location of these inputs across firms. As the latter effects are neglected in
conventional growth models, they are misleadingly captured by the resid-
ual TFP measure. In contrast, we are able to quantify the influence of
these components. Our empirical analysis, which is based on structural
estimation from firm-level data, reveals that changes in allocation of capi-
tal and labor have pronounced effects on GDP-growth for most European
countries. Further, we take cross-country differences in the distributional
effects into account to improve conventional growth accounting exercises.
In particular, we find that they explain additionally up to 17% of growth
differences among 19 European countries. Consequently, allowing for het-
erogeneity in firm-level technologies and input demands increases the ex-
planatory power of the inputs.
3.1 Introduction
In the following, we propose a growth model for an economy consisting of firms which
are heterogeneous in technologies and input demands. We show that the growth rate
in this economy depends not only on changes in the aggregate level of capital and
labor, but also on changes in the allocation of these inputs across firms. As the latter
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effects are neglected in conventional growth models, they are misleadingly captured
by the residual measure, referred to as total factor productivity (TFP). In contrast,
we are able to quantify the influence of these components by structural estimation
from firm-level data. Further, we take cross-country differences in the distributional
effects into account to improve conventional growth accounting exercises.
Why do some countries grow and others stagnate?1 This question initiated the
growth accounting literature, which assigns cross-country differences in growth or
income to differences in physical and human capital as well as the unobservable effi-
ciency with which input factors are combined. The consensus view in this literature is
that only approximately one third of the cross-country growth or income differences is
explained by differences in input factors. The residual two thirds are left unexplained
and attributed to differences in the unobservable efficiency which is referred to as total
factor productivity (TFP).2 In this context, Abramovitz (1956) refers to TFP as the
measure of our ignorance.
The fact that TFP is unobservable and at the same time explains the major part
of cross-country differences triggered tremendous efforts to identify its determinants
in recent years.3 However, we show in this chapter that the above growth accounting
results have to be revised if one consistently aggregates over heterogeneous firms. In
order to illustrate the relevance of aggregation for growth models we briefly discuss
fundamental results of the aggregation literature.
The pillar of every macroeconomic growth model is an aggregate production func-
tion F , which relates aggregate capital K¯ and labor L¯ to aggregate output Y¯ , i.e.,
Y¯ = F (K¯, L¯). However, although there exists a well developed microeconomic the-
ory of production for a single firm, there is no corresponding theoretical foundation
for the entire economy. In fact, the aggregate production function suffers from two
1The Science magazine considers this question as one of the 125 “most compelling puzzles and
questions facing scientists today” (Science, 2005).
2See, for example, Caselli (2005), Hall and Jones (1999) or Jorgenson (2005).
3This issue is best summarized by the title of a recent paper by Prescott (1998) “Needed: A
Theory of Total Factor Productivity.”
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types of aggregation problems. The first, often referred to as the “measurement prob-
lem,” involves the aggregation of different types of capital, labor, and output within
a firm into one capital and labor input and one output. The second is concerned
with aggregation of heterogeneous technologies and input demands across firms into
their aggregate counterpart. These problems have been dealt with extensively in the
aggregation literature. Early works by Nataf (1948), Gorman (1953), and a series of
papers by Franklin Fisher (collected in Fisher (1993))4 have shown that in the absence
of perfect competition and perfect factor mobility the aggregate production function
F cannot be linked to microeconomic production functions unless all firms operate
according to identical and constant returns to scale technologies.
A frequent short-cut that circumvents the problem of aggregation over heteroge-
neous technologies is the assumption that the production function of an entire econ-
omy complies with the one of a single representative firm. Although the above theo-
retical results show that this link is only possible under very restrictive assumption,
it is often applied in theoretical and empirical analysis due to its simplicity. However,
from a practical point of view, growth models that ignore consistent aggregation over
heterogeneous firms will suffer from serious drawbacks:5 they neglect growth effects
of (i) changes in the allocation of inputs6 and (ii) changes in the pattern of economic
interactions between firms. Yet, it is reasonable to expect that these factors affect
4For a comprehensive survey on aggregation of production functions, see Felipe and Fisher (2003).
5Hopenhayn (1992) initiated a literature on the effect of firm heterogeneity on industry dynamics.
His approach was extended, e.g., by Melitz (2003) to analyze the impact of trade liberalization on
the aggregate productivity of an economy. In these models firms are heterogeneous in productivity
which is included in a way such that the impact of the productivity distribution on aggregate demand
for inputs is fully determined by the average productivity. Consequently, under this parsimonious
aggregation rule, aggregate output depends on average productivity and average input demands but
not on the allocation of inputs across firms. That is, once the average productivity level is determined
the model yields identical aggregate outcomes as a model based on a representative firm.
6Empirical studies document that these changes are substantial in developed and developing
countries. For example, Roberts and Tybout (1997) quantify the rate of labor reallocation among
manufacturing firms between 25 and 30 percent.
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growth substantially, since they represent changes in growth due to changes in the
market structure. For example, differences in the degree of competition in different
industries as well as different incentives to innovate for small, medium, and large firms
are found to affect technological change (see, e.g., Aghion and Griffith (2005)). Where
are these effects in the growth literature? As they are not assigned to the levels of
aggregate capital or labor, they are assigned to the unobserved efficiency. Therefore,
they are misleadingly captured by the residual TFP measure.
In order to assess the impact of changes in the allocation of capital and labor on
growth, we apply the aggregation procedure established by Hildenbrand and Kneip
(2005). Our main result is that the growth rate of aggregate output depends on
changes in the levels of aggregate capital and labor as well as changes in the distri-
bution of capital and labor in the economy. We quantify the growth effect of each
component by means of structural estimation based on firm-level data. These effects
are estimated separately for each of 20 European countries. Our main findings are that
distributional effects are significant in all countries. Further they are as large as the
corresponding level effects in most countries. Finally, we exploit the information on
the different distributional changes across countries to conduct a growth accounting
exercise. More precisely, we assess the explanatory power of the distributional changes
with respect to cross-country growth differences. It turns out that these effects ex-
plain additionally up to 17%. Accordingly, an aggregation approach that consistently
accounts for firm heterogeneity can help explain the growth path of a single country
as well as cross-country growth differences. Hence, the role of capital and labor in
explaining the growth path of a single country or growth differences across countries
is understated.
In the next section, we present our growth model for an economy consisting of
heterogeneous firms. In Section 3, we describe the data, the empirical strategy, and
discuss our results. Section 4 presents the growth accounting exercise, whereas the
final section concludes.
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3.2 The Model
Assume that in period t each firm j from a heterogeneous population of firms Jt
produces according to the firm-specific production function f jt (·) defined by:
Y jt = f
j
t (K
j
t , L
j
t),
where Y jt denotes the output level, K
j
t the capital stock and L
j
t the labor demand.
7
Further, we assume that the heterogeneity in production functions f jt , i.e., in tech-
nologies and input demands, can be parameterized by a vector of parameters V jt . In
general, V jt is unobservable. Then one can write:
Y jt = f(K
j
t , L
j
t , V
j
t ) (3.1)
Hence, technological changes over time translate into changes in the distribution
of V jt across Jt. The function f can therefore, without loss of generality, be regarded
as time-invariant and equal for all individuals. In the simplest scenario, f could be a
Cobb-Douglas production function with V jt = (V
j
1,t, V
j
2,t) such that Y
j
t = V
j
1,t ·Kjt
V j2,t ·
Ljt
1−V j2,t . However, in order to establish our main result at the aggregate level, an
explicit parametric specification of f is not required.
In the above setup, we define aggregate output Y¯t in period t as:
Y¯t =
∫
f(K,L, V ) dGt,KLV , (3.2)
where K, L, and V are generic random variables corresponding to capital, labor,
and unobservable productivity parameters of a randomly chosen firm, respectively,
and Gt,KLV is the joint distribution of (K,L, V ) across the population Jt. Thus,
GKLV is the explanatory variable for aggregate output. However, we do not need to
model GKLV but only its changes over time, since our objective is to determine the
growth rate instead of the level of aggregate output.
In order to impose a structure on the evolution of the unobservable distribution of
V , we introduce a set of observable firm specific attributes Ajt with the corresponding
7One can easily extend the model to the case of multiple capital and labor inputs.
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random variable A, which are expected to be correlated with V : the age of a firm, the
region or industry in which it operates, its ownership structure, and its legal form.
Further, we use A to decompose Gt,KLV into the distributions Gt,V |KLA, Gt,A|KL,
and Gt,KL. The first term is the conditional distribution of V given (K,L,A), the
second is the conditional distribution of A given (K,L), and the third is the joint
distribution of (K,L). We write:
Y¯t =
∫ [∫ (∫
f(K,L, V ) dGt,V |KLA
)
dGt,A|KL
]
dGt,KL =
∫ (∫
f¯t(K,L,A) dGt,A|KL
)
dGt,KL,
(3.3)
where f¯t(K,L,A) is the conditional mean of output Y given (K,L,A) in period t.
Thus, it is a regression function of Y on (K,L,A), which can be estimated from a
cross-section of firms in period t.
From (3.3) we infer that assumptions on changes in GV |KLA, GA|KL, and GKL are
required in order to model output growth. It is easier to model the evolution of a
distribution if it is symmetric, because a symmetric distribution can be well-described
by its first few moments, like its mean and variance. Since the distributions of capital
and labor are right-skewed in all countries, we formulate the model assumptions in
terms of log capital kjt := logK
j
t and log labor l
j
t := logL
j
t with the corresponding
random variables k and l. Further, we define k¯t and l¯t as the mean of k and l across
Jt and σ
k
t and σ
l
t as the corresponding standard deviations. By analogy to GV |KLA,
GA|KL, and GKL, we define GV |klA, GA|kl, and Gkl, respectively. In addition, Gk and
Gl represent marginal distributions of log capital and log labor. Finally, let Gk˜l denote
a component-wise standardized joint distribution of (k, l), which is defined as a joint
distribution of (k˜, l˜), where k˜ := k−k¯
σk
and l˜ := l−l¯
σl
.
In line with the aggregation approach of Hildenbrand and Kneip (2005), we impose
the following assumptions.
Assumption 1: (“Structural stability”8 of Gkl) The component-wise standardized
8The concept of structural stability of a distribution relies on an empirical regularity that dis-
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joint distribution of log capital and log labor Gk˜l is approximately equal for two con-
secutive periods t and t− 1, i.e., Gt,k˜l ≈ Gt−1,k˜l.
It is important to note that Gk˜l refers to a standardized distribution. That is, if
Assumption 1 holds, the entire change in Gkl over two consecutive periods is fully
captured by the changes in means and the variances of kjt and l
j
t .
9
In order to impose the assumption on the evolution of GA|kl we define kt,τ as the
τ -quantile of the distribution Gt,k and lt,η as the η-quantile of the distribution Gt,l,
respectively.
Assumption 2: The conditional distribution of A given k = kτ and l = lη denoted by
GA|kτ lη is approximately equal for two consecutive periods t and t− 1, i.e., Gt,A|kτ lη ≈
Gt−1,A|kτ lη .
tributions of individual variables across large populations of economic agents change very slowly
over time. It has been first noticed by Pareto (1896) and introduced into macroeconomic models
by Malinvaud (1993). More precisely, for a distribution of a certain parametric form, for example,
the normal distribution, structural stability holds, if its normal structure prevails and its entire
evolution is captured by changes in its mean and its variance. However, this concept of structural
stability cannot be applied to distributions which are poorly approximated by a parametric form. In
this context, Hildenbrand and Kneip (2005) proposed a nonparametric counterpart of Malinvaud’s
idea. Instead of keeping the parametric structure constant and allowing for changes over time in
few parameters, one can keep these parameters constant and allow the shape of the distribution to
vary over time. This can be achieved by simple transformations of the distribution like centering
(constant mean) or standardizing (constant mean and variance). Accordingly, structural stability as
defined by Hildenbrand and Kneip (2005) holds, if a centered or standardized distribution does not
change over two consecutive periods.
9To be more precise, Hildenbrand and Kneip (2005) model the evolution of Gkl in terms of a
distribution which is standardized by a full covariance matrix Σt :=
 (σkt )2 σklt
σklt (σ
l
t)
2
, instead of a
component-wise standardized one, which uses the matrix Σ˜t =
 (σkt )2 0
0 (σlt)
2
. Our version of the
assumption is more stringent, as it requires that the correlation between log capital and log labor
does not change significantly over two consecutive periods. The main advantage of our formulation
(see Proposition and Appendix C) is the possibility to separate growth effects of changes in σk from
growth effects of changes in σl.
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Assumption 2 refers to the distribution of A across firms with log capital and log
labor in the same quantile position (τ, η) of Gkl in period t and t− 1, instead of firms
with the same values of k and l. We employ the former specification since it increases
the likelihood that we condition on the same group of firms in both periods. That is,
if Gkl shifts over time due to a common trend, we refer to the same group of firms in
both periods by conditioning on the quantile position as opposed to conditioning on
the same values of k and l.
Note that one is able to verify Assumptions 1 and 2, since Gkl and GA|kl are
observable in firm-level data. We document in the Appendix C that both assumptions
are supported by our data. In contrast, one is not able to falsify the following two
assumptions on GV |klA as they concern a distribution of unobservable variables.
Let Jt(k, l, A) denote the subpopulation of firms with capital k, labor l, and at-
tributes A and V¯t(k, l, A) denote the mean of V across Jt(k, l, A). Further, GV˜ |klA
denotes the centered distribution of V across Jt(k, l, A), whereby V˜ corresponds to
the centered variable V˜ := V − V¯t(k, l, A).
Assumption 3: The distribution GV˜ |klA is approximately equal for two periods t and
t − 1, i.e., Gt,V˜ |klA ≈ Gt−1,V˜ |klA. Note that Assumption 3 is a very mild assumption
since we allow for any form of heterogeneity in V across firms with different capital
stocks, labor stocks, or firm characteristics, i.e. Assumption 3 refers to the conditional
distribution of V˜ given k, l, and A. Furthermore, we even allow for heterogeneity in
V across firms with the same capital stock, labor stock, and firm characteristics, as
long as changes in GV |klA are captured by changes in the conditional mean V¯ (k, l, A).
In this case, we assume that V¯t(k, l, A) is additively separable in (k, l) and t. More
precisely,
Assumption 4: V¯t(k, l, A), can be additively factorized by V¯t(k, l, A) = ϕ(k, l, A) +
ψ(t, A), where the function ϕ is continuously differentiable in k and l.
Proposition: (Hildenbrand and Kneip (2005)) If Assumptions 1-4 hold, the growth
rate of aggregate output in the economy, gt :=
Y¯t−Y¯t−1
Y¯t−1
, is given by:
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gt = β
k
t−1(log K¯t − log K¯t−1) + βlt−1(log L¯t − log L¯t−1) (3.4)
+ γkt−1
(σkt − σkt−1
σkt−1
)
+ γlt−1
(σlt − σlt−1
σlt−1
)
(3.5)
+ (effects due to changes in V¯t−1(k, l, A))
+ (second order terms of the Taylor expansion).
The coefficients βkt−1, β
l
t−1, γ
k
t−1, and γ
l
t−1 are defined in terms of partial derivatives
of the regression function f¯t−1(k, l, A). For s = {k, l} and S = {K,L}, βst−1, γst−1 are
defined by
βst−1 =
1
Y¯t−1
∫
∂sf¯t−1(k, l, A) dGt−1,klA, (3.6)
γst−1 =
1
Y¯t−1
∫
(s− s¯t−1)∂sf¯t−1(k, l, A) dGt−1,klA −
βst−1
S¯t−1
∫
(s− s¯t−1) exp(s)dGt−1,s (3.7)
Remark 1: The proof is given in Hildenbrand and Kneip (2005). However, the above
Proposition differs from the one in Hildenbrand and Kneip (2005) in two aspects.
First, our Assumption 1 relies on a component-wise standardization which makes it
possible to separate growth effects of changes in σk from growth effects of changes in
σl. Second, we model the aggregate relation in terms of the logarithm of aggregate
variables, i.e., log K¯ and log L¯ and not the aggregates of the logarithms of individual
variables, i.e., k¯ and l¯. This distinction yields different definitions of γkt−1 and γ
l
t−1 and
is essential to compare our model with conventional growth models, which are based
on (the logarithm of) aggregate variables. See Appendix C for the corresponding
derivations.
From the above representation we infer that the growth rate g of aggregate output
does not only depend on changes in aggregate capital and aggregate labor (term (3.4)).
It also depends on changes in the allocation of inputs (term (3.5)) measured by the
standard deviation of log capital and log labor across firms.
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The aggregate coefficients (βkt−1, γ
k
t−1) and (β
l
t−1, γ
l
t−1) depend on the derivatives of
the regression function f¯t−1 with respect to k and l, respectively. All other variables
in (3.7) are observable. The derivatives ∂kf¯t−1(k, l, A) and ∂lf¯t−1(k, l, A) can be es-
timated using a cross-section of firms in period t − 1. Hence, they can be estimated
independently of each other in each time period. It is important to note that in
the estimation of our representation of the growth rate no time-series model fitting
takes place, which would require to include all potential growth determinants. Our
estimation procedure does not require information on the growth rate of aggregate
capital and labor nor the corresponding standard deviations, since the computation
of aggregate coefficents is based on the estimation from a single cross-section of firms.
In contrast, we are able to quantify the growth effect of changes in the distribution
of inputs without specifying an exhaustive model for the aggregate growth rate. We
describe the estimation methodology for these coefficients in more detail in Section
3.3.2.
Remark 2: Under Assumption 1 coefficients βkt−1 and β
l
t−1 can be interpreted as
elasticities of aggregate output with respect to aggregate capital and aggregate labor,
respectively. Accordingly, γkt−1 and γ
l
t−1 are elasticities of aggregate output with re-
spect to σk and σl, respectively.10 One expects βkt−1 and β
l
t−1 to be positive. However,
to draw conclusions on the expected sign of γkt−1 and γ
l
t−1 one needs to impose addi-
tional assumptions on the impact of changes in the market structure on the standard
deviation of inputs. For example, if a higher degree of product market competition
leads to more similarity in firm size, negative γkt−1 and γ
l
t−1 indicate a positive relation-
ship between growth and competition. Alternatively, we outlined above that changes
in the standard deviation represent changes in the pattern of economic interactions
between firms. These interactions comprise, for instance, technology spill-overs be-
tween firms. If technology diffusion is stronger among more similar firms, we expect a
negative relation between spill-overs and the standard deviation of inputs and, hence,
10See Hildenbrand and Kneip (2005) for a detailed discussion on the interpretation of the coeffi-
cients.
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negative γkt−1 and γ
l
t−1.
Our theoretical result has an important implication for growth accounting. To
illustrate this point, let us hypothetically claim that all variables in our model other
than capital and labor do not change over time. Then, in a classical growth model,
changes in Y¯ would be in part attributed to changes in the mean of capital and
labor (K¯ and L¯). However, a part of the change in Y¯ , which is not captured by
the effect of changes in K¯ and L¯, would be attributed to changes in aggregate TFP.
Such a conclusion, however, would be misleading, since we assumed that TFP did
not change. From the Proposition we know that it is the effect of changes in the
distribution of inputs, which is erroneously attributed to changes in TFP. Obviously,
the correct conclusion in this framework is only possible in models which allow for
input heterogeneity of firms.
3.3 Empirical Analysis
In the following, we structurally estimate the effects of changes in the level and allo-
cation of capital and labor on growth separately for each of 20 European countries in
our sample.
3.3.1 Data
The analysis is based on European firm-level data from 2002 until 2004.11 The data
stem from the Bureau van Dijk’s AMADEUS database. It contains information from
firm balance sheets and covers all firms in each country. We measure output as real12
value added. Capital and labor are measured as real fixed tangible assets and the real
11We estimate the corresponding coefficients exclusively for 2003. Yet, we need additional obser-
vations in 2002 for the Olley and Pakes (1996) estimation procedure and in 2004 for the growth
accounting exercise.
12Real variables are obtained by deflating by the national output price deflators. Unfortunately,
price deflators were not available at the industry level for most of the 20 European countries.
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total cost of employees, respectively.13 Our procedure requires that the firms have
non-missing observations in 2003. Moreover, we only include countries in which data
for at least 200 firms are available.
Furthermore, we include firm’s age and other control variables to control for differ-
ences in economic environment across firms. In particular, we account for industry-
specific and region-specific fixed effects, in that we distinguish sectors by means of two
digit NACE codes and include regional dummies. Moreover, we incorporate dummy
variables that capture the ownership status of a firm: (i) quoted takes value 1 if a
firm is publicly quoted and 0 if not, while (ii) indep1- indep9 correspond to inde-
pendence indicators (defined in the AMADEUS database) which represent different
shareholder structures. Finally, we include gross investment, measured by the change
in the capital stock plus depreciation, which is employed as an instrument for the un-
observable technology shock in the estimation procedure of Olley and Pakes (1996).
The descriptive statistics of the variables for each country in 2003 and 2004 are
listed in Table 3.1. The first column indicates that the number of observations used
for estimation varies substantially across countries in our sample. These differences
can be attributed to different filing regulations of individual countries. For example,
German companies are not legally obliged to reveal some information from their bal-
ance sheets. Hence, although the full sample for Germany covers over 800,000 firms
in 2003, joint information on value added, fixed tangible assets and the number of
employees is available for only roughly 6,000 German firms. In contrast, the corre-
sponding information is available for most companies in the Spanish or Italian sample
which contain about 360,000 and 117,000 observations in 2003, respectively. Analog,
13We define labor in this way in order to account, to a certain extent, for differences in the quality
of employees, i.e., human capital, across firms. These differences are captured by the total cost of
employees, as long as firms that are characterized by the same capital stock, number of employees,
and the same attribute profile A, (that is, the same industry, region, age, ownership structure, etc.)
but a higher human capital stock pay higher wages. We emphasize that the qualitative results do
not change if we define labor as the number of employees. These results are available from authors
upon request.
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means and variances of the variables differ noticeably across countries. We observe
relatively large firms in Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, Great Britain and Por-
tugal, whereas the sample covers many small firms in Romania, Spain, Italy, and
Sweden. Accordingly, we also observe analog differences in the standard deviations.
In all, the date reveals a substantial amount of heterogeneity both across firms within
a country as well as across countries.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics of AMADEUS data
country n2003 Y¯2003 K¯2003 L¯2003 n2004 Y¯2004 K¯2004 L¯2004
Austria 1071 23.766 (112.158) 27.059 (127.479) 18.098 (62.713) 1364 23.883 (113.935) 27.296 (130.298) 14.039 (43.775)
Belgium 10980 12.159 (123.637) 6.708 (32.035) 4.652 (13.922) 11036 12.146 (123.736) 6.720 (31.395) 5.156 (15.683)
Bosnia & H. 2573 0.420 (2.806) 1.358 (9.766) 0.118 (0.353) 2862 0.399 (2.643) 1.215 (7.586) 0.132 (0.380)
Bulgaria 5818 0.311 (2.734) 0.755 (4.083) 0.156 (0.591) 5955 0.308 (2.738) 0.776 (4.029) 0.175 (0.658)
Czech R. 11494 1.258 (14.420) 1.995 (9.655) 0.622 (1.614) 15799 1.270 (13.455) 2.003 (9.833) 0.615 (1.671)
Denmark 20426 2.915 (78.919) 1.359 (7.839) 1.173 (4.930) 21782 2.981 (77.818) 1.370 (7.804) 1.181 (4.778)
Estonia 7666 0.232 (1.799) 0.239 (0.966) 0.097 (0.243) 8083 0.235 (1.811) 0.257 (1.060) 0.112 (0.299)
Finland 32401 1.695 (39.112) 0.795 (5.318) 0.673 (2.848) 30328 1.700 (39.318) 0.730 (4.813) 0.785 (3.215)
France 157141 1.914 (49.716) 0.739 (4.914) 1.154 (4.081) 168079 2.045 (52.413) 0.731 (4.788) 1.214 (4.354)
Germany 6076 71.486 (840.303) 61.754 (273.698) 45.140 (188.750) 7623 68.272 (778.787) 62.813 (296.033) 34.938 (130.982)
Great Britain 41649 18.927 (263.407) 13.435 (88.357) 8.671 (34.791) 37666 19.163 (269.775) 14.751 (98.518) 11.578 (46.104)
Italy 117111 2.385 (86.508) 1.462 (6.618) 1.059 (3.622) 75392 1.976 (24.330) 1.561 (7.379) 1.984 (6.541)
Netherlands 7365 24.505 (329.132) 19.989 (109.564) 16.695 (71.049) 7375 25.337 (347.447) 20.302 (115.710) 17.977 (78.165)
Norway 12051 1.416 (45.918) 1.792 (9.647) 0.540 (1.295) 14299 1.432 (46.209) 1.747 (9.624) 0.679 (1.981)
Poland 10571 2.612 (26.125) 3.338 (13.321) 0.920 (2.119) 11188 2.551 (25.342) 3.823 (14.851) 1.101 (2.535)
Portugal 1451 9.958 (84.895) 19.793 (147.204) 6.114 (25.616) 1487 9.325 (84.477) 21.399 (154.907) 6.003 (25.167)
Romania 49018 0.102 (2.354) 0.102 (0.446) 0.046 (0.164) 66230 0.102 (2.403) 0.120 (0.505) 0.042 (0.141)
Slovakia 2042 1.626 (11.354) 4.157 (30.283) 0.842 (2.302) 2557 2.413 (22.984) 3.231 (23.581) 0.828 (2.489)
Spain 357410 0.956 (34.631) 0.492 (2.250) 0.313 (1.071) 360517 1.003 (37.231) 0.519 (2.374) 0.340 (1.175)
Sweden 123058 1.555 (42.467) 0.731 (5.522) 0.401 (1.776) 125725 1.474 (38.704) 0.735 (5.553) 0.437 (1.906)
All values in millions of EUR.
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3.3.2 Estimation strategy
The aggregate coefficients βst and γ
s
t , s ∈ {k, l} can be estimated as (suitably weighted)
average derivatives in the regression of value added Y jt on log capital k
j
t , log labor l
j
t ,
and a vector of firm specific attributes Ajt , i.e., in the model:
Y jt = f¯t(k
j
t , l
j
t , A
j
t ; ζ) + u
j
t , (3.8)
where ζ is the vector of parameters to be estimated and ujt is the error term
with E(ujt) = 0. Hence, according to (3.6) and (3.7), once consistent estimates
̂∂sf¯t(k, l, A; ζ), s ∈ {k, l}, are obtained, one can estimate aggregate coefficients by:
βˆkt =
∑
j∈Jt
̂∂kf¯t(kjt , l
j
t , A
j
t)∑
j∈Jt Y
j
t
, βˆlt =
∑
j∈Jt
̂∂lf¯t(kjt , l
j
t , A
j
t)∑
j∈Jt Y
j
t
, (3.9)
γˆkt =
∑
j∈Jt(k
j
t − ˆ¯kt) ̂∂kf¯t(kjt , ljt , Ajt)∑
j∈Jt Y
j
t
− βˆ
k
t
K¯t
∑
j∈Jt
(kjt − ˆ¯kt)Kjt , and (3.10)
γˆlt =
∑
j∈Jt(l
j
t − ˆ¯lt) ̂∂lf¯t(kjt , ljt , Ajt)∑
j∈Jt Y
j
t
− βˆ
l
t
L¯t
∑
j∈Jt
(ljt − ˆ¯lt)Ljt (3.11)
Our empirical strategy is focused on the model specification and estimation for f¯t.
However, our analysis revealed that a regression of yjt := log Y
j
t on (k
j
t , l
j
t , A
j
t) provides
a significantly better model fit and stability of results, as compared to the regression
of Y jt on (k
j
t , l
j
t , A
j
t). Consequently, we estimate derivatives of f¯t from the model:
yjt = h¯t(k
j
t , l
j
t , A
j
t ; θ) + ε
j
t , (3.12)
where θ is the vector of parameters to be estimated and εjt is the error term with
E(εjt) = 0. In doing so, we use the fact that ∂sf¯t(k
j
t , l
j
t , A
j
t ; ζˆ) = Y
j
t ∂sh¯t(k
j
t , l
j
t , A
j
t ; θˆ),
if ζˆ and θˆ are consistent estimates of ζ and θ, respectively. Our basic specification
for h¯t is linear in (k, l, A) and can be estimated using OLS. Further, we analyze the
robustness of our results in two ways. First, we control for possible simultaneity
between εjt and (k, l) using the Olley and Pakes (1996) method. Second, we extend
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our analysis to a partially linear specification of h¯t, in which the relationship between
y and (k, l) is modelled nonparametrically. The latter procedure avoids a parametric
misspecification of h¯t.
The loglinear model
Our basic specification for h¯t is the loglinear model, i.e.:
yjt = θ0 + θ
kkjt + θ
lljt + θ
′
AA
j
t + ε
j
t , (3.13)
which implies that ̂∂kf¯t(kjt , l
j
t , A
j
t) = θˆ
kY jt and
̂∂lf¯t(kjt , l
j
t , A
j
t) = θˆ
lY jt .
14 These
quantities are then imputed into (3.9) - (3.11), in order to calculate aggregate param-
eters.
In the simplest case, (3.13) can be estimated by the OLS method from a single
cross-section in 2003. However, the vast literature on estimation of production func-
tions from firm-level data points out that OLS may suffer from a simultaneity problem.
This problem arises if there is a contemporaneous correlation between the demand for
inputs kjt , l
j
t and the realization of the unobservable technology shock contained in
εjt . In such a case, estimates θˆ
k and θˆl, and, hence, βˆk and βˆl would be biased. There
are several approaches to correct for simultaneity between (kjt , l
j
t ) and ε
j
t and all of
them put additional restrictions on the data. For instance, Olley and Pakes (1996)
propose a method, which uses changes in firm’s investment decision as a proxy for the
productivity shock. However, only firms with non-missing data for 2002 and 2003 on
value added, capital, labor, and investment can be used for estimation. Depending on
the country, this requirement involves an elimination of up to 70% of the companies
from our sample of firms with non missing data on value added, capital, and labor in
2003. Following the same idea, Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) suggest the use of inter-
mediate inputs instead of the investment variable as a proxy.15 Finally, as described
14Note that in this model, βˆk = θˆk and βˆl = θˆl.
15They motivate their choice by weaker data requirements and argue that an adjustment in inter-
mediate inputs is likely to have better properties as an instrument for a technology shock than an
adjustment in investment. Interestingly, the approach of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) requires even
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in Blundell and Bond (2000), the simultaneity problem in estimation of production
function can also be bypassed by a GMM system estimator, though it requires a long
time-series of cross-sections and is therefore not attractive for our analysis. Moreover,
OLS may introduce a sample selection bias, if dropping out of the sample between
2002 and 2003 is non-random.
Being aware of the problems mentioned above, we consistently estimate (3.13) fol-
lowing Olley and Pakes (1996) in controlling for both simultaneity bias and sample
attrition. The method is based on a two-step procedure and requires the following
assumptions: (i) labor is the only input which contemporaneously responds to a tech-
nology shock, (ii) the capital stock is predetermined and hence uncorrelated with a
contemporary technology shock, (iii) changes in corporate investment decisions de-
pend on the contemporaneous technology shock, the age and the capital stock of
a firm, (iv) investments are monotonically increasing in the technology shock for a
given value of age and capital. Under these assumptions, the technology shock can
be instrumented as a function of capital, age, and investment. The estimation of this
function is carried out by a series estimator.
Semiparametric model
In order avoid a misspecification of the relationship between y and (k, l, A) we model
h¯t semiparametrically and include an interaction term, i.e.:
yjt = θ0 + h¯
k
t (k
j
t ) + h¯
l
t(l
j
t ) + θ
klkjt l
j
t + θ
′
AA
j
t + ε
j
t , (3.14)
where h¯kt and h¯
l
t are differentiable in k and l, respectively. We model h¯
k
t as a
quadratic splines function with Dk knots dk1 < d
k
2 < · · · < dkDk . Defining basis
functions bki (k) = max{0, k − dki }2, we obtain h¯kt (k) = θk1k + θk2k2 +
∑Dk
i=1 θ
k
3,ib
k
i (k).
Analog, we model h¯lt as h¯
l
t(l) = θ
l
1l+ θ
l
2l
2 +
∑Dl
i=1 θ
l
3,ib
l
i(l). All coefficients in (3.14) can
more firms to be eliminated from our sample due to the very large number of firms with missing
data on the use of materials.
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be estimated by the OLS method. Accordingly, ∂kf¯t(k
j
t , l
j
t , A
j
t) can be estimated as:
̂∂kf¯t(kjt , l
j
t , A
j
t) =
(
θˆk1 + 2θˆ
k
2k
j
t + θˆ
klljt + 2
Dk∑
i=1
θˆk3,i max{0, kjt − dki }
)
Y jt
Similarly, one obtains ̂∂lf¯t(kjt , l
j
t , A
j
t) = (θˆ
l
1 + 2θˆ
l
2l
j
t + θˆ
klkjt + 2
∑Dl
i=1 θˆ
l
3,i max{0, ljt −
dli})Y jt . The optimal number of knots and their position is obtained by the minimiza-
tion of the Mallows’ Cp criterion (see Mallows (1973)) using the knot deletion method
as described by Fan and Gijbels (1996).16
Statistical significance of the aggregate coefficients
Condifence intervals for the aggregate coefficients as well as standard errors of the esti-
mates are determined by bootstrap. For i.i.d. bootstrap resamples (Y j∗t , k
j∗
t , l
j∗
t , A
j∗
t ),
the distribution of (βˆkt − βkt ) is approximated by the conditional distribution of
(βˆk∗t − βˆkt ) given (Y jt , kjt , ljt , Ajt), where βˆk∗t is the estimate of βkt based on the bootstrap
sample. We asses the significance of βkt on the basis of the 95% confidence interval,
[βˆkt − q∗0.975, βˆkt − q∗0.025], where q∗α is the α-quantile of the distribution of (βˆk∗t − βˆkt ).
Analog, we compute confidence intervals for βlt, γ
k
t , and γ
l
t. Distributional effects are
statistically significant, if the condifence interval for γkt or γ
l
t does not include zero.
The consistency proof of such a naive bootstrap in the context of average derivative
estimation can be found in Ha¨rdle and Hart (1992).
16Knot deletion is an iterative procedure. We start with a large number D¯k of initial knots for k,
i.e., dk1 < d
k
2 < · · · < dkD¯k , which divide the domain of k into intervals [dki , dki+1] with approximately
equal number of observations. Similarly, we determine the corresponding D¯l initial knots for l. In
step 0, we estimate (3.14) by the OLS method and obtain D¯ = D¯k+ D¯l estimated spline coefficients
θˆk3,1, . . . , θˆ
k
3,D¯k
, θˆl3,1, . . . , θˆ
l
3,D¯l
with the corresponding t-values, t := θˆ/SE(θˆ). At step 1, we delete the
knot with the lowest absolute t-value at step 0 and reestimate (3.14) using D¯ − 1 knots. We repeat
this process D¯ times until no knots are left. At each step r, 0 6 r 6 D¯, we compute the residual
sum of squares RRSr =
∑n
j=1(εˆ
j
t )2. Finally, we choose the model with the lowest value for Mallows’
Cp defined by Cr := RSSr + 3(D¯ + 6 + nA − r)σˆ20 , where nA is the number of attributes in Ajt and
σˆ0 is the estimated standard deviation of ε
j
t at the 0th model.
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Table 3.2: Aggregate coefficients based on OLS production function estimation
country βˆk βˆl γˆk γˆl
Austria 0.151 (0.016) 0.788 (0.025) -0.190 (0.034)* -0.037 (0.054)
Belgium 0.140 (0.006) 0.749 (0.008) -0.293 (0.020)* -0.250 (0.030)*
Bosnia & H. 0.212 (0.011) 0.581 (0.015) -0.351 (0.039)* -0.166 (0.036)*
Bulgaria 0.234 (0.009) 0.639 (0.010) -0.268 (0.027)* -0.190 (0.063)*
Czech R. 0.140 (0.004) 0.811 (0.007) -0.183 (0.011)* 0.035 (0.026)
Denmark 0.116 (0.004) 0.747 (0.006) -0.181 (0.012)* -0.149 (0.024)*
Estonia 0.185 (0.008) 0.715 (0.009) -0.278 (0.019)* -0.210 (0.029)*
Finland 0.147 (0.002) 0.778 (0.003) -0.299 (0.014)* -0.090 (0.011)*
France 0.111 (0.001) 0.854 (0.002) -0.232 (0.005)* -0.038 (0.007)*
Germany 0.136 (0.007) 0.803 (0.011) -0.130 (0.017)* -0.107 (0.037)*
Great Britain 0.132 (0.003) 0.783 (0.004) -0.248 (0.010)* -0.057 (0.016)*
Italy 0.131 (0.002) 0.732 (0.002) -0.179 (0.004)* -0.058 (0.007)*
Netherlands 0.119 (0.007) 0.832 (0.010) -0.171 (0.017)* -0.158 (0.035)*
Norway 0.091 (0.003) 0.804 (0.006) -0.210 (0.011)* -0.123 (0.018)*
Poland 0.152 (0.006) 0.774 (0.009) -0.213 (0.012)* -0.077 (0.021)*
Portugal 0.130 (0.017) 0.818 (0.022) -0.170 (0.032)* 0.132 (0.060)*
Romania 0.252 (0.003) 0.667 (0.004) -0.241 (0.008)* -0.319 (0.010)*
Slovakia 0.156 (0.013) 0.743 (0.020) -0.193 (0.037)* 0.136 (0.086)
Spain 0.115 (0.001) 0.841 (0.001) -0.181 (0.003)* -0.103 (0.006)*
Sweden 0.148 (0.001) 0.766 (0.002) -0.351 (0.008)* -0.089 (0.012)*
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance of
distributional effects at 5% level.
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3.3.3 Empirical results
In the following, we present the results for the estimation of βk, βl, γk, and γl. We re-
port results based on the OLS estimation of (3.13) in Table 3.2. The first two columns
reveal that, as expected, changes in the levels of aggregate capital and labor have a
positive significant effect on growth in all countries. Further, the capital coefficient
appears to be higher for transition than for developed countries. Overall, the esti-
mated aggregate output elasticities with respect to aggregate capital and labor, i.e.,
βˆk and βˆl, are comparable with those obtained by other studies.17 More interestingly,
we find that distributional effects of capital or labor, associated with γk and γl, are
significant at 1% level in all countries. These coefficients are displayed in the last two
columns of Table 3.2. Further, the distributional effects of capital are negative and
generally higher (in absolute value) than the corresponding level effects associated
with βk. As for distributional effects of labor, they turn out to be negative and signif-
icant at 1% level for all countries except from Austria, Czech Republic, Portugal and
Slovakia. For Portugal they are positive and significant at the 5% level. Summing up,
distributional effects of capital and labor, which have been overlooked in the growth
literature so far, are statistically and economically significant.
We investigate the robustness of this finding, in that we control for potential simul-
taneity and misspecification of the functional form. Table 3.3 reports the estimation
results according to the Olley and Pakes (1996) method. Overall, the estimates are
similar to the OLS estimates but exhibit higher standard errors. We infer that the
simultaneity problem is of less importance in our sample. In particular, γk is still neg-
ative and significant for all countries. Moreover, apart from Germany and Romania,
the distributional effects of capital are again stronger (in absolute value) than the cor-
responding level effect. The distributional effects of labor are negative and significant
in 13 out of 20 countries. The results for the semiparametric estimation are reported
17Recall that under this specification βˆk = θˆk and βˆl = θˆl. Hence, we can compare our estimates
with those obtained in studies on production function estimation from the firm-level data, e.g., Olley
and Pakes (1996), Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), and Blundell and Bond (2000).
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in Table 3.4. We observe that the estimates of βk exceed the corresponding OLS esti-
mates in most countries. In contrast, βˆl are comparable to the OLS counterparts. At
least one of the distributional effects, i.e., γk or γl, is significant in all countries apart
from the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Interestingly, accounting for a more flexible
functional form yields positive significant distributional effect of capital in Denmark,
Italy and Norway. In contrast, γk is negative significant for eleven countries. Besides,
the distributional effects of capital are lower than the ones resulting from the loglinear
model. As opposed to previous models, they are also lower than the corresponding
level effects. As for distributional effects of labor, they are negative significant in ten
countries and positive significant in Portugal. Summing up, the importance of the dis-
tributional effects, which are the main focus of this chapter, is robust to simultaneity
and parametric misspecification.
The negative impact of changes in the standard deviation of inputs in most coun-
tries supports the intuition outlined in Remark 2. First, under the assumption that
a higher degree of product market competition among firms is associated with more
similarity in firm size, i.e., smaller standard deviations of capital and labor, we find a
positive relationship between competition and economic growth. This positive relation
is also found in the literature, for instance, by Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003).
Second, changes in the distribution of inputs capture changes in the pattern of eco-
nomic interactions between firms. In particular, the literature on economic growth em-
phasizes the importance of technology spill-overs among firms in developed economies.
A standard assumption in the literature is that technology spill-overs are more likely
between firms that are more similar in terms of the inputs they use in the produc-
tion process.18 Accordingly, an increase in the standard deviation of capital or labor
corresponds to less intensive technology spill-overs and, hence, to lower growth rates.
18Theoretical models by Basu and Weil (1998) and Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) show that
international technology diffusion is stronger if firms employ more similar capital-labor ratios in
production. An empirical evidence in favor of this result is provided by Keller (2004).
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Table 3.3: Aggregate coefficients based on Olley and Pakes (1996) method
country βˆk βˆl γˆk γˆl
Austria 0.165 (0.067) 0.795 (0.087) -0.240 (0.127)* -0.010 (0.062)
Belgium 0.159 (0.029) 0.715 (0.009) -0.298 (0.057)* -0.184 (0.037)*
Bosnia & H. 0.266 (0.076) 0.509 (0.020) -0.195 (0.86)* -0.260 (0.068)*
Bulgaria 0.286 (0.042) 0.560 (0.017) -0.304 (0.062)* -0.089 (0.072)
Czech R. 0.111 (0.045) 0.752 (0.014) -0.124 (0.051)* 0.029 (0.040)
Denmark 0.121 (0.039) 0.760 (0.008) -0.166 (0.053)* -0.095 (0.017)*
Estonia 0.185 (0.020) 0.685 (0.012) -0.209 (0.025)* -0.080 (0.034)*
Finland 0.156 (0.017) 0.763 (0.005) -0.282 (0.035)* -0.067 (0.013)*
France 0.119 (0.009) 0.829 (0.003) -0.228 (0.018)* -0.031 (0.008)*
Germany 0.117 (0.038) 0.744 (0.016) -0.081 (0.035)* -0.020 (0.044)
Great Britain 0.155 (0.035) 0.782 (0.005) -0.285 (0.067)* -0.038 (0.019)*
Italy 0.163 (0.017) 0.705 (0.003) -0.173 (0.018)* -0.061 (0.007)*
Netherlands 0.180 (0.031) 0.758 (0.013) -0.213 (0.041)* -0.051 (0.034)
Norway 0.064 (0.007) 0.835 (0.008) -0.109 (0.012)* -0.059 (0.006)*
Poland 0.123 (0.046) 0.741 (0.011) -0.164 (0.065)* -0.091 (0.032)*
Portugal 0.126 (0.051) 0.832 (0.041) -0.236 (0.101)* 0.007 (0.062)
Romania 0.147 (0.044) 0.629 (0.006) -0.101 (0.030)* -0.252 (0.014)*
Slovakia 0.158 (0.053) 0.682 (0.028) -0.186 (0.072)* 0.234 (0.135)
Spain 0.121 (0.010) 0.817 (0.002) -0.173 (0.015)* -0.063 (0.007)*
Sweden 0.154 (0.007) 0.759 (0.002) -0.353 (0.018)* -0.070 (0.012)*
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance of
distributional effects at 5% level.
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Table 3.4: Aggregate coefficients based on semiparametric specification
country βˆk βˆl γˆk γˆl
Austria 0.171 (0.030) 0.779 (0.035) -0.095 (0.045)* -0.212 (0.061)*
Belgium 0.142 (0.011) 0.813 (0.014) -0.097 (0.018)* -0.231 (0.041)*
Bosnia & H. 0.240 (0.047) 0.729 (0.040) -0.340 (0.057)* 0.109 (0.077)
Bulgaria 0.295 (0.036) 0.725 (0.041) -0.095 (0.053)* -0.050 (0.087)
Czech R. 0.257 (0.025) 0.793 (0.020) -0.024 (0.039) 0.067 (0.038)
Denmark 0.174 (0.015) 0.796 (0.013) 0.038 (0.022)* -0.220 (0.034)*
Estonia 0.187 (0.016) 0.775 (0.020) -0.119 (0.025)* -0.109 (0.043)
Finland 0.160 (0.010) 0.833 (0.010) -0.095 (0.017)* -0.090 (0.021)*
France 0.119 (0.003) 0.870 (0.004) -0.059 (0.006)* -0.024 (0.011)*
Germany 0.178 (0.013) 0.815 (0.016) -0.006 (0.020) -0.100 (0.044)*
Great Britain 0.211 (0.008) 0.797 (0.009) -0.066 (0.012)* -0.125 (0.021)*
Italy 0.153 (0.007) 0.820 (0.006) -0.027 (0.021) -0.063 (0.013)*
Netherlands 0.170 (0.019) 0.829 (0.022) -0.002 (0.038) -0.115 (0.050)*
Norway 0.141 (0.010) 0.856 (0.011) 0.060 (0.016)* -0.050 (0.027)
Poland 0.156 (0.017) 0.856 (0.017) -0.130 (0.031)* -0.024 (0.033)
Portugal 0.231 (0.058) 0.805 (0.074) -0.045 (0.037) 0.149 (0.084)*
Romania 0.209 (0.009) 0.693 (0.008) -0.264 (0.018)* -0.206 (0.014)*
Slovakia 0.309 (0.060) 0.730 (0.053) -0.082 (0.089) 0.141 (0.103)
Spain 0.164 (0.004) 0.831 (0.003) -0.001 (0.006) -0.142 (0.009)*
Sweden 0.173 (0.004) 0.820 (0.005) -0.095 (0.008)* -0.047 (0.014)*
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance of
distributional effects at 5% level.
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3.4 Growth Accounting
We exploit the economic significance of the distributional effects outlined above to
refine conventional growth accounting exercises. That is, we explore whether cross-
country growth differences can be explained by differences in changes in the allocation
of capital and labor. Their explanatory power depends on the cross-country hetero-
geneity in γk and γl as well as the heterogeneity in the growth rates of the standard
deviations of the inputs.
To measure the success of a model in explaining cross-country growth differences
we follow the tradition of variance decomposition. That is, analog to Caselli (2005),
we compute the explanatory power of the changes in the aggregate input levels as:
S1 =
var(gˆ1,t)
var(gt)
(3.15)
where
gˆ1,t = βˆ
k
t−1(log K¯t − log K¯t−1) + βˆlt−1(log L¯t − log L¯t−1).
The residual of this indicator, 1 − S1, is the explanatory power of changes in TFP.
However, we know from the above Proposition that part of the residual changes should
not be associated to changes in the production technology (TFP), but instead, to
changes in the higher moments of the distribution of capital and labor across firms.
Accordingly, our approach which takes firm-level heterogeneity in the inputs into
account leads to a different growth accounting model:
S2 =
var(gˆ2,t)
var(gt)
, (3.16)
where
gˆ2,t = βˆ
k
t−1(log K¯t−log K¯t−1)+βˆlt−1(log L¯t−log L¯t−1)+γˆkt−1
(σkt − σkt−1
σkt−1
)
+γˆlt−1
(σlt − σlt−1
σlt−1
)
.
In addition to the estimated aggregate coefficients, growth accounting requires data
on the growth rate of aggregate output, aggregate capital, aggregate labor, and the
standard deviations of log capital and log labor. Since the estimation of coefficients
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relies on data in 2003 (corresponding to t − 1) we focus on growth rates from 2003
to 2004. All of the required information is available in the AMADEUS database.
However, the computation of aggregate output and inputs from the cross-section of
firms yields implausibly high growth rates in some countries as is displayed in Table
3.1. Therefore, we employ information on aggregate growth rates from the standard
cross-country data sets. In particular, we employ Penn World Tables and follow
Caselli (2005) in measuring output as real GDP per capita in PPP and computing the
aggregate capital stock from the corresponding investment series using the perpetual
inventory method by assuming a yearly depreciation rate of 6%. Since aggregate labor
in 2004 is not available in the Penn World Tables, we measure aggregate labor as the
total number of employees from the Eurostat database. Obviously, the information on
the standard deviations of log capital and log labor has to be obtained from the firm-
level database. Unfortunately, required aggregate data for Bosnia and Herzegovina
are not available and we are forced to omit this country in our analysis. The growth
rates of the variables employed in the growth accounting exercise are reported in Table
3.5.
We derive S1 and S2 based on the three different estimators outlined in the last
section. In particular, we find that the aggregate capital and labor explain 28% of
the cross-country growth differences based on the OLS estimates (S1OLS = 0.28),
29% based on the Olley and Pakes (1996) method (S1OP = 0.29), and 40% based
on the semiparametric model (S1SP = 0.40). These results are consistent with the
corresponding findings in the conventional growth accounting literature. If we addi-
tionally take the distributional effects into consideration, we are able to explain an
additional 17%, 13%, and 6% of the growth differences across countries, respectively
(S2OLS = 0.45, S2OP = 0.42, S2SP = 0.46). Recall that our aggregate coefficients are
not estimated by fitting changes in aggregate levels and standard deviations to out-
put growth rates, but are computed from a structural estimation based on firm-level
data. Hence, in contrast to standard goodness-of-fit measures, the explanatory power
could drop if we additionally account for distributional effects. This would be the
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Table 3.5: Growth accounting: growth rates in 2004 (in %)
country g04 log K¯04K¯03 log
L¯04
L¯03
σk04−σk03
σk03
σl04−σl03
σl03
Austria 2.14 -1.31 0.57 -2.46 -1.89
Belgium 2.46 3.52 0.65 0.61 -0.76
Bosnia & H. - - - -5.14 -6.20
Bulgaria 5.02 10.02 2.59 -0.62 -1.38
Czech R. 3.10 4.73 -0.28 -0.43 2.33
Denmark 1.71 2.22 0.00 0.79 -1.00
Estonia 7.73 -0.54 0.25 1.24 0.48
Finland 3.47 2.75 0.41 -3.33 -0.22
France 1.97 5.03 0.05 0.46 0.38
Germany 1.66 1.13 0.42 1.22 0.27
Great Britain 2.75 1.93 1.00 1.52 0.56
Italy 1.09 0.28 0.37 3.78 10.14
Netherlands 1.23 2.25 -1.42 -0.21 1.79
Norway 2.20 9.26 0.47 0.83 1.39
Poland 5.31 6.36 1.31 -0.28 0.66
Portugal 0.38 1.26 0.09 0.22 3.50
Romania 8.68 1.64 0.39 -5.42 1.86
Slovakia 3.50 9.25 0.27 -10.04 -4.29
Spain 1.61 1.95 3.42 0.06 -0.92
Sweden 3.58 -1.27 -0.57 1.61 1.04
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case if the changes in σk and σl were negatively correlated with omitted factors that
explain GDP-growth. Consequently, distributional effects of capital and labor across
firms help to explain a significant part of variation in growth across the 19 European
countries.
We analyze the robustness of the above result in two different ways. First, we redo
the growth accounting exercise by excluding one country at a time. We repeat this
procedure for all countries. Doing this, we obtain very similar results as the ones from
the unrestricted sample. Second, we extend the sample period to 2002-2004, which
virtually does not change our results. In all, the growth accounting results are robust
to variations in the cross-section as well as in the time-series dimension.
Overall, we conclude that accounting for distributional effects of capital and labor
helps explain an additional 6-17% of the cross-country variation in output growth
among the 19 European countries. Thus, a growth accounting model which is based
on the correct treatment of firm heterogeneity improves the explanatory power of the
production inputs and reduces the relevance of the residual TFP measure.
3.5 Conclusion of Chapter 3
In this chapter, we propose a growth model to examine the effect of distributional
changes of capital and labor on economic growth. We show that the growth rate
of an economy depends not only on changes in the aggregate level of capital and
labor, but also on changes in the allocation of these inputs across firms, which we
measure by standard deviations of capital and labor. Our empirical analysis, based
on European firm-level data, reveals that changes in the allocation of capital and labor
due to firm-level heterogeneity have economically and statistically significant effects
on GDP-growth in almost all of the 20 European countries. This striking result revises
the rather unimportant role of capital and labor distributions in explaining income
and growth differences across countries as documented, for instance, by Caselli (2005).
Moreover, it suggests that conventional TFP measures misleadingly capture growth
effects stemming from changes in the standard deviations of capital and labor. In fact,
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our framework allows to assess the explanatory power of higher moments of the input
distributions and, therefore, reassess the explanatory power of TFP. In this regard,
we refine conventional growth accounting exercises by controlling for cross-country
differences in aggregate input levels and input allocations.
We find that higher standard deviations in labor and capital have negative effects
on output growth. This finding is consistent with a positive relationship between
competition and growth if more competition is associated with more similarity in firm
size and, hence, lower standard deviations in capital and labor among firms. Our
findings are also consistent with the hypothesis that technology spill-overs are more
intensive if firms are becoming more similar.
Finally, in a growth accounting exercises we show that distributional effects of
capital and labor help explain an additional 6-17% of cross-country growth differences
among the 19 European countries.
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Concluding remarks
This dissertation contributes to the explanation of differences in total factor produc-
tivity growth across countries or over time. It presents new mechanisms that help
explain firm-level technology choices by taking the interdependence between different
micro- and macroeconomic factors into account. In the following, we briefly sum-
marize the most important results particularly with regard to their implications for
policymakers in developed or emerging economies.
The first chapter demonstrates that the provision of infrastructure capital influ-
ences corporate investments in R&D if one accounts for the effect of infrastructure on
the costs of using a large variety of intermediate goods in final production. Therefore,
the model is able to explain the positive empirical relationship between infrastructure
and R&D investments which we detect in the panel of 36 relatively developed countries
as well as a panel of U.S. firms. Instead, we do not find a positive relationship between
the provision of infrastructure and private capital investments at the country- or firm-
level. The empirical findings are striking since they challenge conventional growth
theories which are based on a complementarity between infrastructure and private
capital investments. Moreover, we define relatively mild conditions which involve the
existence of multiple strictly positive balanced growth pathes if one considers an en-
dogenous financing of infrastructure investments. The interdependence of R&D and
infrastructure investments in relatively developed countries refines our understanding
of the link between infrastructure and growth. It implies that the growth-effect of
infrastructure investments depends on factors such as intellectual property rights, the
degree of product market competition, or tertiary education instead of factors that
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influence a household’s saving decision. Thus, policymakers in the 36 countries of our
sample are recommended, on average, to invest in infrastructure in regions with high
R&D investments. Otherwise, the financing or subsidizing of regional infrastructure
projects should be accompanied by simultaneous support of local R&D activities. We
emphasize that our analysis represents only a first step to explain the relation be-
tween infrastructure and growth and future work should be devoted to its effect on
innovative activities and technical change.
The second chapter reveals that the interdependence between the degree of fi-
nancial development and the level of inflation affects the composition of corporate
investments in an economy. It follows that the level of inflation influences long-run
aggregate TFP-growth in a world of incomplete financial markets as long as more
productive investments are also more risky. We underpin the general equilibrium
implications of our model with sound empirical evidence based on dynamic panel es-
timations at the country-, industry-, and firm-level. This novel aspect of monetary
transmission entails strong policy implications. In particular, a low inflation policy
represents a relatively inexpensive way to foster long-run TFP-growth and to encour-
age private sector innovations. This policy implication is the more important for some
emerging economies that suffer from underdeveloped financial markets and high infla-
tion. Moreover, the potential long-run impact of the level of inflation on TFP-growth
implies that monetary authorities should be cautious to use expansionary monetary
policy as a tool to stimulate the economy in the short-run. In this regard, there exists
up to a certain extend a tradeoff between short-run stabilization policy and long-run
productivity growth.
The third chapter presents an endogenous growth model that accounts for a het-
erogeneity in firm-level technologies and input demands. This framework makes it
possible to account for growth-effects stemming from (higher moments of) the distri-
bution of input factors across firms. It is shown that up to 17% of the differences in
TFP-growth across countries have to be attributed to differences in the distribution of
capital and labor. A reduction in the standard deviation of capital or labor induces, on
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average, a positive growth effect in most of the 20 European countries in our sample.
This effect is consistent with a positive relationship between competition and growth
if more competition is associated with more similarity in input demands among firms.
It is also consistent with the empirical prediction that technology spill-overs are more
intensive among more similar firms. Policymakers can potentially affect the distribu-
tion of capital and labor across firms by means of industrial policies, i.e. competition
policy or asymmetric regulations for different firm sizes. We emphasize, however, that
the main purpose of this chapter of the dissertation is to demonstrate the impact of
distributional effects on economic growth and to refine conventional growth account-
ing methods. A more pronounced policy evaluation requires a separate analysis of
distributional growth effects at the industry level. The above model is well-suited
to aggregate among heterogenous firms in each sector separately for a given country.
This approach would accentuate differences in distributional effect across different
industries and thus allow for appropriate industry-specific policy measures. There-
fore, we consider the aggregation across heterogenous firms at the industry level as
important future research.
In sum, this dissertation addresses several new determinants of total factor produc-
tivity growth. Thereby, it refines the scope for macroeconomic or industrial policies
to foster long-run economic growth and development and to reduce income differences
across countries.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition II
Given the assumptions underlying Proposition I, we know that the balanced growth
rate is a continuous, monotonic, increasing function of the stock of infrastructure
capital (assuming λ > λ∗∗ = ρβ
2+ρχµ(ρ+δ)
α(1−α)µ(δ+ρ) ). Since we assume φ
′(G) < 0, φ′′(G) > 0
and λ > λ∗∗, we can infer from (2.20):
∂γ
∂G
=
∂γ
∂φ(G)
∂φ(G)
∂G
=
(
−χρ[a+ χσφ(G)]− χσλˆ
[a+ χσφ(G)]2
)
φ′(G) > 0
∂2γ
∂2G
=
∂2γ
∂2φ(G)
∂2φ(G)
∂2G
=
(
χ2ρσ[a+ χσφ(G)]2 + 2χ2σ2[a+ χσφ(G)]λˆ
[a+ χσφ(G)]3
)
φ′′(G) > 0
where λˆ = aλ− χσφ(G) > 0 and a = α(1− α) > 0.
Hence, the balanced growth rate is a strictly convex function of the stock of infras-
tructure capital: γ = γ(G), γ′(G) > 0, γ′′(G) > 0.
The equilibrium provision of infrastructure capital is given in (1.20). The marginal
variable investment costs are a continuous, monotonic, increasing function of time
(
∂CIt
∂t
¿0). In order to sustain (positive) balanced growth, we assume that marginal
infrastructure investment costs increase proportional to the GDP-level in the economy
(It = δGt), but can not exceed it.
19 It follows from (1.17) that infrastructure capital
is a continuous, monotonic function of the balanced growth rate in equilibrium. This
19Note that this is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the existence of a balanced
growth equilibrium. In order to obtain a sufficient condition, we would need to impose quantitative
assumptions on φ(Gt) and C(It, t) relative to Yt.
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allows us to define N(t) = YtCIt
, where N ′(t) ≥ 0, N ′′(t) ≥ 0. We also defined C˙ItCIt t =
M(t), where M ′(t) > 0 and M ′′(t) = 0 in a balanced growth equilibrium. Thus, we
can infer from (1.20):
∂G
∂γ
=
β2N ′[δ + ρ−M(γ)] + β2N(γ)M ′
[δ + ρ−M(γ)]2 > 0
∂2G
∂2γ
=
[β2N ′′[δ + ρ−M(γ)]− β2N ′M ′][δ + ρ−M(γ)] + [β2N ′[δ + ρ−M(γ)]M ′]
[δ + ρ−M(γ)]3
+
[β2N ′F ′ + β2N(γ)M ′′][δ + ρ−M(γ)] + β2N(γ)M ′M ′
[δ + ρ−M(γ)]3 > 0
The first derivative is always positive. A sufficient condition for the second deriva-
tive to be positive is δ+ρ−M(γ) > 0, which we assume. Hence, we do not allow that
the growth rate of the marginal (variable) infrastructure investment costs exceeds the
summation of the depreciation rate for infrastructure capital and the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution. A violation of this condition is empirically irrelevant so that
the restriction is rather technical. Hence, the infrastructure capital stock is a strictly
convex function of the balanced growth rate: G = G(γ), G′(γ) > 0, G′′(γ) > 0.
In addition, we know that γ = γ(0) = 0 since limG→0 φ(G) → ∞ and
G = G(0) = G0 > 0 holds by assumption. Consequently, given a balanced growth
path exists, it features two strictly positive balanced growth rates γ1 and γ2 with
γ1 > γ2.
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A.2 Marginal investment costs increase in Yt:
In the following, we report the partial derivatives of γ1 and γ2 (from (1.22) and (1.23))
with respect to λ, β and µ:
∂γ1
∂λ
= aµ
(
1 +
aµ(δ + ρ− λ) + χ(µ(ρ+ σ(δ + ρ))− βσ)
Z1/2
)
> 0
∂γ2
∂λ
= aµ
(
1− aµ(δ + ρ− λ) + χ(µ(ρ+ σ(δ + ρ))− βσ)
Z1/2
)
> 0
∂γ1
∂β
= 2βχ
(
σ +
aµ(2ρ+ σ(δ + λ+ ρ)) + σχ(β2σ + µ(ρ+ σ(δ + ρ))
Z1/2
)
> 0
∂γ2
∂β
= 2βχ
(
σ − aµ(2ρ+ σ(δ + λ+ ρ)) + σχ(β
2σ + µ(ρ+ σ(δ + ρ))
Z1/2
)
<> 0
∂γ1
∂µ
= −β
2χ(αµ(2ρ+ σ(δ + λ+ ρ)) + σ(β2σχ+ χµ(ρ+ σ(δ + ρ))− σZ1/2))
2µ2(a+ σρ)Z1/2
< 0
∂γ2
∂µ
=
β2χ(αµ(2ρ+ σ(δ + λ+ ρ)) + σχ(β2σ + µ(ρ+ σ(δ + ρ))) + Z1/2)
2µ2(a+ σρ)Z1/2
<> 0
where Z = [aµ(λ+ δ + ρ) + β2χσ + χµ(σ(δ + ρ)− ρ)]2 − 4µ[a+ χσ][aλµ(δ + ρ)−
ρ(β2 + χµ(δ + ρ))] > 0 and a = α(1− α).
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B Appendix
B.1 Financial contract
In the following, we provide the algebraic solution of the financial contract Ct =
{zt, lzt ,Γt(ξt), τt(ξt)} defined in (2.12).
Optimal factor input ratio and the cost function: Obviously, part of the
optimal contract must be to use factor inputs in a cost minimizing combination.
However, since factor demands are determined via the contract Ct, they will not only
reflect the firm’s profit maximization objective, but also the intermediary’s need to
break even in expectation. With our Cobb-Douglas specification, the possibility of
project failure then requires that factors earn constant shares not of firm revenue,
but of the total costs C (W zt , R
z
t ; y˜
z
t ) associated with a targeted production scale y˜
z
t .
Hence, the demands for capital and labor are:
zt =
αzP zt y˜
z
t
Rzt
and lzt =
(1− αzP zt y˜zt )
W zt
(B.1)
Furthermore, from constant returns to scale and the Cobb-Douglas specification of
the technology, we can write:
C (W zt , R
z
t ; y˜
z
t ) = MC
z
t (Wt, R
z
t ) y˜
z
t =
1
TtV
(
Rt
α
)α(
W zt
(1− α)
)(1−α)
y˜zt (B.2)
where MCzt (·) are the per unit costs of producing a targeted output level y˜zt ;
since the technology displays constant returns to scale, these per unit costs coincide
with marginal costs. Note that, as a consequence, the program to find the optimal
contract is linear in the project size y˜zt .
First best - the socially optimal contract: First look at the first best contract
where b = 0 such that the entrepreneurial moral hazard problem plays no role (but
liquidity is scarce and has an opportunity cost R˜t). The questions asked here are,
what is the maximum overall return on investment, and how does the corresponding
socially optimal contract look like? Suppose for the moment a binding participation
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constraint for the investor; indeed, we will later verify that this is the case in a well-
specified problem.20 Substituting from the binding participation constraint (2.12b)
into the entrepreneur’s net return (2.12a) yields:
ΠFt =
[∫
Γt(ξt)
P zt
MCzt (·)
(
1− ξtR˜t
)
dG(ξt)− 1
]
MCzt (·)y˜zt
Let ξˆt denote the cutoff value for the liquidity shock such that the project is con-
tinued if and only if ξt ≤ ξˆt; using this rule for the indicator function then allows to
rewrite the entrepreneur’s net return as:
ΠFt (ξˆt) = λt(ξˆt)MC
z
t (·)y˜zt , (B.3a)
where:
λt(ξˆt) ≡
[∫ ξˆt
0
P zt
MCzt (·)
(
1− ξtR˜t
)
dG(ξt)− 1
]
(B.3b)
In definition (B.3b), λt(ξˆt) denotes the net social marginal return on one unit
invested in an individual advanced sector project, given a cutoff value ξˆt. Since
P zt
MCzt (·) > 0, λ(ξˆt) is maximized at the socially optimal cutoff value ξˆ
FB
t =
1
R˜t
.
Moreover, from (B.3a), it is clear that the entrepreneur is the residual claimant and
receives the full social surplus from the project.
Second best - entrepreneurial moral hazard: Now consider the case where
b > 0. First of all note that general equilibrium considerations imply that the marginal
net social return under both the first and the second best solution must be positive.21
Then, given a positive value for λt(ξˆt), the entrepreneur will seek to maximize Π
F
t (ξˆt)
20By well-specified, we mean (i) that there is no self-financing by the firms, and (ii) that the
solution to the constrained-optimal contract features a finite investment level.
21To see this, suppose to the contrary that λ(ξˆFBt ) ≤ 0 such that the optimal contract would
prescribe zt = lzt = 0, i.e. zero investment for any level of entrepreneurial equity Et. However, this
implies y˜zt = 0 which contradicts a general equilibrium with positive consumption and investment,
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by choosing the maximum investment volume MCzt (·)y˜zt that still guarantees investor
participation. But from (2.12b), this is achieved by maximizing the state contin-
gent per unit transfer τt(ξt) to the investor. Accordingly, the second best contract
prescribes to retain the minimum amount of profits in the firm that is still consis-
tent with incentive compatibility. Hence, the entrepreneur’s incentive compatibility
constraint (2.12c) is binding at the maximum pledgeable unit return:
τt(ξt) =
Γt(ξt)(1− b)P zt y˜zt
MCzt (·)y˜zt
(B.4)
We can now solve for the largest investment volume MCzt (·)y˜zt that is compatible
with both the investor’s participation constraint and the entrepreneur’s incentive con-
straint by substituting the maximum pledgeable unit return (B.4) into the investor’s
participation constraint (2.12b) to obtain:
[
1−
∫
Γ(ξt)
(
(1− b)− ξtR˜t
) P zt
MCzt (·)
dG(ξt)
]
MCzt (·)y˜zt = Et (B.5)
Here, the expression in squared brackets represents the difference between marginal
cost of investment to an outside investor and the expected marginal return to such out-
side investment. Let ξˆ0t ≡ (1−b)R˜t denote the cutoff value that maximizes the expected
marginal return to outside investors, and note that equation (B.5) implies that, given
some Et > 0, the expected (subject to idiosyncratic liquidity shocks) marginal return
on outside investment is strictly smaller than one.22
and the price of the advanced intermediate good would adjust such as to guarantee a positive marginal
net social return. By the same token, the second best solution must also involve a cutoff rule ξˆt with
positive marginal net social return.
22Indeed, if this was not the case, investment would be self-financing and there would be no demand
for liquidity at all in that the investor’s participation constraint would be non-binding. A sufficient
condition for ruling out self-financing is:
∫ ξˆ0t
0
(
(1− b)− ξtR˜t
) P zt
MCzt (·)
dG(ξt) < 1
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Solving equation (B.5) for the maximum investment volume conditional on a given
cutoff value ξˆt, allows to write the firm’s investment capacity as:
MCzt (·)y˜zt = µt(ξˆt)Et, (B.6a)
where:
µt(ξˆt) ≡ 1
1− ∫ ξˆt
0
(
(1− b)− ξtR˜t
)
P zt
MCzt (·)dG(ξt)
(B.6b)
is an equity multiplier, whose denominator specifies the amount of internal funds
that the firm has to contribute per unit of investment in order to compensate the
outside investor for the shortfall implied by the expression in squared brackets in (B.5).
Finally, using (B.3a) and (B.6a), the entrepreneur’s expected net payoff becomes:
ΠFt (ξˆt) = λt(ξˆt)µt(ξˆt)Et (B.7)
It now remains to determine the second best continuation threshold, to be denoted
ξˆ∗t . Given an entrepreneurial equity position Et, the second best cutoff ξˆ
∗
t maximizes
(B.7). It is clear that ξˆ∗t ∈ [ξˆ0t , ξˆFBt ]. Within this interval there emerges a trade-off
since, on the one hand, increasing ξˆt implies that continuation is possible in more
contingencies and, on the other hand, decreasing ξˆt allows to increase the amount of
initial investment MCzt (·)y˜zt by increasing the equity multiplier µt(ξˆt). After substi-
tution from the definitions (B.3b) and (B.6b) into (B.7), it is straightforward to show
that the optimal continuation value ξˆ∗t can be found as the solution to the following
problem:
min
ξˆt
R˜t
∫ ξˆt
0
ξtdG(ξt) +
MCzt (·)
P zt
G(ξˆt)
(B.8)
Observe that rewriting this condition yields λt(ξˆ0t ) < b
P zt
MCzt (·)G(ξˆ
0
t ); then, it is apparent that
ξˆFBt = ξˆ
0
t if b = 0, which leads to the conclusion that, in order to rule out self-financing, a positive
wedge ξˆFBt − ξˆ0t > 0 and therefore b > 0 are essential.
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which has the interpretation that the second best cutoff value minimizes the ex-
pected unit cost of total expected investment. The first order condition to this problem
is:
∫ ξˆ∗t
0
G(ξt)dξt =
MCzt (·)
P zt
1
R˜t
(B.9)
Finally, using the optimality condition for the cutoff value allows to rewrite the
entrepreneur’s expected net return in the following compact form:
ΠFt (ξˆ
∗
t ) =
1
R˜t
− ξˆ∗t
ξˆ∗t − (1−b)R˜t
Et =
ξˆFBt − ξˆ∗t
ξˆ∗t − ξˆ0t
Et (B.10)
Observe how this expression reflects the trade-off underlying the choice of ξˆ∗t ∈
[ξˆ0t , ξˆ
FB
t ]. For future reference, we define the expected net return per unit of en-
trepreneurial equity Et as:
Π˜Ft (ξˆ
∗
t ) ≡
1
R˜t
− ξˆ∗t
ξˆ∗t − (1−b)R˜t
Implementation and aggregate liquidity demand: In order to cover liquidity
shocks up to the second best cutoff ξˆ∗t , it is necessary that outside investors commit
funds at the initial contracting stage (stage one). The reason is that, by issuing
corporate claims at the interim stage (stage two), it is not possible to raise enough
funds because the entrepreneurial commitment problem limits the maximum return
pledgeable to outside investors at ξˆ0t < ξˆ
∗
t . It is then an natural question to ask how
the second best policy can actually be implemented at the initial contracting stage;
moreover, in view of our modelling hypothesis that an economy’s physical investment
portfolio is affected by the degree to which firms can insure their activities by means
of holding corporate liquidity, there arises the related question of whether there is a
second best policy that features firms (rather than the intermediary) holding liquidity.
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Aggregating over the advanced sector firms, we can derive two measures of aggre-
gate liquidity demand. The first one is relevant if the second best policy should be
feasible for each individual firm, but liquidity provision is organized in a way that
disregards the scope for risk sharing across firms:
D¯t = ξˆ
∗
tP
z
t y˜
z
t (B.11a)
In contrast, the second measure of overall liquidity demand is relevant if liquidity risk
can be pooled across firms:
D∗t =
[∫ ξˆ∗t
0
ξtg(ξt)dξt
]
P zt y˜
z
t < D¯t (B.11b)
It is clear that this latter concept requires some form of financial intermediation.
Now, drawing on Holmstrom and Tirole (1998), we turn to the institutional details
supporting the implementation of the second best policy derived in Section 2.4.5. One
possibility is to have the financial intermediary initially extend the amountMCzt (·)y˜zt−
Et to the entrepreneur together with an irrevocable line of credit of maximum size
ξˆ∗tP
z
t y˜
z
t to be drawn from as needed at the interim stage. Given our assumptions on the
details of the moral hazard problem which does not envisage distraction of resources on
the part of the entrepreneur, this line of credit implements the second best solution as
long as the credit line, irrespective of the amount ξtP
z
t y˜
z
t ≤ ξˆ∗tP zt y˜zt of liquidity actually
requested, is provided free of charge. Since the firms’ liquidity shocks are independent,
the aggregate amount of resources needed to cover the advanced sector’s refinancing
needs at the interim stage is then given by D∗t . At the level of an individual advanced
sector firm, an alternative would be via a liquidity covenant which involves the financial
intermediary initially extending the amount [1 + (P zt /MC
z
t (·))ξˆ∗t ]MCzt (·)y˜zt − Et to
the entrepreneur, whereby the requirement is imposed that the amount ξˆ∗tP
z
t y˜
z
t is not
sunk in the project but kept in the form of readily marketable assets. However, at
the aggregate level across all advanced sector firms, implementation of the second
best policy via liquidity covenants is seen to require strictly more resources D¯t > D
∗
t
because liquidity is kept separately at each firm, thus forgoing the potential to pool
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liquidity across firms.23
Given our empirical interest, the question arises whether there is a second best pol-
icy that features firms (rather than the intermediary) holding liquidity. We now give
an example for such a policy. For that purpose, first define a number ξˇt which is implic-
itly given by D∗t = ξˇtP
z
t y˜
z
t ; then, a policy of the desired kind is constructed as follows:
At stage one, the intermediary extends the amount [1+(P zt /MC
z
t (·))ξˇt]MCzt (·)y˜zt −Et
to the entrepreneur. The financial contract further stipulates that the amount ξˇtP
z
t y˜
z
t
must be held in the form of liquid assets. The firm will then invest up to the maximum
admissible scale MCzt (·)y˜zt −Et and deposit its liquid assets with the intermediary (at
zero interest). Now, at stage two, when hit by a liquidity shock ξt, the firm must first
use up its own asset position of ξˇtP
z
t y˜
z
t ; only then can it approach the intermediary
for additional funds, which the latter will residually provide up to the second best
quantity ξˆ∗tP
z
t y˜
z
t . The intermediary is able to provide this liquidity by calling idle
funds from those firms who receive shocks ξt < ξˇt. Obviously, this policy replicates
the second best in terms of both the initial investment scale and the cutoff ξˆ∗t . Thus,
it only remains to check whether above arrangement is feasible, which is the case
since, from the definition of ξˇt, the supply of and demand for liquidity are equal at
the aggregate level: P zt y˜
z
t ξˇt = D
∗
t = P
z
t y˜
z
t
∫ ξˆ∗t
0
ξtg(ξt)dξt. Further variations on the
institutional structure implementing the second best, involving advanced sector firms
holding assets other than cash (e.g. corporate debt issued by the basic sector firms)
as well as liquid assets earning non-zero rates of return, are possible.
23In the benchmark section of their paper which features an exogenous supply of liquidity, Holm-
strom and Tirole (1998) establish equivalence of the two methods of providing liquidity. This result
stems from the fact that their economy allows for a technology (“cash”) to transfer wealth across the
stages of the financial contracting problem and the additional assumption that cash is not scarce.
Conversely, in our economy cash is available, but its (limited) supply is determined in general equi-
librium via households’ financial deposits and monetary policy. Importantly then, liquidity is costly
(it has a price R˜t > 1), and agents have an incentive to economize on its usage. The consequence is
that intermediated credit lines and liquidity holdings on behalf of the firms are no longer equivalent.
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B.2 Competitive equilibrium relations
We can derive a set of relations that characterize a competitive equilibrium at the
aggregate level. Specifically, for R˜t > 1, the household’s cash constraint (2.1b) is
binding and we can aggregate over households and entrepreneurs to obtain a condition
relating aggregate consumption and investment to agents’ nominal asset holdings:
Qt + (1− η)At = Ptct, (B.12)
where ct = c
H
t +(1−η)cEt . Then, the evolution of nominal wealth held by households
is determined via the nominal budget constraint (2.1c) and the binding cash constraint
(2.1b):
Mt+1 = R˜t[Mt −Qt + Jt] + Υt +Rkt kt +Rzt zt +W k,Ht hk,Ht +W z,Ht hz,Ht , (B.13)
where we note that Υt = Dt + Et. This relation stipulates that, at the end of
any given period, the nominal resources Dt + Et lost due to liquidity shocks are
re-channelled to the household sector. Accordingly then, while the termination of
projects implies that the production of real output is curbed, the amount of nominal
resources (“money”) circulating is unaffected by liquidity shocks. Now, making use (i)
of a zero-profit condition for firms in the basic sector, firms in the advanced sector (net
of entrepreneurial rents Π˜Ft (ξˆ
∗
t )Et) and the financial intermediary, (ii) of the financial
market clearing condition (2.4), and (iii) of the aggregate cash constraint (B.12), one
obtains:
Mt+1 = Mt + Jt +
{
(1− η)At − [W k,Et hk,Et +W z,Et hz,Et + (Π˜Ft (ξˆ∗t )− 1)Et]
}
(B.14)
This relation has the intuitive interpretation that the evolution of nominal house-
hold wealth is governed by cash injections Jt and the net cash flow from the en-
trepreneurial sector (entrepreneurial consumption expenditure minus retained earn-
ings) to the household sector. The evolution of nominal wealth in the entrepreneurial
sector itself follows:
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At+1 = Π˜
F
t (ξˆ
∗
t )Et +W
k,E
t h
k,E
t +W
z,E
t h
z,E
t , (B.15)
where Et = ηAt. In order to derive a convenient expression for the evolution of
aggregate wealth, we add equations (B.13) and (B.15) and employ the zero-profit
condition mentioned above as well as condition (2.4) to obtain:
Mt+1 + At+1 − (Dt + Et) = Ptyt, (B.16)
which gives immediately rise to a modified quantity relation:
Pt =
Mt+1 + At+1 − (Dt + Et)
yt
(B.17)
Again, this equation allows for an intuitive interpretation, namely that the con-
temporaneous price level Pt is determined as the ratio of nominal resources channelled
through the goods market to aggregate output.24
B.3 Equilibrium
Definition 1. (Competitive Equilibrium) Given initial conditions {k0, z0, A0,M0}
and realizations of monetary policy {Jt}∞t=0 and idiosyncratic shocks {ξit}∞t=0, a
competitive equilibrium is a list of allocations {cHt , hk,Ht , hz,Ht , kt, zt, Qt,Mt+1}∞t=0
to households and {cE,it , hk,Et , hz,Et , Eit , Ait+1}∞t=0∀i to entrepreneurs, of sec-
toral and economy-wide aggregates {ct, lkt , lzt , L,K, ykt , yzt , yt}∞t=0 and of prices
{Pt, P zt , P kt ,Wt,W kt ,W k,Ht ,W k,Et ,W zt ,W z,Ht ,W z,Et , Rt, Rkt , Rzt , R˜t}∞t=0 such that:
1. given prices, the allocation solves the household problem (2.1) as well as the
basic and advanced firm problems (2.8) and (2.12);
24To see this, note that the agents’ end-of-period wealth Mt+1 + At+1 is effectively generated
via firm profits whose generation requires transactions on the goods market; from this amount, the
nominal resources which are absorbed by liquidity needs and later redistributed to the household
sector must be deduced.
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2. entrepreneurs follow their behavioral rules and the financial intermediary breaks
even;
3. aggregation across agents and sectors as well as among the entrepreneurs ob-
tains, i.e. for a generic variable vE,it belonging to the allocation to entrepreneurs:∫
i
vE,it di = v
E
t ;
4. the financial market as well as the markets for final goods, intermediate goods
and factor inputs clear.
Note that the competitive equilibrium is not efficient due to the entrepreneurial
moral hazard problem that leads to the termination of ex-post efficient projects and
the externality of knowledge on the future productivity of investment projects.
B.4 The responsiveness of corporate liquidity to changes in
the financial rate (H1)
In the following, we demonstrate that the general equilibrium effect of the financial
rate (R˜t) on the corporate provision of liquidity ξˆ
∗
t is negative as summarized in H1.
Therefore, we assume a specific functional form for the distribution of liquidity shocks:
G(ξ) = ξ
1
φ , φ > 0. Hence, in accordance with Aghion et al. (2005), we assume that
the distribution of liquidity shocks is monotonically increasing in ξ.
Moreover, the relative demand for both intermediates given by (2.6) leads to the
following equilibrium condition:
yzt
ykt
= 1−ζ
ζ
(
P zt
Pkt
)−ρ
. If we substitute for the price ratio
by
P zt
Pkt
= A
V
1
R˜t
R ξˆ∗t
0 G(ξ)dξ
from (2.21), we get:
G(ξˆ∗t ) =
1− ζ
ζ
(
A
V
)1−ρ(
R˜t
∫ ξˆ∗t
0
G(ξ)dξ
)ρ
(B.18)
Taking the total derivative of (B.18) and noting that the functional form for the
distribution of liquidity shocks implies that
dG(ξˆ∗t )
dξˆ∗t
ξˆ∗t
G(ξˆ∗t )
= 1
φ
and
d
R ξˆ∗t
0 G(ξ)dξ
dξˆ∗t
ξˆ∗tR ξˆ∗t
0 G(ξ)dξ
=
1+φ
φ
, we obtain:
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dξˆ∗t
dR˜t
=
R˜t
ξˆ∗t
ρφ
1− ρ(1 + φ) < 0 (B.19)
Thus, given that the functional form for the distribution of liquidity shocks is
monotonically increasing in ξ, the general equilibrium provision of corporate liquidity
is decreasing in the nominal financial rate R˜ as stated in H1.
B.5 Construction of the TFP measure
We construct the series of aggregate TFP-growth, as a residual from the human
capital augmented Solow-model.25 We follow the basic specification in Caselli (2005)
who computes TFP levels across countries for the year 1996. That is, we employ the
production function: yt = Atk
α
t h
1−α
t , where A is the level of TFP, y the real GDP
per worker in international dollars, k the physical capital stock per worker and h the
human capital stock per worker. The first measures stem from the Penn World Tables
(PWT) and the latter from Barro and Lee (2001), respectively. The capital stock (K)
is computed with the perpetual inventory method, whereby the depreciation rate (δ)
is set to 6% and the initial capital stock is computed as K0 =
I0
g+δ
. g is the average
geometric growth rate for the investment series between the first year with available
data and 1970.26 The stock of human capital is derived according to Hall and Jones
(1999): h = expφ(s), where s is the average years of schooling in the population
over 25 year old and the function φ(s) is piecewise linear with slope 0.13 for s ≤ 4,
0.10 for 4 < s ≤ 8 and 0.07 for 8 < s. We incorporate a share of private capital
per worker of 1/3 (α = 1/3). Caselli (2005) provides a comprehensive discussion of
various robustness tests to this procedure in a development accounting framework.
He shows that the explanatory power of the TFP-series (2/3) to explain variations in
25The inclusion of various control variables reduces the effective size of the panel to a minimum of
68 countries in some estimations.
26The investment series starts for 54 countries in 1950, for 17 in 1955 and for the remaining 17 in
1960.
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GDP is robust to the inclusion of different measures for the quality of human capital
or different estimation procedures for k.27 Therefore, we follow his basic specification.
We compute the TFP series for 88 countries from 1970-1980. Our TFP-series complies
with Caselli (2005) for 1996. We drop the TFP-measure for the first ten observations
and start the series in 1980 in order to minimize the influence of the initial capital
stock on our results. The rankings of the TFP-measures across countries and years
yield plausible results.28
27We note that this explanatory power decreases significantly if α exceeds 0.5, which, however,
does not comply with existing empirical estimates.
28The five highest (log-) TFP level exhibit Ireland in 2000-1997, respectively, and Italy in 1999.
The 50 lowest TFP-levels are measured in Zaire, Malawi, Romania, Zambia, Rwanda, Lesotho and
China for different time periods, respectively. The complete ranking is available from the authors on
request.
143
C Appendix
C.1 Empirical verification of Assumption 1
We aim to analyze whether the standardized joint distribution of log capital and
log labor, i.e., Gk˜l, changes sufficiently slowly over time, so that it can be regarded
as approximately equal for two 2003 and 2004. In order to answer this question,
we apply a nonparametric kernel-based test of closeness between two distribution
functions as proposed by Li (1996). Under the null hypothesis that two distribu-
tions are equal the test statistic T , which relies on the integrated squared differ-
ence between G2003,k˜l and G2004,k˜l, has a standard normal distribution. However,
the asymptotic distribution of T under the null hypothesis has a slow rate of con-
vergence to the the standard normal distribution. In order to account for this fi-
nite sample bias, we perform the bootstrap procedure to approximate the distribu-
tion of T . We repeat the following procedure B = 500 times: Out of the pooled
sample {(k12003, l12003), . . . , (kn20032003 , ln20032003 ); (k12004, l12004), . . . , (kn20042004 , ln20042004 )} two samples
{(k∗1, l∗1), . . . , (k∗n2003 , l∗n2003) and {(k∗1, l∗1), . . . , (k∗n2004 , l∗n2004) are randomly drawn
with replacement. Then, based on the new samples the test statistic T ∗b is computed.
The empirical distribution of T under the null hypothesis is then estimated from the
sample {T ∗1 , . . . , T ∗B}. The consistency of the bootstrap in this context is proven by Li
et al. (2007). Moreover, bandwidth parameters used for testing were obtained through
the Sheather and Jones (1991) method.
Assumption 1 is well supported by the Amadeus data. The test results for 20
countries are given in Table 6. They indicate that changes in Gk˜l from 2003 to
2004 can be indeed regarded as statistically insignificant for 17 out of 20 countries
in our sample. We reject equality of G2003,k˜l and G2004,k˜l only for Finland, Italy, and
Romania.
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Table C.6: Empirical verification of Assumption 1
country test stat. emp. p-value as. p-value
Austria -1.741 0.950 0.959
Belgium -0.454 0.591 0.675
Bosnia & H. -2.069 0.976 0.981
Bulgaria 0.047 0.456 0.481
Czech R. -1.659 0.922 0.951
Denmark 0.259 0.310 0.398
Estonia -1.231 0.856 0.891
Finland 3.973∗ 0.001 0.000
France -0.193 0.502 0.577
Germany 1.343 0.057 0.090
Great Britain 1.512 0.077 0.065
Italy 12.522∗ 0.000 0.000
Netherlands -1.966 0.951 0.975
Norway -0.565 0.696 0.714
Poland -1.970 0.975 0.976
Portugal -1.889 0.970 0.971
Romania 3.161∗ 0.013 0.001
Slovakia -0.892 0.733 0.814
Spain -1.067 0.823 0.857
Sweden 1.562 0.072 0.059
Apply Li (1996) test for equality of distributions. Asterisks
denote that changes in the (coordinate-wise) standardized
joint distribution of log capital and log labor from 2003
to 2004 were statistically significant at the 5% level.
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C.2 Empirical verification of Assumption 2
Recall that we denote by kt,τ the τ -quantile of the distribution Gt,k and by lt,η the η-
quantile of the distribution Gt,l. We analyze whether for all 0 < τ < 1 and 0 < η < 1
the conditional distribution of attributes given k = kτ and l = lη, i.e., GA|kτ ,lη changed
significantly from 2003 to 2004.
In our analysis Ajt contains company age, industry and regional dummies, inde-
pendence indicators and a dummy for being publicly quoted. Since among these
variables solely the age of a company age is a continuous variable, while veri-
fying Hypothesis 2, we concentrate on the evolution of the conditional distribu-
tion of age, i.e., Gage|kτ lη . We study the evolution this distribution for (τ, η) ∈
{(0.1, 0.1), (0.25, 0.25), (0.5, 0.5), (0.75, 0.75), (0.9, 0.9)}.29 In order to assess the sig-
nificance of changes in Gage|kτ lη from 2003 to 2004 we perform the nonparametric
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, the results of which are given in Table 7. We conclude
that changes over time in Gage|kτ lη at most quantile positions (τ, η) are statistically
significant in only four countries: the Czech Republic, Italy, Romania, and Spain.
Moreover, for Bosnia and Herzegovina, France, Germany, Norway, Portugal, and Slo-
vakia changes in Gage|kτ lη are significant at only one quantile position. Finally, Gage|kτ lη
did not change significantly at any quantile position in the remaining ten countries.
29In fact, when analyzing the evolution of Gt,age|kτ lη we focus on the distribution of firm age for
firms with kjt ∈ [kt,τ−0.025, kt,τ+0.025] and ljt ∈ [lt,η−0.025, lt,η+0.025].
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Table C.7: Test of equality of G2003,age|kτ lη and G2004,age|kτ lη
country τ = η = 0.1 τ = η = 0.25 τ = η = 0.5 τ = η = 0.75 τ = η = 0.9
Austria 0.243 0.107 0.616 0.561 0.862
Belgium 0.794 0.703 0.772 0.416 0.978
Bosnia & H. 0.059 0.058 0.827 0.473 0.003∗
Bulgaria 0.548 0.980 0.730 0.884 0.382
Czech R. 0.011∗ 0.956 0.244 0.028∗ 0.001∗
Denmark 0.952 0.999 0.114 0.808 0.723
Estonia 0.149 0.087 0.595 0.781 0.439
Finland 0.597 0.487 0.124 0.422 0.600
France 0.708 0.825 0.740 0.029∗ 0.996
Germany 0.532 0.032∗ 0.497 0.977 0.853
Great Britain 0.266 0.546 0.215 0.753 0.235
Italy 0.000∗ 0.001∗ 0.000∗ 0.672 0.474
Netherlands 0.876 0.913 0.720 0.879 0.888
Norway 0.116 0.436 0.373 0.064 0.000∗
Poland 0.213 0.083 0.334 0.496 0.998
Portugal 0.499 0.029∗ 0.121 0.768 0.995
Romania 0.000∗ 0.001∗ 0.001∗ 0.000∗ 0.000∗
Slovakia 0.957 0.021∗ 0.649 0.974 0.305
Spain 0.000∗ 0.000∗ 0.020∗ 0.000∗ 0.053
Sweden 0.167 0.679 0.115 0.238 0.464
Apply Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of equality of G2003,age|kτ lη and G2004,age|kτ lη for different
quantile positions τ and η. Asterisks correspond to p-values smaller than 0.05 and indicate
that changes in the distribution were statistically significant at the 5% level.
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C.3 Derivation of the aggregate relation in terms of log K¯ and
log L¯
Let xjt = (k
j
t , l
j
t )
′ denote the observable firm-specific explanatory variables with the
corresponding mean vector x¯t. Further, Σt =
 (σkt )2 σklt
σklt (σ
l
t)
2
 denotes the covari-
ance matrix of xjt across Jt. According to Hildenbrand and Kneip (2005) the growth
rate gt of the aggregate response variable is given by:
gt = β
′
t−1(x¯t − x¯t−1) + tr[∆t−1(Σ1/2t Σ−1/2t−1 − I)] + other effects, (C.1)
where I is the identity matrix, βt−1 = (βkt−1, βlt−1)′ is a vector and ∆t−1 = δkt−1 δklt−1
δklt−1 δ
l
t−1
 is a matrix of coefficients. Under coordinate-wise standardization
(in Assumption 1) Σt is replaced by Σ˜t =
 (σkt )2 0
0 (σlt)
2
 and the first two rhs
terms in (C.1) simplify to:
βkt−1(k¯t − k¯t−1) + βlt−1(l¯t − l¯t−1) + δkt−1(
σkt − σkt−1
σkt−1
) + δlt−1(
σlt − σlt−1
σlt−1
), (C.2)
where
δkt−1 =
1
Y¯t−1
∫
(k − k¯t−1)∂kf¯t−1(k, l, A) dGt−1,klA
and
δlt−1 =
1
Y¯t−1
∫
(l − l¯t−1)∂lf¯t−1(k, l, A) dGt−1,klA.
For the sake of comparability with conventional growth models, we are interested in
a relationship like (C.1) but in terms of changes in aggregate levels K¯ and L¯ rather
than in terms of aggregate log levels k¯ and l¯. More specifically, we want to arrive at
a relationship for the growth rate containing:
βkt−1(log K¯t − log K¯t−1) + βlt−1(log L¯t − log L¯t−1)
We start30 with the definition of log K¯t:
30The derivation for log L¯t can be carried out analogously.
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log K¯t = log
[ ∫
KdGt,K
]
= log
[ ∫
exp(k)dGt,k
]
(C.3)
For two periods t and t− 1 Assumption 1 (Structural stability of Gkl) implies:
Gt−1,k
( σkt
σkt−1
(k − k¯t−1) + k¯t
)
= Gt,k(k)
Hence, we can rewrite (C.3) by:
log K¯t = log
[ ∫
exp
( σkt
σkt−1
(k − k¯t−1) + k¯t
)
dGt−1,k
]
= k¯t + log
[ ∫
exp
( σkt
σkt−1
(k − k¯t−1)
)
dGt−1,l
]
Now, we define a function q from R+ to R such that:
q(σk) := log
[ ∫
exp
( σk
σkt−1
(k − k¯t−1)
)
dGt−1,k
]
By the definition of q we have q(σkt ) = log K¯t− k¯t and simple algebra yields q(σkt−1) =
log K¯t−1 − k¯t−1. From these properties of q it follows that:
k¯t − k¯t−1 = log K¯t − log K¯t−1 − [q(σkt )− q(σkt−1)]
Further, by the first order Taylor approximation of q(σk) at σkt−1 we obtain:
q(σkt ) ≈ q(σkt−1) + ∂σkq(σk)
∣∣
σk=σkt−1
· (σkt − σkt−1)
= q(σkt−1) +
1
σkt−1K¯t−1
∫
(k − k¯t−1) exp(k)dGt−1,k · (σkt − σkt−1)
Consequently,
βkt−1(k¯t−k¯t−1) = βkt−1(log K¯t−log K¯t−1)−
βkt−1
K¯t−1
∫
(k−k¯t−1) exp(k)dGt−1,k·
(σkt − σkt−1
σkt−1
)
.
Doing analogous derivations for log L¯t, we obtain:
gt = β
k
t−1(log K¯t − log K¯t−1) + βlt−1(log L¯t − log L¯t−1)
+ γkt−1
(σkt − σkt−1
σkt−1
)
+ γlt−1
(σlt − σlt−1
σlt−1
)
+ other effects,
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where
γkt−1 = δ
k
t−1 −
βkt−1
K¯t−1
∫
(k − k¯t−1) exp(k)dGt−1,k
and
γlt−1 = δ
l
t−1 −
βlt−1
L¯t−1
∫
(l − l¯t−1) exp(l)dGt−1,l.
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